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COMPARISON OF THE ILLINOIS COMMISSION
REPORT ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT WITH THE
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT SYSTEM IN CALIFORNIA
Robert M. Sanger*
I. INTRODUCTION
On Saturday, January 11, 2003, Governor George H.
Ryan took the historic step of commuting all death sentences
of all prisoners on Illinois' death row to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole.1 In his words, he did so be-
cause:
I must act.
Our capital system is haunted by the demon of error-
error in determining guilt, and error in determining who
among the guilty deserves to die.
Because of all of these reasons today I am commuting the
sentences of all death row inmates.2
California has the largest death row population of any
state in this country,3 more than three and one half times lar-
* Member of the California State Bar. Partner, Sanger & Swysen, Santa
Barbara, California. B.A., University of California, Santa Barbara; J.D., Uni-
versity of California, Los Angeles. Certified Criminal Law Specialist, the State
Bar of California Board of Legal Specialization.
1. Governor George H. Ryan, Speech at the Northwestern University
School of Law (Jan. 11, 2003) [hereinafter Ryan Speech],
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/wrongful/RyanSpeech.htm (last
visited Sept. 18, 2003).
2. Id.
3. According to the official statistics of the California Department of Cor-
rections, there were 622 condemned inmates as of April 9, 2003. See CAL. DEP'T
OF CORRECTIONS, CONDEMNED INMATE LIST SUMMARY, at
http://www.corr.ca.gov/communicationsoffice/capitalpunishmentPDF/2003-04S
ummary.pdf (last visited Aug. 11, 2003) [hereinafter CONDEMNED INMATE
SUMMARY]. There were 608 condemned males almost all of whom were housed
at San Quentin State Prison and 14 condemned females at Chowchilla State
Prison. Id. Texas and Florida follow California with the next largest death row
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ger than that of Illinois when Governor Ryan acted.4 Califor-
nia lawyers, judges, legislators, and voters need to ask: "How
does the California death penalty system compare to that of
Illinois?" Toward that end, this article will compare the sys-
tem in California to the comprehensive study of the Illinois
system conducted by Governor Ryan's blue-ribbon Commis-
sion. The Commission's report identified the shortcomings of
the Illinois death penalty system,' and formed the basis for
the Governor's ultimate decision of commutation.6
populations of 453 and 380, respectively. See NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND
EDUCATION FUND, DEATH Row U.S.A. (Winter 2003) [hereinafter NAACP,
DEATH Row U.S.A.].
4. Governor Ryan commuted the sentences of 167 condemned people, 164
to life without the possibility of parole, and 3 others to conform to the sentences
of their co-defendants. See Jeff Flock, 'Blanket Commutation" Empties Illinois
Death Row, at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/01/11/illinois.death.row/index.html (last visited
Oct. 5, 2003).
5. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, GOvERNOR'S
COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (Apr. 15, 2002),
http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commission-report/index.html (last
visited Aug. 12, 2003) [hereinafter ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT].
6. Other states, prompted in part by Governor Ryan's initial moratorium,
have undertaken studies of their death penalty systems. None, so far, has pro-
duced a report as comprehensive as that of the Illinois Commission. The State
of Connecticut issued its report of its Commission on the Death Penalty on
January 8, 2003. See THE CONNECTICUT COMMISSION ON THE DEATH PENALTY,
STUDY PURSUANT TO PUBLIC ACT NO. 01-151 OF THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH
PENALTY IN CONNECTICUT (Jan. 8, 2003),
http://www.opm.state.ct.us/pdpdl/CDP/DCPFinal-Report-Jan2003.doc. The
Commission was unfunded and was limited to fourteen questions posed by the
legislature. See id. at 4-5, Appendix A. Nevertheless, the Connecticut Com-
mission came to the same conclusions as the Illinois Commission on several is-
sues. See, e.g., id. at 35 (recommending that preliminary decisions to seek the
death penalty be reviewed by a statewide committee comprised of State's Attor-
neys, similar to Illinois recommendation 30), 56-62 (recommending changes to
police procedures to ensure "best practices" in criminal investigations, similar to
Illinois recommendations 1 through 19).
Nevada issued a compilation of recommendations to the legislature prepared
by outside agencies also concurring in many of the recommendations of the Illi-
nois Commission Report. Work Session Document, Legislative Commission'
Subcommittee to Study the Death Penalty and Related DNA Testing (Assembly
Concurrent Resolution No. 3 [File No. 7, Statutes of Nevada 2001 Special Ses-
sion], June 14, 2002),
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/lcb/research/03InterimReports/Bulletin3-05.pdf.
(eliminating "great risk of death to more than one person" as an aggravating
circumstance).
Arizona created a Capital Case Commission, which issued a report critical of
the death penalty process in that state. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
THE STATE OF ARIZONA, CAPITAL CASE COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, 14 (Dec. 31,
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II. THE ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT ON CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT
Illinois Governor George H. Ryan declared a moratorium
on executions in his state on January 31, 2000.' On March 4,
2000, he appointed a special Governor's Commission to study
how the death penalty system in Illinois could be reformed.8
The Governor took this dramatic action because thirteen peo-
ple who had been condemned to Illinois' Death Row were
subsequently determined to be innocent.9
Nevertheless, the Governor made clear in his instructions
to the Commission that it was to study how to reform the
death penalty system, not to debate whether or not the death
penalty should be abolished. 10 The Governor's Executive Or-
der forming the Commission and setting forth its mission
stated:
The Commission, upon concluding its examination and
analysis of the capital punishment process, shall submit to
the Governor a written report detailing its findings and
providing comprehensive advice and recommendations to
the Governor that will further ensure the administration
of capital punishment in the State of Illinois will be fair
and accurate."
Governor Ryan, a Republican, selected members from
across the political spectrum, all of whom were familiar with
Illinois' death penalty system. 2
2002),
http://www.attorneygeneral.state.az.us/CCC/Capital%20Case%2Commission%
20-%20Final%20Report.pdf. Their report, released December 21, 2002, included
a number of recommendations that were in-line with those made by the Illinois
Commission. See, e.g., id. at 15 (recommending audio or video recording of sus-
pect interrogations, similar to Illinois recommendation 4), 17-18 (recommending
minimum competency standards for capital defense counsel, similar to Illinois
recommendations 40 and 42).
7. See Press Release, Governor Ryan Declares Moratorium on Execution,
Will Appoint Commission to Review Capital Punishment System (Jan. 31, 2000)
http://www.state.il.us/gov/press/00/Jan/morat.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2003)
[hereinafter Ryan Press Release].
8. See Exec. Order No. 424 Ill. Reg. 7439 (Mar. 4, 2000), available at 2000
WL 635067.
9. See Ryan Press Release, supra note 7. However, by the time Governor
Ryan' commuted the sentences of the remaining condemned inmates, seventeen
people had been exonerated. See Ryan Speech, supra note 1.
10. See Ryan Press Release, supra note 7.
11. Exec. Order No. 424, supra note 8.
12. Former federal prosecutor and First Assistant Illinois Attorney General,
2003]
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On April 15, 2002, after two years of study, the Illinois
Governor's Commission issued its Report." The Report made
eighty-five specific recommendations for corrections to the Il-
linois death penalty system, backed by 207 pages of analysis
and appended materials. 5 Although discussion of the death
penalty's abolition was not within the mandate of the Com-
mission, after reporting on the various reform recommenda-
tions, the Commissioners stated: "The Commission was
unanimous in the belief that no system, given human nature
and frailties, could ever be devised or constructed that would
work perfectly and guarantee absolutely that no innocent
person is ever again sentenced to death."6
III. KNOWN DEFICIENCIES IN CALIFORNIA'S CAPITAL SYSTEM
The author maintains that at one time California was
perceived to be at the forefront of modern jurisprudence. It
has fallen far from that status, particularly with regard to
Judge Frank McGarr served as the Commission's Chairman. ILLINOIS
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 1. Judge McGarr spent eighteen years on
the federal bench and served as Chief Judge of the Federal District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois between 1981 and 1986. Id. A former member
of the Illinois General Assembly and the United States Congress, Senator Paul
Simon served as Co-Chair. Id. Since he retired from the United States Senate
in 1997, Senator Simon has been a professor at Southern Illinois University and
Director of its Public Policy Institute. Id. Thomas P. Sullivan also served as
Co-Chair. Formerly a United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illi-
nois from 1977 to 1981, Mr. Sullivan is now in private practice at Jenner &
Block. Id. The Commission included six former prosecutors: Judge Frank
McGarr (Chairman), Thomas P. Sullivan (Co-Chair), Former Deputy Governor
Mathew R. Bettenhausen (Member and Executive Director), William J. Martin,
Thomas Needham, and Scott Turow. Id. The Commission also included four
current or former criminal defense attorneys: Kathryn Dobrinic, Rita Fry, Theo-
dore Gottfried, and Andrea Zopp. Id. The Commission also included two cur-
rent or former judges: Judge Frank McGarr (Chairman) and Judge William H.
Webster. Id. The remainder of the committee included Senator Paul Simon
(Co-Chair and former member of the Illinois General Assembly and the United
States Congress), Mike Waller (the elected State's Attorney of Lake County, Il-
linois), Donald Hubert (former President of the Chicago Bar Association), and
Roberto Ramirez (founder of the Jesfis Guadalupe Foundation to financially as-
sist Latino students in pursuit of higher education). Id. Refer to the "Commis-
sion Members" section of the Illinois Commission Report for more information.
Commission Members, ILLINOIS COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, at
http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/memberinfo.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2003).
13. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 1.
14. See id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 207.
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criminal justice issues and specifically with regard to the
death penalty. The Columbia University Liebman study re-
vealed that California has the largest death row population of
any state in the nation." People sentenced to death in Cali-
fornia have to wait four to six years before counsel is ap-
pointed to represent them. In all, condemned people in Cali-
fornia have to wait almost ten years before their direct
appeals and post conviction petitions are heard by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court. 9 Even after that long wait, the court
affirms almost all convictions, no matter what issues are
raised."
A. Problems Identified by San Jose Mercury News
Investigative Reports
Extensive investigative reporting by the San Jose Mer-
cury News has also unearthed disturbing evidence that the
California death penalty system is not functioning.2' Lead re-
17. Liebman et al., A Broken System, Part II: Why There Is So Much Error
in Capital Cases, and What Can Be Done About It, THE JUSTICE PROJECT, Ap-
pendix A (2002), at http://justice.policy.net/cjreform/dpstudyliebman2.pdf (last
visited Aug. 11, 2003).
18. Michael Millman, Director of the California Appellate Project, estimated
the delay at four to five years. Interview with Michael Millman, Director, Cali-
fornia Appellate Project, in Monterey, Cal. (Mar. 1, 2003)[hereinafter Millman
Interview]. The California District Attorneys Association (CDAA) and the
Criminal Justice Legal Foundation issued a report stating that the delay in ap-
pointment of counsel for condemned inmates in California is currently five to six
years. CALIFORNIA DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
LEGAL FOUNDATION, PROSECUTORS PERSPECTIVE ON CALIFORNIA DEATH
PENALTY, at 18 (2003), http://wwwcdaa.org/whitepapers/DPPaper.pdf (last vis-
ited Aug. 11, 2003) [hereinafter CDAA PROSECUTOR'S WHITE PAPER].
19. See Liebman et al., supra note 17, at Appendix A-7.
20. See id. Since the voters removed Chief Justice Rose Bird and two other
Justices in 1986, the California Supreme Court has been even more reluctant to
reverse death sentences. See Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the
Rights/Remedies Split, 88 Va. L.Rev. 1, 62-64 (2002). More recent figures show
a greater disparity in recent years between the low reversal rate in California
state court and the high reversal rate of California cases in federal court. See
Howard Mintz, State, US. Courts at Odds on Sentences: Different Standards
Lead to Reversals, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Apr. 15, 2002,
http://www.bayarea.com/mld/mercurynews/news/special-packages/3067231.htm
(last visited Aug. 11, 2003) [hereinafter Mintz, Different Standards].
21. See Howard Mintz, Death Sentence Reversals Cast Doubt on System:
Courtroom Mistakes Put Executions on Hold, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Apr.
14, 2002,
http://www.bayarea.com/mld/mercurynews/news/special-packages/3062323.htm
(last visited Aug. 11, 2003) [hereinafter Mintz, Courtroom Mistakes]; see also
Mintz, Different Standards, supra note 20; Howard Mintz, Under Fire, Court
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porter Howard Mintz incorporated some of the research of the
Liebman Study and further corroborated it with case studies
from California. "The Mercury News study examined sev-
enty-two California cases reversed by state and federal courts
since 1987 and 150 appeals pending in the federal courts."22
It found that even though California spends more money on
capital cases than other states, its convictions are reversed
because of problems similar to those in other states that
spend less money, such as Alabama or Texas. These prob-
lems include incompetent lawyers, prosecutorial misconduct,
and judicial errors.23
The Mercury News study found no minimum statewide
standards for the qualifications of defense lawyers appointed
to death penalty trials.24 According to the study, the main is-
sue on appeal is the penalty, as opposed to guilt or innocence.
Two-thirds of reversals are reversals of the penalty phase;
and fewer than one-third of those whose sentences were re-
versed on appeal have received the death penalty on re-
mand." The study also found that California conflicts with
the federal courts more than any other state. The California
Supreme Court's reversal rate is 10%, the lowest in the coun-
try, while the federal courts have reversed 62% of the death
sentences affirmed by the California Supreme Court, the
highest rate nationally.26 The combined reversal rate for Cali-
fornia cases, however, is roughly in line with the national av-
erage found in a Columbia University study performed by
Eases Limits on Presenting New Evidence, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, May 2,
2002,
http://www.bayarea.com/mld/mercurynews/news/special-packages/3184491.htm
(last visited Aug. 11, 2003) [hereinafter Mintz, Under Fire].
22. Mintz, Courtroom Mistakes, supra note 21.
23. Id.
24. California has enacted minimum standards for the appointment of
counsel in capital cases on appeal under California Rule of Court 76.6 (effective
Feb. 27, 1998). Condemned people in California must wait nearly ten years be-
fore their direct appeals and post conviction petitions are heard by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court, however. See note 18, supra. Therefore, few if any con-
demned people on California's death row are represented by counsel appointed
under this rule. Similarly, California's minimum standards for the appoint-
ment of trial counsel in capital cases under under California Rule of Court 4.117
became effective on January 1, 2003. Because capital trials typically take be-
tween one and two years to complete, it is unlikely that any of the death row
residents were represented at trial by counsel appointed under this new rule.
25. See Howard Mintz, Courtroom Mistakes, supra note 21.
26. See id.
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James S. Liebman and colleagues."
B. California's Procedures Compare Unfavorably with Those
of Other States
In addition, California's death penalty procedures com-
pare unfavorably with the procedures of other states. In part,
this is because the system introduced in 197728 and re-
introduced in 197829 was not well thought out. Since its en-
actment it has been amended repeatedly, creating a patch-
work of provisions rather than a coherent system." Whatever
the reasons, most other states that impose the death penalty
have checks and balances and procedural safeguards not pre-
sent in California.3 Some of these deficiencies may also vio-
late the Federal Constitution, and they should give Califor-
nians pause to think.32
1. California Law Fails to Narrow the Pool of Death
Eligible Defendants
California's death penalty statute does not meaningfully
narrow the pool of people convicted of murder to a smaller
group eligible for the death penalty.33 As in all states that
have the death penalty, the death penalty is actually imposed
on a small fraction of those who are death eligible. 4 As a
matter of constitutional law, the selection of those who are to
receive the death penalty cannot be capricious; instead, a ra-
27. See Liebman et al., supra note 17, at Appendix A-15.
28. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190-190.4 (West 1977), repealed by
PROPOSITION 7 (Nov. 7, 1978).
29. Known as the Briggs Initiative on the November 7, 1978 general elec-
tion ballot, Proposition 7 repealed and replaced California Penal Code Sections
190, 190.1, 190.2, 190.3, and 190.4, and repealed Penal Code Section 190.26.
30. See Steven F. Shatz & Nina Rivkind, The California Death Penalty
Scheme: Requiem for Furman9 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1283, 1314-17 (1997).
31. Id. at 1316-18.
32. Examples include (1) the failure to narrow the categories of death eligi-
ble murder cases as set forth below, see infra text accompanying notes 33-40; (2)
the failure to have meaningful narrowing factors in aggravation and mitigation,
see text accompanying notes 41-48, infra; (3) the failure to require proof beyond
a reasonable doubt to establish aggravating factors, see infra text accompanying
notes 50-57; and (4) the failure to permit inter-case proportionality review, see
infra text accompanying notes 59-60.
33. See Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 30, at 1283.
34. A meticulous study of California murder cases showed that less than
one in eight (11.4%) of people convicted of death eligible murders receives a
death judgment. See id. at 1332.
2003]
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tional narrowing process is required.35 Purportedly, Califor-
nia narrows the field of death eligible convicts by requiring a
finding of "special circumstances" in addition to simple guilt.36
Those special circumstances are so numerous and so broad,
however, that they encompass nearly every first degree mur-
der.37 There are twenty-five special circumstances under the
35. The Supreme Court of the United States, in Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972), declared the then existing death penalty schemes unconstitu-
tional under the Federal Constitution on the grounds that death was being im-
posed arbitrarily. See id. at 240. The Court has described this process as nar-
rowing. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 341-42 (1992). Before the
United States Supreme Court acted in Furman, the California Supreme Court
had already found the California death penalty system constitutionally flawed.
See People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 899 (Cal. 1972). Chief Justice Wright
concluded that
[C]apital punishment is impermissibly cruel. It degrades and dehu-
manizes all who participate in its processes. It is unnecessary to any
legitimate goal of the state and is incompatible with the dignity of man
and the judicial process. Our conclusion that the death penalty may no
longer be exacted in California consistently with article I, section 6, of
our Constitution is not grounded in sympathy for those who would
commit crimes of violence, but in concern for the society that dimin-
ishes itself whenever it takes the life of one of its members.
Id. The Chief Justice then went on to quote Lord Chancellor Gardiner of the
House of Lords, debating abolition of capital punishment in England:
[W]hen we abolished the punishment for treason that you should be
hanged, and then cut down while still alive, and then disembowelled
while still alive, and then quartered, we did not abolish that
punishment because we sympathized with traitors, but because we
took the view that it was a punishment no longer consistent with our
self respect."
Id. (quoting 268 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates (5th Series) (Lords, 43d Parl.,
First Sess., 1964-1965) (1965) p. 703).
36. See CAL. PENAL CODE §190.2-190.3 (West 2003).
37. California's broad construction of the "felony murder," "lying in wait,"
and other enumerated special circumstancesmeans that more than 84% of con-
victed first degree murderers are statutorily death eligible under the California
statutory scheme. See Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 30, at 1332 ("When juvenile
first degree murderers are excluded from the calculation, the result is that more
than 84% of convicted first degree murderers are statutorily death-eligible un-
der the present California Scheme."). Further in 2000, Proposition 18 changed
the elements of the "lying in wait" special circumstance from one committed
"while lying-in-wait" to one committed "by means of lying-in-wait," the same
standard required for non-capital first degree murder. Cal. Penal Code
§190.2(15) (West 2003); California Secretary of State, Murder.- Special Circum-
stances. Legislative Initiative Amendment. Analysis by Legislative Analyst,
available at
http://primary2000.ss.ca.gov/VoterGuide/Propositions/18analysis.htm (last ac-
cessed Oct. 5, 2003) (describing the changes made by the Proposition to Califor-
nia Penal Code Section 190.2). This change should render the statute unconsti-
tutional, because there is no longer any meaningful way to distinguish between
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current California statutes, many with subsections, rendering
over thirty-six actual circumstances in which capital punish-
ment may be sought.38
One scholarly article has identified seven restricted, theo-
retically possible categories of first degree murder that would
not be capital crimes under the California statute.39 These
seven restricted categories of non-capital murder stand in
contrast to the twenty-five special circumstances making
cases death eligible. Given that some of the narrowing spe-
cial circumstances are so broad, it can hardly be claimed that
they fulfill their constitutionally mandated job of narrowing
at all. The seven exceptions are so restricted that the process
is turned on its head: rather than having almost all murders
ineligible with limited exceptions, almost all murders are
death eligible with limited exceptions."
In the second phase of the narrowing process, the jury
considers whether the aggravating factors outweigh the miti-
gating factors." One aggravating factor, the circumstances of
the crime,42 has been interpreted so broadly that prosecutors
capital and non-capital murder committed by means of lying-in-wait. Further-
more, since "lying-in-wait" requires virtually no "lying" or "waiting," nearly any
intentional homicide can become "death-eligible" first degree murder.
38. California Penal Code section 190.2 has twenty-two subdivisions setting
forth special circumstances. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 2003). In addi-
tion, special circumstances are found in Military and Veterans Code section
1627(a) and in Penal Code sections 37, 128, 219, and 4500, pursuant to Penal
Code section 190.3 . CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE § 1627(a) (West 2003); CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 37, 128, 219, 4500 (West 2003). This figure does not include the "hei-
nous, atrocious, or cruel" special circumstance declared invalid in People v. Su-
perior Court, 647 P.2d. 76 (1982); accord Maynard v. Cartwright 486 U.S. 356
(1988). California Penal Code section 219 is also listed in section 190.2(17)(1) as
a felony special circumstance in conjunction with a conviction for first degree
murder. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(17)(I) (West 2003). Therefore, twenty-one
special circumstances remain under section 190.2, and four additional circum-
stances remaining under section 190.3, totaling twenty-five. See id. However,
if the separate subdivisions of section 190.2(17) are counted, there are thirty-six
special circumstances. If all of the qualifying felonies are counted, there would
be thirty-nine total. Conservatively, California has twenty-five special circum-
stances, and over thirty-six if subsections are counted.
39. See Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 30, at 1324-26.
40. See Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994); Zant v. Stephens,
462 U.S. 862, 875 (1983); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
41. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 2003).
42. See id. § 190.3(a). For portions of the analysis in the text associated
with notes 43-48, and the notes themselves, the author is indebted to the work
of the California Appellate Project and draft briefing collected and prepared by
that office. These arguments have been included in various briefs filed in the
SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW
can argue practically any case warrants the death penalty.
The California Supreme Court has never interpreted this fac-
tor in a way that would make it a narrowing circumstance.
To the contrary, the court has approved the use of this factor
to allow the prosecution to argue that the defendant should
get the death penalty on the grounds that the defendant had
a "hatred of religion, 43 or because three weeks after the crime
the defendant sought to conceal evidence,44 threatened wit-
nesses after his arrest,45 or disposed of the victim's body in a
46
manner that precluded its recovery.
In actual practice, prosecutors throughout California
have argued that the jury could weigh in aggravation almost
every conceivable circumstance of the crime, even those that,
from case to case, are absolutely opposite to each other.47 For
instance, prosecutors have argued that cases were aggravated
and death verdicts should be returned because the victim was
killed (1) in the middle of the night, (2) late at night, (3) early
in the morning, or (4) in the middle of the day. 48 These and
countless other examples demonstrate that no rational nar-
rowing process exists. Therefore, courts impose death sen-
tences based on the unfettered discretion of prosecutors and
jurors.
2. California Lacks Important Procedural
Safeguards
Furthermore, California does not have many of the safe-
California Supreme Court including briefs filed by the author. See, e.g., Appel-
lant's Opening Brief in People v. Turner (No. S009038) (brief on file with the
California Supreme Court); Appellant's Opening Brief in People v. Lewis (No.
S020570) (brief on file with the California Supreme Court). As adapted and ex-
panded here, the author accepts responsibility for any deficiencies.
43. See People v. Nicolaus, 817 P.2d 893, 908 (Cal. 1991).
44. See People v. Walker, 765 P.2d 70, 90 n. 10 (Cal. 1988).
45. See People v. Hardy, 82 P.2d 781, 899 (Cal. 1992).
46. See People v. Bittaker, 774 P.2d 659, 697 n.35 (Cal. 1989).
47. The California Appellate Project assembled a collection of these argu-
ments for inclusion in their amicus brief filed in Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S.
967, 972 (1994). The anomalous results are summarized in Appellant's Opening
Brief in People v. Turner (No. S009038) (brief on file with the California Su-
preme Court).
48. See, e.g., People v. Fauber (No. S005868, RT 5777) (early morning kill-
ings); People v. Bean (No. S004387 RT 4715) (middle of the night killings); Peo-
ple v. Avena (No. S004422 RT 2603-04) (late-night killings); People v. Lucero
(No. S012568RT 4125-26) (middle of the day killing). All briefs are on file with
the California Supreme Court.
[Vol: 44
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guards common to death penalty sentencing schemes in other
states that guard against the arbitrary imposition of death.
In California, juries do not have to make written findings on
the basis for their death verdict.49 Nor do they have to decide
unanimously upon which aggravating circumstances they are
relying." The standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
not required for the proof of aggravating circumstances, nor is
it required for the jury to find that the aggravating circum-
stances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. The jury is
not even required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that
death is the appropriate penalty."' In fact, except as to the ex-
istence of other criminal activity and prior convictions, juries
are not instructed on any burden of proof at all.5'
Twenty-seven states require that factors relied on to im-
pose death in a penalty phase must be proven beyond a rea-
sonable doubt by the prosecution, and three additional states
have related provisions. 3 Only California and Florida fail to
49. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190-191 (West 2003); see also THE COMMITTEE
ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL, OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS
ANGELES COUNTY, CAL., CAL. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL, 8.88 (West 2003)
[hereinafter CALJIC].
50. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 2003); CALIC, supra note 49, at
8.88.
51. CALJIC, supra note 49, at 8.88, in relevant part, instructs the jury:
In weighing of various [aggravating and mitigating] circumstances you
determine under the relevant evidence which penalty is justified and
appropriate considering the totality of the aggravating circumstances
with the totality of the mitigating circumstances. To return a judg-
ment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating cir-
cumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating cir-
cumstances that it warrants death instead of life without the
possibility of parole.
Id.
52. See id. at 8.86; see also People v. Robertson, 655 P.2d 279, 298-300 (Cal.
1982).
53. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55-165 (Michie 1975); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-603
(Michie 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103(d) (repealed 2002); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d)(1)(a) (1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(c) (Harrison
1990); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(h) (Michie 1993); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-
1(f) (West 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(a),(e) (West 1992); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 532.025(3) (Michie 1992); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.3 (West
1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(d), (f), (g) (1957); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-
103 (1993); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.032 (West 2002); MONT. LAWS 154 (2003);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. '175.554(3) (Michie 1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5
(2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-3 (Michie 1990); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2929.04 (Anderson 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.11 (West 1993); 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c)(1)(iii) (West 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(A),
(C) (Law. Co-op 1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-5 (Michie 1988); TENN.
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address the matter statutorily.54
Three states require that the jury must base any death
sentence on a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that death is
the appropriate punishment.55 The supreme court of a fourth
state, Utah, reversed a death judgment because that judg-
ment was based on a standard of proof that was less than
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In contrast, California
does not require that a reasonable doubt standard be used
during any part of the penalty phase, except as to proof of
prior criminality relied upon as an aggravating circum-
stance. Even in that context, the required finding need not
be unanimous."
Unlike other states, California has no requirement of
proportionality review whereby the trial and appellate courts
can compare the nature of the offense and offender to unre-
lated cases or to the cases of co-defendants. In fact, propor-
tionality review is actually prohibited in California. There-
fore, the courts have no means to review individual cases on
the basis that individual defendants are being treated in a
disparate fashion, though non-capital defendants have that
right of review.
CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(f) (1991); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(c)
(Vernon 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(C) (Michie 1990); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 6-2-102(d)(i)(A), (e)(i) (Michie 1992); see also State v. Stewart, 250 N.W.2d
849, 863 (Neb. 1977); State v. Simants, 250 N.W.2d 881, 888-90 (Neb. 1977);
State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338-48 (Ut. 1977).
54. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 921.141-921.142 (West 2003).
55. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-603(a)(3) (Michie 1991); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 10.95.060 (West 1990); see also State v. Goodman, 257 S.E.2d 569, 577
(N.C. 1979).
56. See State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 83-84 (Utah 1982).
57. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 2003); CALJIC, supra note 49, at
8.86.
58. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190-191 (West 2003); CALJIC, supra note 49, at
8.84-8.88.
59. According to the Illinois Commission study, nineteen states provide for
proportionality review: Alabama, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisi-
ana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, and Washington. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at
166.
60. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
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C. Racial Disparities Cast Doubt upon California's Death
Penalty System
Serious racial disparities permeate California's death
penalty system." Recent studies in Pennsylvania and Mary-
land confirm significant racial bias in the death penalty sen-
tencing systems of those states.62 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court Committee found that, "[e]mpirical studies conducted
in Pennsylvania to date demonstrate that, at least in some
counties, race plays a major, if not overwhelming, role in the
imposition of the death penalty."" The Maryland study con-
cluded that, "[o]ffenders who kill white victims, especially if
the offender is black, are significantly and substantially more
likely to be charged with a capital crime."" Although Califor-
nians may think their system is not subject to the same criti-
cism, the preliminary studies show that it is racially biased in
exactly the same way.65 More significantly, since California
has no proportionality review either in the trial courts66 or the
state supreme court, 7 no mechanism exists to bring the issue
of racial bias before the courts of this state.
61. See id. Since the death penalty was re-instituted in California in 1977,
only twelve white defendants were executed for killing blacks while 180 blacks
were executed for killing whites. See NAACP, DEATH Row U.S.A., supra note 3;
see also Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, Race, Region and Death Sentenc-
ingin Illinois, 81 OR. L. REV. 39 (2002).
62. See FINAL REPORT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE
ON RACIAL AND GENDER BIAS IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 218 (2003),
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/Index/Supreme/BiasCmte/FinalReport.pdf [here-
inafter Pennsylvania Report]; PATERNOSTER ET AL., AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF
MARYLAND'S DEATH SENTENCING SYSTEM WITH RESPECT TO THE INFLUENCE OF
RACE AND LEGAL JURISDICTION, FINAL REPORT 36 (2003),
http://justice.policy.net/relatives/21200.pdf. [hereinafter Maryland Report].
63. Pennsylvania Report, supra note 62, at 218.
64. Maryland Report, supra note 62, at 36.
65. A noted sociologist and author of studies on race and the death penalty
in other states, Michael Radelet states that preliminary studies show a signifi-
cant disparity between the race of victim and the race of defendant regarding
those who get sentenced to death in California. Interview with Michael
Radelet, Sociology Professor, University of Colorado, in Gaviota, Cal. (Mar. 2,
2003). Racial minorities convicted of murdering a white person are at least
twice as likely to receive the death penalty as those who murder blacks. See id.
66. The trial judge has no authority to do an inter-case proportionality re-
view. See People v. Marshall, 790 P.2d 676, 692 (Cal. 1990). However the judge
can do an intra-case review to determine if the punishment is proportionate to
the individual defendant's culpability. Id. at 691-92. See also People v. Dillion,
668 P.2d 697 (Cal. 1983).
67. See People v. Lang, 782 P.2d 627, 662 (Cal. 1989).
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D. DNA Evidence Has Exonerated Many Death-row Inmates
There is also good reason to suspect that some of the peo-
ple on California's death row are actually innocent. Approxi-
mately 111 condemned people in this country have been re-
leased from death row since the death penalty was reinstated
in the 1970s." Though DNA testing has exonerated many of
these people, DNA trace evidence is available in only a small
percentage of the cases." Therefore, many innocent people
will never have the opportunity to bring forth scientific evi-
dence of their innocence."
To determine how such injustice occurs, the Institute for
Law and Justice has analyzed twenty-eight cases in which
the defendant was shown conclusively to be innocent.7' The
studies show that most of those cases involved positive identi-
fications or police misconduct." California has not estab-
lished procedures to minimize these wrongful convictions.
Significantly, many California death-row cases have not
been reviewed. Of the approximately 620 people condemned
in California, roughly 140 have no lawyer to represent them
at all. 73 Another 110 have an appellate lawyer but no lawyer
to do the habeas corpus investigation and petition.74 A death
68. According to data compiled by the DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION
CENTER, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innoc.html (last visited Aug. 12,
2003), there have been 111 exonerations since 1973. The California District At-
torney's Association and the conservative Criminal Justice Legal Foundation
concluded that, as of the time of their writing, only thirty-four of these people
were actually innocent. See CDAA PROSECUTOR'S WHITE PAPER, supra note 18,
at vi. Using suspect methodology, they contend-contrary to the Constitu-
tion-that even if acquitted, a person can be deemed "not innocent." For in-
stance, they disagree that Patrick Croy was innocent, even though the jury ac-
quitted him based on self-defense, because he killed a police officer. Id. at vii.
However, it is not necessary to quibble over numbers. Whatever the number of
exonerated people condemned to death, it is a significant number and it reflects
a larger number of condemned people who have not yet been-and some who
will never be-discovered.
69. See Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 277, 278 (2002).
70. See Connors et al., Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by Science: Case
Studies in the Use of DNA Evidence to Establish Innocence After Trial, NIJ
RES. REP. 15 (1996), http://www.ilj.org/infotech/dnaevid.pdf.
71. Id. at 1.
72. Id. at 15.
73. Millman Interview supra, note 18.
74. See id. Since the habeas corpus defense team examines innocence
claims, forty percent (140 without an attorney plus 110 without habeas corpus
representation) of the 620 people presently condemned in California have not
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row inmate must wait approximately four to six years before
the California Supreme Court appoints a lawyer." Further-
more, the California Supreme Court takes approximately ten
years before it considers the direct appeal and state habeas
petition.6 Meaningful review often does not occur until the
case reaches the federal court. 7 As a result, most of the con-
demned people on California's death row have not had a
chance to have their innocence claims advanced or tested.
Given the experience of other states, including Illinois, it
is likely that innocent people have also been condemned to
death in California. Illinois courts have discovered that al-
most ten percent of their death row population were factually
innocent." Since no one knows how many other innocent
people simply had their sentences commuted or, more tragi-
cally, have been executed, ten percent is probably a conserva-
tive figure. 9 California's death row population is approxi-
mately 620.80 If California's rate of wrongful conviction were
the same as Illnois', that would mean that over sixty innocent
people have been condemned to death in California.
E. California's Death Penalty System Conflicts with
International Law
Finally, California's death penalty system does not com-
ply with international law.8 Almost all industrialized nations
yet had anyone begin examining their innocence claims. Once that examination
begins, it can take years before any significant information about those claims
comes to light.
75. See id.; see also CDAA PROSECUTOR'S WHITE PAPER, supra note 18, at
18.
76. See Liebman et al., supra note 17, at Appendix A-7.
77. Id.
78. Since the death penalty was re-instituted in Illinois in the 1970's, there
were seventeen people exonerated. See Ryan Speech, supra note 1. Governor
Ryan commuted the sentences of 165 people, almost all to life in prison without
the possibility of parole. Id. In addition, thirty-three other people condemned
in Illinois have been exonerated since the death penalty was initially estab-
lished in that state. Id.
79. See id. Certainly many of the people who were condemned to death in
Illinois are probably guilty. However, Governor Ryan was not able to ascertain
whether or not all of the remaining condemned 167 people were in fact guilty.
Id.
80. See Millman Interview, supra note 18.
81. See generally ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLDWIDE
PERSPECTIVE (3d ed. 2002). Turkey eliminated the death penalty in August
2002, meaning that there are no European nations which have retained the
death penalty. Id. at 8. The four nations that now account for the most execu-
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have abandoned the death penalty. For instance, the Euro-
pean Union denies admission to a country with the death
penalty." Ninety percent of the world's known executions are
conducted by four nations: China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the
United States."3 Beyond that, the death penalty and the
manner in which California imposes it conflict with numerous
provisions of international treaties and conventions to which
the United States claims to be a party.84
F. Summary
Therefore, as the Columbia University and the San Jose
Mercury News studies show, the system in California is not
working. Compared with constitutional law and procedures
in other jurisdictions, California's system does not contain
even the basic safeguards to avoid capricious, erroneous, and
discriminatory application of the death penalty. A strong
probability exists that dozens of innocent people are awaiting
death on California's death row. Finally, California's system
conflicts with international law. In light of these concerns,
California could benefit from adopting the recommendations
of the Illinois Commission.
tions in the world are China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. Id. at
90-91.
82. Id. at 17; see also DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, THE DEATH
PENALTY: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (summarizing the number of aboli-
tionist countries as of August, 2002), at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=127&scid=30 (last visited Aug.
11, 2003).
83. See HOOD, supra note 81. In 2001, there were 3,048 known executions
in 31 countries, 90% of which took place in China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the
United States. Id. at 89.
84. The International Court of Justice, known as the World Court, has is-
sued orders seeking to halt executions pending in the state of Texas. See Case
Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States),
2003 WL 256903 (I.C.J.) (Jan. 21, 2003). Case information is available at the
International Court of Justice's website at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusframe.htm). The ICJ's provisional order of
02/05/03 is available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusorder/imusjiorder_20030205.PDF. Treaties
which raise issues with this country's use of capital punishment include the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Dec. 9, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment (Convention Against Torture), Dec. 10, 1984,
39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, at 197, the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), 1966, 660 U.N.TS.
195, and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR), 1963, 596
U.N.T.S. 261.
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IV. COMPARISON OF CALIFORNIA WITH THE ILLINOIS
COMMISSION REPORT
Given the deficiences described in Part III, an inquiry
into whether California follows the Illinois Commission's
recommendations will aid in evaluating California's system.
California adopts the Illinois recommendations at a dismal
rate of 6.17%. Far from being a leader in jurisprudence in the
country, California fails miserably when measured against
the standards set by the Illinois Commission.
The Illinois Commission Report tracks the system of
criminal justice in capital cases systematically from the in-
ception of a case to its conclusion.85 The Report acknowledges
numerous flaws, many of which either have resulted in the
conviction of the innocent or are likely to contribute to those
results. 6 The recommendations, for the most part, neither
hamper the conviction of the truly guilty nor place an undue
burden on law enforcement, the courts, or the defense func-
tion.87 Some are simple, common sense measures.88 Others
ultimately save resources by giving a greater assurance that
things will be done right the first time. 9
A. Overall Comparison
Appendix A of this article summarizes the comparison of
the Illinois Commission Report to current California law.9"
85. See generally ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5.
86. Id. at 7-11.
87. See, e.g., id. at 34 (recommending that eyewitnesses should be told that
the suspect may not be present in a lineup, that the witness need not select
anyone from the lineup, and that the witness should not assume that the person
conducting the lineup knows which person in the lineup is the suspect). Id. at
93-101 (recommending initial and particular education, ongoing education, and
minimum educational standards for judges hearing capital cases).
88. See, e.g., id. at 20-21 (recommending that police continue to pursue al-
ternate leads even after acquiring a suspect); id. at 28 (recommending that a
homicide suspect's unrecorded statements to police be repeated back to him or
her on tape and his or her comments recorded).
89. See, e.g., id. at 55-56 (recommending the establishment of minimum
standards for DNA evidence); id. at 56-57 (recommending that the state estab-
lish a comprehensive DNA database); id. at 57-58 (recommending that capital
defendants have an opportunity to conduct a court-ordered search of the DNA
database to identify others who may be guilty of the crime).
90. The Illinois Commission Report is quite specific in its recommendations.
ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 207. Many of the recommenda-
tions are improvements on existing law enforcement procedures or portions of
the existing judicial system. As such, the recommendations should be taken
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The recommendations were determined to be "Met" by cur-
rent California law, "Met with Qualifications," "Not Met,"
"Constitutionally Required," or in one case "Not Applicable."
California does not meet seventy-six of the Recommendations.
It meets three; two other recommendations have been "Met
with Qualifications." Three recommendations are required by
the United States Constitution, as construed by the Supreme
Court. One recommendation is arguably peculiar to Illinois
and will not be compared in this analysis.9'
Therefore, out of eighty-one recommendations that a
state could choose to meet; California does not follow seventy-
six. This renders an adoption rate of 6.17% including the
three recommendations that are "Met" and the two that are
"Met with Qualifications."9 In short, California fails to adopt
the recommendations of the Illinois Governor's Commission.
B. Substantive Comparison
The Illinois Commission studied twelve areas of the
criminal process relating to the conduct of capital cases."
both in letter and spirit to require real and specific reform, not mere rhetorical
compliance.
91. Recommendation 77 "recommend[s] the reauthorization of the Capital
Crimes Litigation Act." Id. at 178-79. California does not have such an act and,
therefore, by definition, California does not adopt the recommendation. This
recommendation is peculiar to Illinois, so it will be deemed inapplicable for the
purpose of this study.
92. A critic of this analysis might argue that California should get "credit"
for complying with the three recommendations which are compelled by the
United States Supreme Court in all states. However, compliance with constitu-
tional requirements rarely requires that the California legislature or courts act
to change its capital punishment system. Therefore, crediting California with
meeting these three recommendations would suggest, erroneously, that the leg-
islature had been more active than they have been in responding to issues un-
derlying the Illinois Commission's findings. Even including these three recom-
mendations, however, California's adoption rate would only be eight of eighty-
four or 9.52%.
93. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496, n.17 (1977) (discussing sta-
tistical significance); see also FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL
ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, 80-177 (2d ed. 2000). This article presents a correla-
tion study of the actual system in California, compared to the recommendations
for the Illinois system. It is not a regression analysis employing a comprehen-
sive statistical database. Nevertheless, the adoption of only 6.17% of the rec-
ommendations in California leads to the conclusion that no meaningful correla-
tion exists between the Illinois recommendations and actual practice in
California.
94. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5. The twelve areas in the
Report are (1) Police and Pre-trial Investigations: Recommendations 1 through
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Starting with an analysis of police procedures, the Commis-
sion studied investigation, pre-trial matters, trials, and sen-
tencing.95 From those areas of study came eighty-two specific
recommendations.96 The Commission concluded with a gen-
eral section in which it made three more recommendations."
Overall, the Commission found that every stage of the crimi-
nal process in Illinois needed serious repair to avoid injustice,
including the ultimate injustice of convicting and executing
innocent people." It concluded that even meeting all of the
recommendations would not eliminate the possibility of exe-
cuting an innocent person.99
This paper compares the California criminal process with
the Illinois recommendations. California has virtually none
of the police practices recommended to promote the integrity
of investigations. These recommended practices are designed
to solve the crime and advance the probability that the real
killer is arrested, prosecuted, and convicted.' As Illinois dis-
covered, unchecked police practices not only condemn inno-
cent people but also leave the real killers free to continue kill-
ing.'
0
As described in Part III, California lists twenty-five spe-
cial circumstances that make a murder death eligible in Cali-
19; (2) DNA and Forensic Testing: Recommendations 20 through 26; (3) Eligibil-
ity for Capital Punishment: Recommendations 27 and 28; (4) Prosecutors Selec-
tion of Cases for Capital Punishment: Recommendations 29 through 31; (5)
Trial Judges: Recommendations 32 through 39; (6) Trial Lawyers: Recommen-
dations 40 through 45; (7) Pretrial Proceedings: Recommendations 46 through
54; (8) The Guilt-Innocence Phase: Recommendations 55 through 59; (9) The
Sentencing Phase: Recommendations 60 through 64; (10) Imposition of Sen-
tence: Recommendations 65 through 69; (11) Proceedings Following Conviction
and Sentence: Recommendations 70 through 75; and (12) Funding: Recommen-
dations 76 through 82. Id.
95. Id. at 19.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 187-200 (describing general Recommendations 83 through 85).
98. Id. at 207.
99. Id.
100. See ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 19.
101. See generally THOMAS FRISBIE & RANDY GARRETT, VICTIMS OF JUSTICE
(1998). This book chronicles the police practices, some well intentioned, some
simply incompetent, and some corrupt, that led to the death sentences of two
innocent men. See generally id. While the police and prosecutors were forcing
the case through the courts and resisting reviews and retrials, the real killer
continued to rape and kill others, including an eight-year-old girl. Id. at 18,
287.
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fornia.'0 ' Many of them have subparts, resulting in over
thirty-six factors. 10 3  The Illinois Commission recommends
that there be five and only five.14 In contrast, the California
system makes virtually any murder death eligible. Arguably,
California does not even comply with the Federal Constitu-
tion on this point.' California is so far out of line with the
Illinois Commission recommendations on narrowing that the
adoption of other recommendations in the Report would still
render California's system fundamentally flawed.' °
Having noted the major differences between California's
system and the Illinois Commission's recommendations, this
paper will take the Illinois Commission Report segment by
segment and compare California's requirements with each
recommendation.
1. Police and Pre-trial In vestigations:
Recommendations I Through 19
California does not meet any of the nineteen recommen-
dations made by the Commission in this category.' 7 In es-
sence, these recommendations are designed to bring police
practices up to minimum requirements in order to avoid false
confessions, misrecollected and misinterpreted events, false
identifications, and contaminated testimony.' They also re-
quire police to receive training on issues that have caused
wrongful convictions and to encourage police practices which
really result in finding the actual perpetrator.' 9
California adopts none of these recommendations. If the
police investigation is a search for the truth, as it should be,
102. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 2003); CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE§ 1627(a) (West 2003); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 37, 128, 219, 4500 (West 2003) (pur-
suant to CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3).
103. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 2003).
104. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 65-80.
105. See Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 30, at 1283.
106. Id. at 1283, 1288; see McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 305 (1987) (the
death penalty cannot be imposed without "rational criteria that narrow the de-
cision maker's judgment."); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 50 (1984) (emphasiz-
ing the importance of the "constitutionally necessary narrowing function of
statutory aggravating circumstances."). See generally, Furman v. Georgia, 480
U.S. 238 (1972) (striking down the death penalty based on the infrequency in
which it was applied).
107. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 19-50.
108. See id. at 19.
109. See id.
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California should implement these recommendations.
Recommendation 1:
After a suspect has been identified, the police should con-
tinue to pursue all reasonable lines of inquiry, whether
these point towards or away from the suspect."°
The Illinois Commission recognized that established re-
search has identified "tunnel vision""' as an impediment to
law enforcement arresting and prosecuting the real crimi-
nal."' At the time of the Commission's study, Illinois released
thirteen wrongfully convicted people from death row."3 For
many of them, the Commission found that "tunnel vision" or
"confirmatory bias" led to the wrongful condemnation."'
California law does not require that police pursue inquir-
ies that point away from the defendant."' The law does not
penalize the prosecution for law enforcement's failure to pur-
sue leads, interview witnesses and collect evidence."'
Recommendation 2:
(a) The police must list on schedules all existing items of
relevant evidence including exculpatory evidence, and
their location.
(b) Record-keeping obligations must be assigned to specific
police officers or employees, who must certify their com-
pliance in writing to the prosecutor.
110. See id. at 20.
111. The Illinois Commission suggests that tunnel vision occurs "where the
belief that a particular suspect has committed a crime often obviates an objec-
tive evaluation of whether there might be others who are actually guilty." Id. at
20. Officers become so convinced that they have arrested the correct person
that they often ignore information pointing in another direction. Id. at 20-21.
112. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 20-21; see also, Stanley
Fisher, The Prosecutor's Ethical Duty to Seek Exculpatory Evidence in Police
Hands: Lessons from England, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1379 (2000).
113. Id. at 20.
114. See id.
115. Part IV of the California Penal Code contains those sections controlling
the detection and apprehension of criminals. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11006-
11010 (West 2003). Nowhere within is there a requirement or direction to look
beyond the first suspect identified. Id.
116. The California Supreme Court has followed the United States Supreme
Court in holding that "unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the
part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not consti-
tute a denial of due process of law." People v. Catlin, 26 P.3d 357, 408 (Cal.
2001) (quoting Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57 (1988)).
122 SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW [Vol: 44
(c) The police must give copies of the schedules to the
prosecution.
(d) The police must give the prosecutor access to all inves-
tigatory materials in their possession."7
The Illinois Commission recognized problems with giving
the prosecutors and the courts the responsibility to document
evidence and ensure that it will be disclosed to the defense."'
Although prosecutors ultimately have that burden, the study
showed that evidence was not being disclosed by law en-
forcement to the prosecutors and, if it was, sometimes not un-
til long after the prosecution was completed."9
California law does not require that police perform the
kind of record keeping recommended. Various police agencies
throughout the state may have their own record keeping re-
quirements, but no statewide standard or standards from
agency to agency within particular counties exist."' Since
county-wide prosecutors and the state-wide Attorney Gen-
eral's Office deal with multiple agencies, no expectation exists
that records will be maintained in a uniform fashion.12
117. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 22.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11006-11010 (West 2003).
121. There are fifty-eight counties and over a thousand cities in the State of
California. California Association of Counties at
http://www.csac.counties.org/counties-close-up/ca-county-map.html. There are
well over a thousand independent law enforcement agencies in this state. Law
Enforcement Agencies at http://www.post.ca.gov/library/other/agency-page.asp.
For instance, in Santa Barbara County, local law enforcement agencies include:
the Santa Barbara County Sheriff; the Santa Barbara Police Department; the
Santa Maria Police Department; the Guadalupe Police Department; the Santa
Barbara Airport Patrol; the Lompoc Police Department; the Santa Barbara
Harbor Patrol; the University of California at Santa Barbara Police; the District
Attorney's Investigator staff; the Santa Barbara County Fire Inspectors; the
Fire Inspectors of the city Fire Departments of Carpinteria, Santa Maria,
Lompoc, Santa Barbara, and Vandenberg; Elder Abuse Investigators; the Santa
Barbara County Probation Department; and, by contract with the Santa Bar-
bara Sheriff, the Goleta Police, the Solvang Police, and the Buellton Police. See
id. Santa Barbara prosecutors may have investigations involving evidence col-
lected by state agencies, such as the Department of Justice Criminalistics
Laboratory, the California Highway Patrol, the Department of Fish and Game,
the State Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement, the State Park Rangers, the
Alcohol Beverage Control, the State Franchise Tax Board, the California
Department of Forestry, the Department of Corrections, the State Fire Marshal,
Department of Motor Vehicles Investigators, State Parole, and several others.
Additional evidence may be collected by other quasi-law enforcement agencies,
such as Child Protective Services, Welfare Fraud Investigators, Child Support
Investigators, the Air Pollution Control District, and various city and county
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Recommendation 3:
In a death eligible case, representation by the public de-
fender during a custodial interrogation should be author-
ized by the [state] legislature when a suspect requests the
advice of counsel, and where there is a reasonable belief
that the suspect is indigent. To the extent that there is
some doubt about the indigency of the suspect, police
should resolve the doubt in favor of allowing the suspectS 122
to have access to the public defender.
The Illinois Commission noted "the inherent coerciveness
of station house interrogations."'23  False confessions have
been documented as a serious factor in the conviction of the
innocent."' The Commission believed that Recommendation
3 would reduce false confessions while imposing relatively lit-
tle financial burden on the system.
12 5
California law does not require a court to provide the
public defender or any counsel for an adult at the time of an
interrogation.'26 If the suspect invokes his or her rights pur-
suant to Miranda,'27 the police are supposed to stop. 12' The
public defender is only appointed for adults at the arraign-
ment.'29 Therefore, invocation of right to counsel by an ar-
restee results in returning the arrestee to custody until ar-
the Air Pollution Control District, and various city and county administrative
agencies. Finally, of course, Santa Barbara prosecutors, like prosecutors from
other counties, depend on evidence collected from agencies in other counties,
special agents, police officers, and inspectors general from the multitude of fed-
eral agencies, as well as agents from other countries and organizations like In-
terpol.
122. Id. at 23.
123. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 24.
124. See generally Richard Ofshe & Richard Leo, The Decision to Confess
Falsely. Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DENV. UNIV. L. REV. 979
(1997).
125. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 24.
126. A public defender or other counsel is appointed when criminal proceed-
ings begin at arraignment. See CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 27706(a) (West 2003); but
see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 625 (West 2003) (right to counsel for a juvenile
at interrogation during temporary detention).
127. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1964).
128. See id. at 437; see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981).
In California, police officers have been trained to continue with the interroga-
tion, because it may provide other leads or be admissible for the purpose of im-
peachment under Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). People v. Neal, 72
P.3d 280, 297 (Cal. 2003) (Baxter J., concurring).
129. See CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 27706(a) (West 2003).
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raignment.' Arrestees often "voluntarily" waive their right
to counsel while awaiting arraignment.
131
California law does not even require law enforcement to
interrupt an interrogation when a lawyer comes to the jail or
station house to see the client.3 ' Some prosecutors argue that
officers may deliberately violate Miranda in order to obtain
confessions that can be used for further investigation and im-
peachment if the defendant testifies.'33 Conflicting case law
exists on this issue.3
Recommendation 4.
Custodial interrogations of a suspect in a homicide case
occurring at a police facility should be videotaped.
Videotaping should not include merely the statement
made by the suspect after interrogation, but the entire
interrogation process.
The Illinois Commission observed that prosecutors some-
times used false confessions to convict people later found to be
innocent.'36 These purported confessions came at the end of
lengthy interrogations."7  The Commission also concluded
that videotaping would help to establish that valid confes-
sions were obtained without physical coercion or undue influ-
ence.
138
California law does not require law enforcement to tape
130. Invocation of Miranda rights simply require the police to stop their in-
terrogations, not to provide the suspect with an attorney. Neal, 72 P.3d at 281.
131. See People v. Williams, 941 P.2d 752, 774 (Cal. 1997).
132. Incredibly, where a lawyer is waiting in the lobby of the police station,
the police may exclude him or her and not even tell the subject that the lawyer
is there. See People v. Ledesma, 204 Cal. App. 3d 682 (1988); People v. Gott,
117 Cal. App. 3d 125, 128-30 (1981).
133. See Neal, 72 P.3d at 297.
134. See People v. Peevy, 953 P.2d 1212 (Cal. 1998) (holding statements
made by a suspect to police officers in deliberate violation of Miranda may be
admitted at trial to challenge the suspect's credibility).; but see Cal. Attorneys
for Criminal Justice v. Butts, 195 F.3d 1039 (Cal. 1999) (holding that officers
who deliberately violated suspects' Miranda rights were potentially civilly liable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for those constitutional violations).
135. Id. at 24.
136. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 24-25.
137. Id. at 25, n.16; see also Gail Johnson, False Confessions and Fundamen-
tal Fairness: The Need for Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations, 6
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 719 (1997).
138. Id. at 24-25.
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record interrogations at all.139 Videotaping does sometimes
occur in practice but is not required. Furthermore, law en-
forcement commonly videotapes only after preliminary dis-
cussions with the defendant have taken place.4 °
Recommendation 5:
Any statements by a homicide suspect which are not re-
corded should be repeated to the suspect on tape, and his
or her comments recorded.1
4 1
The Illinois Commission recognized practical limitations
on videotaping all statements of all suspects, notwithstanding
its recommendation that videotaping be done whenever pos-
sible.' The Commission noted that suspects often make
statements on the way to the police station or when videotap-
ing is not a realistic option.' In such instances, the Commis-
sion recommends that the suspect repeat statements on video
as soon as it is practical.'" Adoption of this recommendation
would not only help avoid false confessions, but also would
help law enforcement document valid confessions.
4 1
California law does not require that law enforcement re-
cord a suspect's statements or specify the manner with which
recording should be conducted. Thus, California does not
adopt this recommendation.
Recommendation 6:
There are circumstances in which videotaping may not be
practical, and some uniform method of recording such in-
terrogations, such as tape recording, should be estab-
lished. Police investigators should carry tape recorders for
use when interviewing suspects in homicide cases outside
the station, and all such interviews should be audio-
taped.
146
The Illinois Commission recommended this as a corollary
to the preceding recommendations. Videotaping aids police in
139. See People v. Neal, 72 P.3d 280, 297 (Cal. 2003) (Baxter J., concurring).
140. See, e.g., Neal, 72 P,3d 280.
141. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 28.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 29.
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preserving statements they believe to be reliable.14 '7 However,
videotaping may be impractical for many interrogations in
the field, especially after a hot pursuit. 1 4  In these situations,
it is important to have a backup method of recording impor-
tant statements that may be used later in court.
149
California law does not require officers to record interro-
gations or carry tape recorders. Many agencies provide their
officers with tape equipment in the field, but there is no state
standard.
Recommendation 7.
The [state] eavesdropping act should be amended to per-
mit police taping of statements without the suspects'
knowledge or consent in order to enable the videotaping
and audio taping of statements as recommended by the
Commission. The amendment should apply only to homi-
cide cases, where the suspect is aware that the person ask-
ing the question is a police oflicer.150
The Illinois Commission recommends that the Illinois
eavesdropping statute be amended to allow surreptitious re-
cording of a suspect's statements of a suspect, but only in
homicide cases where the suspect knows that he or she is
talking to a police officer.'5 '
California follows this recommendation with qualifica-
tions. California Penal Code section 633 allows a blanket ex-
ception to the California "eavesdropping statutes" for law en-
forcement personnel or anyone acting at their direction."1
2
California law meets the goal of allowing greater latitude in
the recording of homicide suspects' statements, but does not
limit surreptitious recording to homicide suspects. 153  Fur-
thermore, California law allows the recording to take place
even if the officer does not identify him or herself as an officer
or even if a non-officer is acting at law enforcement direc-
tion.1
5 4
Not only do exceptions to California's eavesdropping stat-
147. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 29.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See id. (citation omitted).
151. Id. at 29-30.
152. CAL. PENAL CODE § 633 (West 2003).
153. See id.; ILLINOIS COMMISSIONN REPORT, supra note 5, at 29-30.
154. CAL. PENAL CODE § 633 (2003).
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statutes permit greater invasion of privacy than the Illinois
Commission recommends, they may also lead to unreliable
statements. Unaware that he is speaking to an officer, a sus-
pect does not expect that his statements may be used against
him later. For instance, law enforcement often instigates
"cool calls." A civilian witness during a "cool call" may be
asked by the police to call the subject and engage in a conver-
sation for the purpose of eliciting admissions or adoptive ad-
missions. The civilian may draw on his or her relationship
with the subject. The subject, not knowing that the call is in-
sincere, may try to avoid talking about issues relating to
criminal allegations and instead try to maintain the personal
relationship with the civilian. The prosecution at trial may
claim that the failure to deny the allegations is an adoptive
admission.1 5'
Recommendation 8:
The police should electronically record interviews con-
ducted of significant witnesses in homicide cases where it
is reasonably foreseeable that their testimony may be
challenged at trial.1
6
The Illinois Commission found that recording witness
statements was important in order to ensure accurate testi-
mony at trial."7 If the witness's account changes at trial, the
judge and the jury will be able to view the original account on
tape." 8 The Commission found a number of questionable wit-
ness statements in the cases of the thirteen condemned peo-
ple released from death row."9 However, California law does
not require that witness statements be recorded.' °
155. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1221 (2003).
156. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 30.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See People v. Fauber, 831 P.2d 249, 269 (Cal. 1992) (holding that failure
to record the entire interview did not violate the defendant's Fourteenth
Amendment rights to disclosure of exculpatory evidence, nor did it suppress
evidence favorable to the defendant). Because the defendant established only
the possibility that the co-defendant's unrecorded remarks would help him at-
tack the co-defendant's credibility, the Fauber court concluded that the failure
to record did not amount to a loss of material substantial evidence. Id. at 270.
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Recommendation 9."
Police should be required to make a reasonable attempt to
determine the suspect' mental capacity before interroga-
tion, and if a suspect is determined to be mentally re-
tarded, the police should be limited to asking nonleading
questions and prohibited from implying they believe the
• 1 161
suspect is guiltY.
The Illinois Commission found that police need to take
special care when interrogating mentally retarded people "be-
cause they may be inclined to agree with the police version of
events in an effort to seek approval, or may be easily led."6'
Nevertheless, California law does not require that the po-
lice either attempt to determine a suspect's mental capacity
or use appropriate procedures to avoid false confessions. Re-
cent research demonstrates the substantial danger of obtain-
ing false confessions from the mentally retarded, who may
confess falsely even without coercion.'63 California does man-
date police officer training regarding the interrogation of
mentally retarded people;"' however, there are no limitations
as set forth by this recommendation.
Under the Supreme Court's decision in Atkins v. Vir-
ginia,165 states may not execute mentally retarded people.
Nevertheless, the evaluation of the suspect's mental capacity
and the determination of mental retardation are critical at
the earliest stages of the investigation. Individuals with re-
duced mental capacity are likely to give false confessions and
cannot meaningfully assist their counsel, making their de-
fense more difficult.'66 Early determination will help ensure
that defendants' rights are protected, reducing the likelihood
that they will harm their defense or distract police from pur-
suing the real killer.
161. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 30.
162. Id.
163. See Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards
Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 105, 123 (1997).
164. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1315.25(4) (West 2003) (describing training on
appropriate language to use when interacting with mentally ill or developmen-
tally disabled people).
165. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
166. Id. at 320-2 1.
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Recommendation 10:
When practicable, police departments should insure that
the person who conducts the lineup or photospread should
not be aware of which member of the lineup or photo
spread is the suspect.'6'
California law does not require that a lineup or pho-
tospread be conducted "blind.' 68 To the contrary, the investi-
gating officers conducting the identification usually know the
suspect's identity. The Illinois Commission recommends a
"double-blind" procedure, which requires that neither the
administrator nor the witness know in advance who in the
lineup or the photospread is the subject. 6 '
Studies have shown that the investigator conducting a
lineup or photospread can have an effect on the choice made
by the witness.' The Illinois Commission concluded that, "if
the person who administers the lineup or photospread knows
the identity of the suspect, the administrator can consciously
or unconsciously - for example, by eye contact, facial expres-
sion, tone of voice, pauses, verbal exchanges - signal his or
her knowledge of the witness."7' This proposal is critical to
accurate identifications, because it reduces the possibility
that the identifications will be compromised.
Recommendation 11:
(a) Eyewitnesses should be told explicitly that the sus-
pected perpetrator might not be in the the lineup or pho-
tospread, and therefore they should not feel they must
make an identification;
(b) Eyewitnesses should also be told that they should not
167. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 32.
168. Tom Perrotta, Hynes Endorses Double-Blind Police Lineups, N.Y. L.J.,
Dec. 13, 2002, at page 1, col. 3. New Jersey is the only state that conducts dou-
ble blind and sequential lineups. Id. Although not required statewide, Santa
Clara County, California has adopted procedures for both double blind and se-
quential lineups. Id.
169. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 32-33.
170. See generally Wells & Olsen, supra note 69 (reviewing the literature
over the last thirty years). Studies continue to be published regarding this is-
sue. See, e.g., Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54
ANNU. REV. PSYCHOL. 277 (2003); Amy L. Bradfield et al., The Damaging Effect
of Confirming Feedback on the Relation Between Eyewitness Certainty and
Identification Accuracy, 87 J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 112 (2002).
171. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 32.
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assume that the person administeing the lineup or pho-
tospread knows which person is the suspect in the case.1
7 2
The Illinois Commission based this recommendation on
Gary Wells' study of eyewitness identification procedures.'73
Gary Wells found a substantial amount of evidence showing
that false eyewitness identifications are the primary cause of
the conviction of innocent people.74  In such instances, the
eyewitnesses were almost certain that they identified the cor-
rect person."' Their misidentification was often influenced by
outside circumstances.' 6 The United States Department of
Justice commissioned a study which came to the same conclu-
sions.' 7 The DOJ study found that "[e]ven honest well-
meaning witnesses can make errors, such as identifying the
wrong person or failing to identify the perpetrator of the
crime."'78 Based on that evidence, the study outlines proce-
dures similar to the Illinois Commission's to obtain the most
reliable and accurate information from eyewitnesses. '
Since California law does not require a "double-blind"
identification procedure, 80 officers do not give this admoni-
tion. Based on the author's experience, officers in California
may give a version of the admonition, stating that the perpe-
trator may not be in the lineup. California should adopt a
double-blind requirement because it increases the likelihood
that the actual perpetrator will be identified and protects
against any intentional or unintentional outside influence.
Recommendation 12."
If the administrator of the lineup or photospread does not
know who the suspect is, a sequential procedure should be
used, so that the eyewitness views only one lineup mem-
172. Id. at 34.
173. See generally Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures.-
Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603
(1998).
174. Id. at 603, 606-08.
175. Id. at 624.
176. Id.
177. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE,
TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP FOR EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE, EYEWITNESS
EVIDENCE: A GUIDE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, (Oct. 1999) at 2-3, available at
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/178240.pdf.
178. Id. at 1.
179. Id. at 2-3.
180. See Perrotta, supra note 168.
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her or photo at a time and makes a decision (that is the
perpetrator or that is not the perpetrator) regarding each
person before viewing another lineup member or photo.TM
California law does not require that officers conduct
lineup or photospread procedures sequentially."2 The Illinois
Commission referred to scientific studies demonstrating that
a sequential process was more reliable than a process that
places all subjects in front of the witness at once.'83 The
Commission recognized, however, that sequential pho-
tospreads and lineups, without a double-blind procedure pro-
duce a higher rate of mistaken identifications.1
4
California should institute a sequential procedure only if
the procedure is "double-blind," since the risk of false identifi-
cation increases if the administrator knows the suspect's
identity and shows subjects to the witness one at a time.' 85
Recommendation 13:
Suspects should not stand out in the lineup or photo
spread as being different from the distractors, based on
the eyewitness'previous description of the perpetrator, or
based on other factors that would draw attention to the
suspect.1
6
The Illinois Commission specifically recognized that the
distractors, or "fillers," in a lineup or photospread procedure
should resemble the description of the perpetrator, not the
suspect.' 7 In other words, studies show that when the fillers
are chosen to resemble the suspect, the suspect is more likely
to be chosen.'
California law does not dictate the manner in which the
lineup should be constructed. Case law may require suppres-
sion at trial of an unduly suggestive line-up or photospread.' 9
181. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 34.
182. See Perrotta, supra note 168, at page 1, col.3
183. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 39.
184. Id. at 35.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 37.
187. Id.
188. See Wells et al., supra note 173, at 630-35.
189. See Wade v. United States, 388 U.S. 218, 235 (1967) (referring to earlier
studies conducted); see also Bradfield et al., The Damaging Effect of Confiring
Feedback on the Relation Between Eyewitness Certainty and Identification Ac-
curacy, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 112 (2002) (referring to more recent studies
conducted).
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However, California does not comply with the recommenda-
tion to the extent that it requires the distractors be similar to
the description of the person observed rather than to the sus-
pect in custody. In actual practice, officers conducting a pho-
tospread or live line-up procedure usually look for distractors
who resemble the suspect. They either go through "mug"
books for photographs or through the jail for live subjects.
Typically, they take the photo of the actual suspect and try to
find similar people as distractors. Studies show that the sus-
pect then bears a familial resemblance to all of the distractors
even if they do not bear a resemblance to each other.19 ° This
makes it more likely that the suspect will be falsely identi-
fied.9  Also, research shows that a false identification at an
improper line-up or photospread can contaminate the identi-
fying witnesses' testimony.'92
Recommendation 14:
A clear written statement should be made of any state-
ments made by the eyewitness at the time of the identifi-
cation procedure as to his or her confidence that the iden-
tified person is or is not the actual culprit. This statement
should be recorded prior to any feedback by law enforce-
ment personnel.19'
The Illinois Commission found that law enforcement
feedback has a significant effect on the confidence level of
witnesses who then testify before juries.' Scientific studies
show that witnesses who receive positive feedback from the
police will testify that they have more confidence in their
identification.' 9' In addition, these witnesses are more likely
to make stronger claims about their ability to observe the
subject at the scene.'96 This dramatic increase in confidence
occurs even where the eyewitnesses have made totally incor-
rect identifications. 1
9 7
190. Wells et al., supra note 173, at 630-35.
191. See id.; TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP FOR EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE,
EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, 29-30 (Oct. 1999), at
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/178240.pdf.
192. See generally Wells et al., supra note 173.
193. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 37.
194. Id. at 38.
195. See Wells et al., supra note 173, at 635.
196. See id.
197. See id. at 645-36.
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California law does not require officers to make a clear
written record of the statements of eyewitnesses at the time
of the identification procedure, let alone before law enforce-
ment gives any feedback. Since false eyewitness identifica-
tions often account for the conviction of the innocent, the trier
of fact should have accurate information about the confidence
of the eyewitness at the time of an identification procedure.'98
Recommendation 15:
When practicable, the police should videotape lineup pro-
cedures, including the witness' confidence statement.'99
Although the leading study did not recommend videotap-
ing, the Commission unanimously recommended it. Video-
taping requires three synchronized cameras, which would be
expensive. Nevertheless, the Commission concluded that
videotaping would aid in resolving disputes between the de-
fense and prosecution."'
California law does not require that lineup procedures be
videotaped. Videotaping does not necessarily enhance the re-
liability of the lineup results, but it creates a record to review
later, and ensures that participants are more likely to abide
by the rules.
Recommendation 16:
All police who work on homicide cases should receive peri-
odic training in the following areas, and experts on these
subjects should be retained to conduct training and pre-
pare manuals on these topics: (1) The risks of false testi-
mony by in-custody informants (j''ailhouse snitches". (2)
The risks of false testimony by accomplice witnesses. (3)
The dangers of tunnel vision or confirmatory bias. (4) The
risks of wrongful convictions in homicide cases. (5) Police
investigative and interrogation methods. (6) Police inves-
tigating and reporting of exculpatory evidence. (7) Foren-
sic evidence. (8) The risks of false confessions.201
California law does not require that police officers be
trained on these particular issues. Supplemented by the
198. See ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 38.
199. Id. at 39.
200. Id. at 39-40; see People v. Pierce, 290 N.E. 2d 256, 262 (Ill. 1972).
201. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 40.
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Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training
(P.O.S.T.), state law sets forth the training standards."2
Training includes courses on such issues as civil disobedi-
ence, °3 elder abuse, °4 interaction with developmentally dis-
206
abled and mentally ill, 05 high technology crime, sexual as-
sault 07 first aid and CPR, °8 domestic violence,2 stalking,210
sudden infant death,2 ' racial profiling,2"2 gang and drug en-
forcement,213 hate crimes,214 high speed vehicle pursuit, car
cinogenic materials,216 chemical agents,2 7 shotguns and ri-
fles,"1 wiretapping, 19 and disaster response."'
However, the state does not require training on the risks
of false testimony by "jailhouse snitches," the risks of false
testimony by accomplice witnesses, the dangers of tunnel vi-
sion or confirmatory bias, the risks of wrongful convictions in
homicide cases, police investigative and interrogation meth-
ods, police investigation and reporting of exculpatory evi-
dence, forensic evidence, or the risks of false confessions.
Since all of these problems have been demonstrated to con-
tribute to the possibility of a wrongful conviction, police offi-
cers ought to be trained on how to minimize this risk.
Recommendation 17:
Police academies, police agencies and the [state] Depart-
ment of Corrections should include within their training
curricula information on consular rights and the notifica-
tion obligations to be followed during the arrest and de-
202. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 832-832.3 (West 2003).
203. See id. § 13514.5.
204. See id. § 13515.
205. See id, § 13515.25.
206. See id. § 13515.55.
207. Seeid. § 13516.
208. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 13518.
209. Seeid. § 13519.
210. Seeid. § 13519.05.
211. Seeid. § 13519.3.
212. Seeid. § 13519.4.
213. See id. § 13519.5.
214. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 13519.6.
215. See id. § 13519.8.
216. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1797.187 (West 2003).
217. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12403 (West 2003).
218. See id. § 12020(b)(1).
219. See id. § 629.24, repealed by Cal. Stat. 1997.
220. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8607 (West 2003).
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tention of foreign nationals.221
The Illinois Commission recognized Illinois' efforts within
certain agencies to train their officers regarding the require-
ments of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
('CCR").2 2 Nevertheless, the Commission found that "more
consistent efforts ... would serve to protect the rights of for-
eign nationals."
22 3
California law does not require specific training on consu-
lar rights and notifications. In light of the recent attention to
the VCCR,224 police academies and agencies have undoubtedly
discussed consular rights and notifications. A larger, more
diverse state with more law enforcement agencies than Illi-
nois, California would also benefit from more consistent
treatment of foreign nationals.
Recommendation 18:
The [state] Attorney General should remind all law en-
forcement agencies of their notification obligations under
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and under-
take regular reviews of the measures taken by state and
local police to ensure full compliance. This could include
publication of a guide based on the United States State
Department Manual.225
California law now requires advisement of rights under
the VCCR.2 6 The extent to which the VCCR's requirements
have reached the officers and detectives working throughout
all of the law enforcement agencies in California is unknown.
The publication list of the California Attorney General does
not list the VCCR,27 and California does not require regular
221. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 41.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Lisa Adams, Review Sought for Mexicans on Death Row, Sun-Sentinel
(Ft. Lauderdale Fla.), Jan. 10, 2001, at 17A. Amnesty International reported in
August 2001 that there is a disregard for the consular rights of foreign nationals
charged with capital crimes in the United States. United States of America: A
time for Action-Protecting the Consular Rights of Foreign Nationals Facing the
Death Penalty, Amnesty International (Aug. 2001),
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGAMR511062001 (last accessed Oct.
11, 2003).
225. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 42
226. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 834(c) (West 2003).
227. See http://caag.state.ca.us/publications/index.htm (last visited Oct. 11,
2003).
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reviews to ensure compliance with the VCCR.
Recommendation 19."
The statute relating to the [state] Law Enforcement Train-
ing Standards Board should be amended to add police per-
jury (regardless of whether there is a criminal conviction)
as a basis upon which the Board may revoke certification
of a peace officer.228
Noting the existence of agency rules against officer per-
jury,229 the Commission recommended an amendment to the
state statute to make police perjury a basis for revoking certi-
fication, whether or not a conviction resulted.3 °
A police officer who files a false police report commits
perjury under California law. 3' Perjury in a capital case is
itself a capital offense. 32 However, police officers are seldom,
if ever, prosecuted for these offenses. 33 California law does
not revoke a peace officer's P.O.S.T. certificate if the officer
commits perjury. Thus, California does not follow this rec-
ommendation.
2. DNA and Forensic Testing: Recommendations
20 Through 26
The Illinois Commission made seven recommendations
regarding DNA and forensic testing.3 ' California follows only
one, with qualifications. The Commission recommends ade-
quate funding and supervision of DNA and forensic testing
and mandatory minimum state standards. 35 California fol-
lows these recommendations in the sense that it makes funds
available, at the trial court's discretion and within limitations
on appeal, for defense experts and testing. 6 Otherwise, Cali-
fornia does not follow the recommendations.
228. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 42.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 42-43.
231. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 118.1 (West 2003).
232. See id. § 128.
233. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 42.
234. Id. at 51-63.
235. See id.
236. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.9(a) (West 2003).
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Recommendation 20:
An independent state forensic laboratory should be cre-
ated, operated by civilian personnel, with its own budget,
237separate from any police agency or supervision.
The Illinois Commission found that a laboratory truly in-
dependent of law enforcement is critical to promoting confi-
dence, both in the prosecution and the defense, that "results
have been fairly and completely analyzed, and honestly re-
ported."23" The Commission states, "Crime labs should func-
tion as an independent third force in the criminal justice sys-tem." 239
California's state-wide forensic services are provided by
the Bureau of Forensic Services. 210 The bureau is not an in-
dependent agency as the Illinois Commission contemplated,
but is located within the California Department of Justice.24'
Its services are available to "state and local law enforcement
agencies, district attorneys, and the courts," but not to defen-
dants.242
Recommendation 21:
Adequate funding should be provided by the [state] to hire
and train both entry level and supervisory level forensic
scientists to support expansion of DNA testing and
evaluation. Support should also be provided for additional
up-to-date facilities for DNA testing. The state should be
prepared to outsource by sending evidence to private com-
panies for analysis when appropriate.241
The Illinois Commission appreciated the importance of
DNA testing." It also recognized the backlog of requests for
DNA testing throughout the nation.2 45 Even though DNA evi-
dence is relevant to only a small percentage of homicide cases,
testing should be mandated where it may establish innocence.
237. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 52.
238. Id. at 53.
239. Id.
240. See CAL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, The Bureau of Forensic SeMces, at
http://caag.state.ca.us/bfs/index.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2003).
241. See id.
242. See id.
243. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 54-55
244. See id.
245. See id.
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Some funding and outsourcing is available in California,
but not to the extent that this recommendation contemplates.
Various local agencies, many of which are underfunded and
overburdened, perform DNA testing throughout the state.
24 6
Neither state nor local facilities have the capacity to analyze
evidence for the purpose of evaluating innocence claims.
Recommendation 22.'
The Commission supports the [state supreme court rule]
establishing minimum standards for DNA evidence. 47
California law does not set minimum standards for DNA
evidence. The California courts, including the California Su-
preme Court, have dealt with DNA standards on a case-by-
case basis.
4
1
Recommendation 23:
The federal government and the [state] should provide
adequate funding to enable the development of a compre-
hensive DNA database.249
California law provides for a database system25 and has
authorized a DNA database program for missing persons."'
There is also a data collection and data bank program set up
under the direction of the California Attorney General. 5 ' As
the Illinois Commission reported, all fifty states have enacted
similar legislation.53
At the federal level, the United States Congress had not
enacted the proposed Innocence Protection Act; however, the
federal program (CODIS).54 is in place and subject to expan-
246. See, e.g., Alison Soltau, Lab Short on DNA Dough, EXAMINER, July 24,
2002, at http://www.examiner.com/news/default.jsp?story=n.dna.0724w (last
visited Aug. 2, 2003).
247. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 55 (referring to Illinois
State Supreme Court Rule 417).
248. See, e.g., People v. Venegas, 954 P.2d 525 (Cal. 1998).
249. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 56.
250. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 295-295.1 (West 2003).
251. See id. §§ 14250-14251 (providing funding through Jan. 1, 2006).
252. See id. §§ 296-296.2.
253. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 56.
254. CODIS is the FBI's (CO)mbined D(NA) (I)dentification (S)ystem, a data-
base superstructure intended to enable federal, state, and local crime labs to
exchange and compare DNA profiles electronically. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATIONS, THE FBI'S COMBINED DNA INDEX SYSTEM: CODIS, 2 (2000), at
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/brochure.pdf. The federal government currently
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sion.
The Commission recommends adequate funding for these
programs."' If California does not obtain federal funding in
the near future, adequate funding may not be secure. Cali-
fornia is facing a severe budget crisis and programs are being
cut statewide. Meanwhile a backlog of samples still waits
to be tested.
Recommendation 24:
[State] Statutes should be amended to provide that in
capital cases a defendant may apply to the court for an or-
der to obtain a search of the DNA database to identify oth-
ers who may be guilty of the crime.7
California law does not allow a defendant to apply for a
court to order a search of the DNA database. California law
allows a defendant, after he or she has been convicted, to ap-
ply for an order to have DNA testing done.59 This statute
does not apply to defendants in the trial courts and does not
modify the discovery statutes for pre-conviction cases.6 °
Furthermore, the California statute provides that the
DNA data bank information can only be disclosed to and used
by law enforcement. A specific exception allows DNA infor-
mation "of the defendant" to be released to the defendant's at-
torney in compliance with discovery. 1  California does not
follow the Illinois Commission recommendation, which seeks
to ensure that an accused has the ability to potentially exon-
requires that CODIS be supplied with DNA samples from certain classes of fed-
eral offenders. 10 U.S.C. § 1565 (2003) (military personnel convicted of qualify-
ing felony or sexual offenses); 42 U.S.C. § 14135(a) (2003) (anyone convicted of a
qualifying offense who is in the Bureau of Prisons' custody); 42 U.S.C.
§ 14135(b) (2003) (District of Columbia offenders convicted of a qualifying of-
fense). For more information, see the FBI's DNA & Databasing Initiatives bro-
chure (2000), available at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/fbidna.pdf.
255. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 56.
256. Gregg Jones, The Nation, State Needs Fast Billions to Deal with Budget
Crisis, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2002, at Al.
257. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 57.
258. There is an argument that there is a constitutional right to post-
conviction DNA testing. See Seth F. Kreimer & David Rudovsky, Double Helix,
Double Bind: Factual Innocence and Postcon viction DNA Testing, 151 U. PA. L.
REV. 547 (2002).
259. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405 (West 2003).
260. See id. §§ 1054-1054.9; see also id. § 1054.9(e) (regarding the applicabil-
ity of section 1405 to post-conviction cases).
261. See id. § 299.5(f).
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erate him or herself at any stage of the proceedings. 6 '
Recommendation 25:
In capital cases, forensic testing, including DNA testing
pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/116(3), should be permitted where
it has the scientific potential to produce new, noncummu-
lative evidence relevant to the defendant's assertion of ac-
tual innocence, even though the results may not com-
pletely exonerate the defendant.63
California law does not provide the broad access to DNA
testing recommended by the Illinois Commission. The Cali-
fornia statute allows DNA testing of evidence at the defen-
dant's request, but only in post-conviction cases and does not
modify the provisions of discovery for trial cases.2
Recommendation 26:
The provisions governing the Capital Litigation Trust
Fund should be construed broadly so as to provide a
source of funding for forensic testing pursuant to 725
ILCS 5/116(3) when the defendant faces the possibility of
a capital sentence. For noncapital defendants, provisions
should be made for payment of costs of forensic testing for
indignets from sources other than the Capital Litigation
Trust Fund.
265
California follows this recommendation, with qualifica-
tions. California law provides that the state will provide
funds for capital defense at the trial level in cases where the
defendant can show indigence.266 Individual trial court judges
have wide discretion to grant or deny particular requests.
26 7
Furthermore, the California Supreme Court limits funds
available to the defense on direct appeal and habeas corpus
proceedings. 266  The funds available are not sufficient for ex-
262. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 58.
263. Id. at 58-59.
264. California Penal Code section 1405 permits a post-conviction court order
based on a motion and on a showing. CAL PENAL CODE § 1405 (West 2003).
Section 1054.9(e), effective January 1, 2003, makes it clear that section 1405 is
the post-conviction exception to the general discovery rules. Id. § 1054.9.
265. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 60.
266. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.9 (West 2003).
267. See, e.g., People v. Alvarez, 926 P.2d 365, 423 (Cal. 1996).
268. See CAL. SUPREME CT. STATEMENT OF POLICIES REGARDING CASES
ARISING FROM JUDGMENT OF DEATH § 3:2-2.1 (1989).
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pensive procedures or complex cases.269 While prosecutors use
the resources of police investigators, the FBI, and other agen-
cies, defense attorneys must pay for similar services out of
the money provided for defense services.27 ° Private attorneys
sometimes try to subsidize the costs at serious personal risks
to themselves, but the majority cannot afford to make that
choice.2 7' For example, one Alabama lawyer reported that the
cost of defending a capital case exceeded $340,000 and pushed
him into bankruptcy.272
3. Eligibility for Capital Punishment:
Recommendations 27 and 28
The Illinois Commission made two recommendations ad-
dressing the "narrowing" of death eligible cases to a smaller
subset.272 It recommended that there be five and only five cir-
cumstances which would make a murder case death eligible.
In contrast, California has twenty-five special circumstances
which actually break down into more than thirty-six.
2 74
As mentioned above, California's system is so far askew
from the recommendations that this area alone makes our
system a failure. California can hardly claim that it complies
with the Federal Constitutional requirement of a narrow
class of death eligible murder defendants when nearly all
murder cases in California are death eligible.
The point of narrowing is not simply to limit the total
number of death sentences handed down. In fact, only a
small percentage of death eligible cases result in a death sen-
tence. The issue here is whether California has a rational ba-
sis to narrow the class of cases, so that actual death judg-
ments are based on principles and not capriciousness or
prejudice. 17
269. Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Ser-
vices and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 375 (1993). In
California, lawyers are not paid at a rate that is "adequate to attract enough
attorneys to represent all defendants appealing their death sentences." Id. at
375.
270. Id. at 395.
271. Id. at 397.
272. Id.
273. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 65-79.
274. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 2003); CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE
§ 1627(a) (West 2003); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 37, 128, 4500 (West 2003) (pursuant
to section 190.3).
275. See Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994); Zant v. Stephens,
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Recommendation 27."
The current list of 20 eligibility factors should be reduced
to a smaller number.7 6
The Illinois Commission concluded that, "[r]educing the
number of eligibility factors should lead to more uniformity in
the way in which the death penalty is applied in Illinois, and
provide greater clarity in the statute, while retaining capital
punishment for the most heinous of homicides. 77
The Illinois statutory death penalty scheme is quite simi-
lar to California's. The first step in Illinois is to determine if
a homicide case fits into one of the statutory definitions that
would make the defendant death eligible. 78 This is equiva-
lent to a finding of "special circumstances" under California
law. However, like California, Illinois law contains twenty
such eligibility factors some of which are so broad that,
"nearly every first degree murder in Illinois could be eligible
for the death penalty under one theory or another.,179 There-
fore, as in California, there is little rational narrowing.
California currently lists twenty-five separate eligibility
factors called "special circumstances" under California Penal
Code section 190.2 and the additional sections referred to in
section 190.3, many of which have subparts. 8 ° Because these
special circumstances encompass such a broad area, Califor-
nia's statutory scheme does not meaningfully narrow the
class of cases as discussed above.28' Hence, as observed by the
author, death row in California prisons is disproportionately
populated by the poor, the uneducated, those who had poor
representation, the mentally ill, the developmentally dis-
abled, those whose victims were white or prominent, those
462 U.S. 862, 875 (1983); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
276. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 66.
277. Id. at 67.
278. Id. at 65.
279. Id. at 66. The Illinois Commission Report does not discuss an even
greater problem associated with California's law: In California, almost all mur-
ders can be construed to be first degree murder, thereby making the available
pool even larger and the restraints on abuse of discretion, prejudice and caprice
even less meaningful. See Shatz & Rivkin, supra note 30, at 1318.
280. The issue of the breadth of the California statute has been briefed in a
case now pending before the California Supreme Court; the briefs drew heavily
on the fine work of the California Appellate Project. Appellant's Opening Brief
in People v. Turner (No. S009038) (brief on file with the California Supreme
Court).
281. See supra text accompanying note 33-40.
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who suffered child abuse themselves, those from certain geo-
graphic locations, and sometimes the innocent. To reduce
this disparity, California should adopt Recommedation 27.
Recommendation 28:
There should be only five eligibility factors:
(1) The murder of a police officer or firefighter killed in
the performance of his/her offlcial duties, or to prevent the
performance of his/her official duties, or in retaliation for
the performing of his/her ofTicial duties.
(2) The murder of any person (inmate, staff, visitor, etc.),
occurring at a correctional facility.
(3) The murder of two or more persons as set forth in [cur-
rent Illinois law].
(4) The intentional murder of a person involving the inflic-
tion of torture. For the purposes of this section, torture
means the intentional and depraved infliction of extreme
physical pain for a prolonged period of time prior to the
victim's death; depraved means the defendant relished the
infliction of extreme pain upon the victim evidencing de-
basement or perversion or that the defendant evidenced a
sense ofpleasure in the infliction of extreme physical pain.
(5) The murder by a person who is under in vestigation for
or who has been charged with or has been convicted of a
crime which would be a felony under [the] law, of anyone
involved in the investigation, prosecution or defense of
that crime, including, but not limited to, witnesses, jurors,
judges, prosecutors and investigators.28 2
The Illinois Commission identified four policy reasons in
favor of capital punishment: (1) certain crimes, when com-
pared to other first degree murders, are especially heinous
and shocking; (2) certain people have clearly demonstrated a
propensity to murder again; (3) some situations seem to sug-
gest that capital punishment is the only meaningful form of
punishment; and (4) some victims deserve special considera-
tion, because they risk their lives for the sake of public
safety.283 Arriving at the five categories of death eligible
homicides, the Commission reported, "[i]f the death penalty
282. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 67-68.
283. Id. at 69.
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continues to be applied in Illinois, a majority of Commission
members believed that it should be tailored to further these
objectives, while minimizing the opportunities for arbitrary
application of this most severe form of punishment.""
California has virtually no limitation on death eligible
homicides.285 The very act of trying to limit the selection of
death eligible cases begs the question of whether such a list
can be rationally devised at all. If death sentences are im-
posed on irrational criteria, then capital punishment should
be abolished. For instance, if the race of the victim signifi-
cantly influences the ultimate decision to kill a prisoner, few
people would publicly argue that the decision making process
is valid. 86 If we seek to reject race as a significant influence,
we have to agree on rational criteria or agree that capital
punishment cannot remain a part of our society's laws.287
If the selection is to be made, it is noteworthy that four of
the Illinois Commission's five eligibility factors are similar to
existing "special circumstances" in California: murder of a po-
lice officer or firefighter; 88 murder of two or more persons;289
murder involving torture;29 ° and murder of a person involved
in the investigation, prosecution, or defense of a crime by a
person under investigation or a defendant.29' Although not
identical, these four eligibility factors are approximately the
same as ten of the California special circumstances. There-
fore, the Illinois Commission recommendation that its list be
284. Id.
285. See supra text accompanying note 33-40.
286. Nationwide, the death penalty is imposed on an extremely skewed racial
basis. Since the death penalty was re-instituted in 1973, only twelve white de-
fendants were executed for killing blacks while 180 blacks were executed for
killing whites. See NAACP, DEATH Row U.S.A, supra note 3. Preliminary
studies show significant disparity between race of victim and race of defendant
regarding who gets sentenced to death in California. See Interview with Mi-
chael Radelet, supra note 65. Racial minorities convicted of murdering a white
person are at least twice as likely to receive the death penalty as those who
murder blacks. See id.
287. Justice Virginia Long of the New Jersey Supreme Court, in dissent,
stated this fact succinctly: "It is time for the members of this Court to accept
that there is simply no meaningful way to distinguish between one grotesque
murder and another for the purpose of determining why one defendant has been
granted a life sentence and another is awaiting execution." See State v. Tim-
mendequas, 773 A.2d 18, 52 (N.J. 2001) (Long, J., dissenting).
288. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(7)-(9) (West 2003).
289. See id. § 190.2(a)(2)-(3).
290. See id. § 190.2(a)(18).
291. See id. § 190.2(a)(10)-(13).
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limited to five eligibility factors does not include the other fif-
teen to twenty-six special circumstances listed in California.
More importantly, they do not include the most abused and
overbroad categories, "felony murder"29 ' and "by means of ly-
ing in wait."9'
4. Prosecutors' Selection of Cases for Capital
Punishment." Recommendations 29 Through 31
The Illinois Commission made three recommendations
regarding the manner in which prosecutors should select
cases for death.294 The recommendations attempt to create a
rational system under which prosecutors in capital cases se-
lect defendants whose cases meet the theoretically narrowed
category of death-eligibility. Prosecutors would be required
to follow statewide standards, and to articulate their reasons
for choosing particular defendants for death.
California does not have any such standards. Prosecu-
tors are permitted, from county to county, to choose death
cases based on their own criteria or none at all.296 This results
in a wild and unprincipled disparity from county to county,
such that the location of the case can determine the outcome.
Some of California's fifty-eight counties have few or no death
cases at all, while others account for the vast majority of
death row inmates. 97
Recommendation 29:
The [state] attorney general and the [state's prosecutor
association] should adopt recommendations as to the pro-
cedures [prosecutors] should follow in deciding whether or
not to seek the death penalty, but these recommendations
should not have the force of law, or be imposed by court
rule or legislation.
299
The great disparity in filing decisions from county to
292. See id. § 190.2(a)(17).
293. See id. § 190.2(a)(15).
294. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 81-92.
295. Id. at 81.
296. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 26500 (West 2003) (granting prosecutors power over
prosecutions within their jurisdiction). See also People v. Keenan, 758 P.2d
1081, 1097-98 (Cal. 1988) (confirming that prosecutors have discretionary power
to seek the death penalty).
297. See CONDEMNED INMATE SUMMARY, supra note 3.
298. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 82.
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county in California gives rise to a serious geographical de-
nial of equal protection.299 Since California re-instituted the
death penalty in 1977, thirty percent of the condemned in-
mates were sentenced out of Los Angeles County, and signifi-
cant numbers of inmates came from counties with smaller
populations like Riverside, Kern, San Bernardino, Sacra-
mento, San Diego, and Santa Clara. °° On the other hand,
sixteen counties have never imposed the death penalty and
eleven have only done so once.3"' The District Attorney of San
Francisco, Terrence Hallinan, has refused to seek the death
penalty at all, although three condemned people were con-
victed in San Francisco before his term in office began."0
The Illinois Commission found similar geographic dis-
parities within Illinois."3 Even without a sophisticated study,
it is apparent that there is a significant geographical dispar-
ity in California. One way to address this issue, the Commis-
sion found, is to require a statewide protocol, including state-
wide recommendations to guide the local prosecutors.
California leaves local prosecutors the discretion to de-
cide whether or not to allege special circumstances and, if so,
whether to seek the death penalty.0 4 The defense can only
299. The California Supreme Court held that "prosecutorial discretion to se-
lect those eligible cases in which the death penalty will actually be sought does
not in and of itself evidence an arbitrary and capricious capital punishment sys-
tem or offend principles of equal protection, due process, or cruel and/or unusual
punishment." Keenan, 758 P.2d at 1097-98. The fact that a small group of coun-
ties prosecute the majority of capital cases in California indicates unequal
treatment. See CONDEMNED INMATE SUMMARY, supra note 3. The county in
which an individual commits his crime ultimately determines whether he gets
life or death.
300. CONDEMNED INMATE SUMMARY, supra note 3. The California Depart-
ment of Corrections website contains the statistics as of April 9, 2002.
301. Seeid.
302. See The Death Penalty Upheld in San Francisco Robbery, Killing, MET.
NEWS-ENTERPRISE, Dec. 6, 2002. San Francisco District Attorney Hallinan not
only refused to seek the death penalty in his county but also refused to file a
motion to set an execution date in a case predating his taking office. Id. at 3.
The Attorney General of California stepped in and signed the motion. Id.
303. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 82.
304. See People v. Keenan, 758 P.2d 1081, 1109 (Cal. 1988); see also Shatz &
Rivkind, supra note 30, at 1292. Neither the California Code nor the state At-
torney General's office sets forth standards. Prosecutors exercise their discre-
tion to varying degrees, as evidenced by the differing number of convicts that
each county has sent to death row. See generally CONDEMNED INMATE
SUMMARY, supra note 3. A full study of the geographical disparity in the impo-
sition of the death penalty in California should be conducted. However, it is
clear from the raw data derived from the Department of Corrections that a glar-
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challenge that decision on the basis that the prosecutor en-
gaged in intentional and invidious discrimination.3 5 Absent
evidence of such discrimination, the court lacks the pre-trial
jurisdiction to preclude the death penalty in the furtherance
of justice."6
Recommendation 30.
The death penalty sentencing statute should be revised to
include a mandatory review of death eligibility under-
taken by a state-wide review committee. In the absence of
legislative action to make this a mandatory scheme, the
Governor should make a commitment to setting up a vol-
untary review process, supported by the presumption that
the Governor will commute the death sentences of defen-
dants when the prosecutor has not participated in the vol-
untary review process, unless the prosecutor can offer a
compelling explanation, based on exceptional circum-
stances, for the failure to submit the case for review.
The state-wide review committee would be conposed of
five members, four of whom would be prosecutors. The
committee would develop standards to implement the leg-
islative intent of the General Assembly with respect to
death eligible cases. Membership of the committee, its
terms and scope ofpowers are set forth in the commentary
below. °7
As a matter of fundamental Eighth Amendment juris-
prudence, the death penalty may only be imposed if it is im-
posed on a rational basis."' The Supreme Court in Furman v.
Georgia, and subsequent cases, held that it cannot be im-
posed based on random factors, on the basis of race, or on un-
ing disparity exists. See id. (indicating that nineteen counties have not imposed
any death sentences and thirteen more have imposed less than three, while four
have imposed more than forty each. San Francisco, a large metropolitan
county, has imposed only three.). Some of the largest counties have contributed
fewer inmates than much smaller counties (e.g. San Francisco County contrib-
uted three while Kings County contributed four). Id. The denial of equal pro-
tection based on geographical location may raise constitutional issues per the
Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
305. See Keenan, 758 P.2d at 1109.
306. The court cannot use Penal Code section 1385, allowing dismissals in
the furtherance of justice, to preclude the prosecution from seeking the death
penalty by pre-trial order. See People v. Superior Court (Bridgette), 189 Cal.
App. 3d 1649, 1652 (1987).
307. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 84.
308. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972).
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fettered prosecutorial discretion. 9
The Illinois Commission recognized that one means to
help control prosecutorial discretion would be to create a
statewide committee to review death penalty charging deci-
sions.31° Absent such a legislative enactment, the governor
could set up a voluntary review process and commute death
sentences which were not so reviewed.31' This would promote
uniformity and adherence to a set of rational guidelines in se-
lecting death cases.
California law does not require either a statewide com-
mittee to review death eligibility or any presumption flowing
from a failure to participate in a voluntary review process."'
Since the death penalty was re-instituted in 1977, no Califor-
nia governor has commuted a single death sentence.313 The
imposition of the death penalty in California varies depend-
ing on the court's geographical location. Indisputably,
prosecutorial discretion is a major factor."' Yet, there is no
statewide committee to review the decisions. Furthermore,
California's governors have done nothing to remedy the dis-
parity.
Recommendation 31:
The Commission supports [Illinois] Supreme Court Rule
416(c) requiring that the state announce its intention to
seek the death penalty, and the factors to be relied upon,
as soon as practicable but in no event later than 120 days
after arraignm en t. 6
At the time of the Commission's study, the Illinois Su-
309. See id.
310. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 84.
311. Id.
312. CAL. CONST. art 5, § 13. The California Attorney General is the only
person in the state with the power to review decisions of the prosecutor. Id.
313. For the period from 1977 (when the death penalty was re-instituted in
California) until 2002, the Department of Corrections received 717 condemned
inmates. See CAL. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, Death Sentence Status, 1978 to Pre-
sent, (2002),
http://www.cdc.state.ca.us/CommunicationsOffice/CapitalPunishment/deathse
ntencestatus.asp (last visited Aug. 12, 2003). The death sentence was over-
turned in 60 cases, 13 committed suicide, 22 died from other causes, and 10
were executed. Id. The governor did not commute any of the sentences. Id.
314. See supra note 304.
315. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5,
316. Id. at 89.
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preme Court had already issued a rule instituting this rec-
ommendation. As discussed below, defense counsel in Cali-
fornia may not know until almost the day of trial whether the
prosecution intends to seek the death penalty. California law
does not require that the prosecutor announce his or her in-
tention to seek the death penalty in a timely fashion. The
only certain deadline by which the prosecutor must alert the
defense that she or he will seek the death penalty is just be-
fore jury selection begins." ' This requirement exists only be-
cause the defendant has the right to "death-qualify" a jury
where the death penalty is sought."8
The death penalty cannot be imposed in California unless
the prosecution charges and proves one or more special cir-
cumstances.319 If the district attorney files a felony complaint
and information, she or he may allege one or more special cir-
cumstances therein.32 ° If the prosecutor indicts the defendant,
she or he may ask the grand jury to return one or more spe-
cial circumstances.32'
Whether a defendant is arraigned on an information or
an indictment,22 the prosecutor may thereafter amend the ac-
cusatory pleading to allege one or more special circumstances
if evidence was adduced at the preliminary hearing or grand
jury to support them.323
317. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 223 (West 2003).
318. See id. § 223 (West 2003); see also People v. Pike, 372 P.2d 656 (Cal.
1962).
319. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3-.4 (West 2003).
320. See id. § 806.
321. See id. § 952. The cases in which district attorneys commonly seek
grand jury indictments are murder and sex crimes. Some Aspects of the Cali-
fornia Grand Jury System, 8 STAN. L. REV. 631, 644 (1956).
322. For an information, a complaint is filed and a preliminary hearing is
held before a magistrate. The magistrate determines if there is sufficient evi-
dence to hold the defendant to answer. The evidence at the preliminary hearing
may be hearsay and the standard of proof is "probable cause" meaning that
there is a strong suspicion that a crime was committed and that the defendant
committed it. If the defendant is held to answer, the prosecutor then files a
charging document called an "information" in the superior court. The defendant
is then arraigned on the information and proceeds to trial. With an indictment,
the prosecutor goes before a secret grand jury. Neither the suspect nor his or
her counsel are allowed in the grand jury room and usually are not given any
notice that the grand jury has been convened. After hearing the evidence pre-
sented by the prosecutor, the grand jury decides whether to return an indict-
ment. The indictment is then the charging document filed in the superior court
upon which the defendant is arraigned and proceeds to trial.
323. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1009; but see Talamantez v. Superior Court,
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Even where special circumstances are alleged, the defen-
dant still may not be certain that he or she faces the death
penalty. If the prosecutor intends to introduce evidence in
aggravation during the penalty phase, she or he must give
the defendant reasonable notice prior to trial.324 A lack of no-
tice does not mean that the prosecutor will not seek the death
penalty, however, since the notice requirement does not apply
to evidence that will also be used as proof of the offense or
special circumstances. 25 This is likely where, for example,
the prosecutor intends to rely only on the "circumstances of
the crime" aggravating factor.326
Finally, even the district attorney's statement that she or
he will not seek the death penalty is not conclusive. The Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal has held that the Constitution does not
necessarily bar the prosecutor from changing her or his mind
later.327 In Leo v. Superior Court, the California Court of Ap-
peals found that the district attorney's decision did not violate
either the United States or the California Constitution, be-
cause the decision was not random, arbitrary, or capricious.2
The absence of any timely notification requirement under
California law is a serious procedural gap. It is easily reme-
died by compliance with this recommendation.
5. Trial Judges. Recommendations 32 Through 39
The Illinois Commission made eight recommendations
regarding the administration of the trial courts. 29 These rec-
ommendations are designed to increase the level of knowledge
and performance by the judges trying capital cases. They also
provide for more centralized management and oversight.
Recommendation 32.
The [state] supreme court should give consideration to en-
122 Cal. App.3d 629, 633-36 (1981) (suggesting in dicta that amending an in-
dictment to add a special circumstance would change the offense charged in vio-
lation of California Penal Code section 1009).
324. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 2003).
325. See id.
326. See id. § 190.3(a); see also Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 30, at 1293.
327. See Leo v. Superior Court, 179 Cal.App.3d 274, 285 (1986).
328. Id. at 284 (stating that since the trial had not begun, the defendant had
adequate time to prepare a defense as one for a capital offense and, thus, there
was no violation of due process of law).
329. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 93-101.
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couraging the [state administrative office of the courts] to
undertake a concerted effort to educate trial judges
throughout the state in the parameters of the Capital
Crimes Litigation Act and the funding sources availabler .. . 330
for defense of capital cases.
The Illinois Commission recognized that the State of Illi-
nois also had a funding act and that the Illinois Supreme
Court had instituted a training program on capital cases.33'
In fact, the recommendation goes beyond what was in place
both to train on the specific issues of funding and to ensure
that the actual trial judges responsible for funding decision
receive the training.332
California law does not require that judges be educated
specifically on capital case funding issues. Funding for ser-
vices related to defense of capital cases in the trial courts is
established primarily by statute.333 The individual judges de-
termine how much money, if any, will be allowed for any par-
ticular request.334 These judges must determine what kinds of
experts, investigators, and other defense services are appro-
priate in a death penalty case, and how much money should
be allocated to each request.33 ' Furthermore, no mechanism
exists to ensure that the judges responsible for administering
the funds have access to the information they need to make
educated decisions on funding.33 1 Judicial education on fund-
ing issues, as well as other issues related to capital litigation
recommended in Recommendations 36 through 38, is critical
to developing statewide judicial competence in death penalty
cases. It is unrealistic to think that all of the judges from all
the various jurisdictions within the state, rural and urban,
will have the experience and knowledge necessary to rule on
the funding issues related to these complex cases. Certainly,
judges have to exercise judgment in refusing or reducing
some defense requests, but they must also have the training
330. Id. at 93-94.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 94.
333. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.9 (West 2003).
334. See id.
335. See id.
336. California judges are obligated to obtain ongoing judicial education. See
CAL. CT. R. APPENDIX § 970. There are, however, no oversight procedures in
place to ensure that judges meet this oblication or that judges have training in
capital case issues prior to accepting assignment of a capital case.
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and experience in capital litigation necessary to understand
what requests should be granted.
Recommendation 33:
... The [state] supreme court sould be encouraged to un-
dertake more action as outlined in this report to insure
the highest quality training and support are provided to
any judge trying a capital case.
The Commission also supports the revised Committee
Comments to new Supreme Court Rule 43, which contem-
plate that capital case training will occur prior to the time
a judge hears a capital case. The Supreme court should be
encouraged to consider going further and requiring that
331judges be trained before presiding over a capital case.
At the time of the Commission's report, the Illinois Su-
preme Court provided training through the Illinois Judicial
Conference and had specifically established "Capital Litiga-
tion Regional Seminars" for judges who may preside over
death penalty cases. 338 Nevertheless, the Commission unani-
mously recommended that, "the Supreme Court go one step
further and specifically require that judges who are going to
hear capital cases undertake this training prior to hearing
capital cases., 3 9 The Commission determined that this train-
ing is necessary to ensure that judges "understand the pa-
rameters of the Capital Crimes Litigation Act and the fund-
ing sources available for the defense of capital cases" and that
judges hearing capital cases be the most qualified and best
trained. '
California does not require a judge to have any particular
training prior to assignment to a capital case beyond the re-
quirements to pass the bar examination.3 4' The sole qualifica-
tion to become a superior court judge in California is that the
candidate has been a member of the California State Bar for a
period of ten years.342 Even inactive membership can qualify
a candidate.343
337. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 94.
338. Id. at 94-95.
339. Id. at 95.
340. Id.
341. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 15.
342. See id.
343. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6006 (West 2003).
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After judges take the bench, they receive general training
through the auspices of the California Judicial Council.344
Presiding judges of each county are responsible for scheduling
the judges' attendance at schools. 45 The California Standards
of Judicial Administration specify some general requirements
for initial and continuing judicial education. 346 They do not
require education regarding capital litigation.347 However,
they do expound specific educational standards regarding as-
signment to jury trials, family court and juvenile dependency
court.38 Because the issues involved in capital cases are at
least as weighty as those in family or juvenile dependency
court, the Standards of Judicial Administration should also
include specific educational standards for death penalty
cases.
If the judges were all trained on the issues involved in
homicide and death penalty cases, conviction of the innocent
would be less likely, and the results in those cases would be
more reliable. To comply with the letter and the spirit of the
recommendations, judges should be trained, at a minimum,
regarding capital case funding" 9 and on the law of capital liti-
gation.35 ° Judges should also be trained in advance of the
management of the discovery process related to capital litiga-
tion,351 and the legal and evidentiary problems which have led
to conviction of the innocent.352 The latter would include
training regarding the risks of false testimony by in-custody
informants, the risks of false testimony by accomplice wit-
nesses, the dangers of tunnel vision or confirmatory bias, the
risks of wrongful convictions in homicide cases, police investi-
gative and interrogation methods, police investigating and
reporting of exculpatory evidence, forensic evidence, and the
344. See CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 68551 (West 2003).
345. See CAL. CT. R. APPENDIX § 6.603(c)(2).
346. See id.§ 25.1.
347. Id. § 25.2(a). The Center for Judicial Education and Research issues two
chapters in a general workbook on criminal law which relate to death penalty
trials. CJER California Judges Benchguides 98 and 99 (2001). These chapters
are 88 and 86 pages long, respectively.
348. See id. § 25.2.
349. See ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 94 (Recommenda-
tion 32).
350. See id. at 97 (Recommendation 36).
351. See id. at 96 (Recommendation 34).
352. See id. (Recommendation 35).
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risks of false confessions.353
To adopt this recommendation for judicial education
would require that California first implement other substan-
tive changes. For instance, California first would have to en-
act the recommendations pertaining to management of the
discovery process and then institute judicial training regard-
ing it. However, other aspects of the proposed mandatory
training could be instituted immediately such as education on
funding and legal and evidentiary issues which have led to
conviction of the innocent.
Recommendation 34.
In light of the changes in Illinois Supreme Court rules
governing the discovery process in capital cases, the Su-
preme Court should give consideration to ways the Court
can insure that particularized training is provided to trial
judges with respect to implementation of the new rules
governing capital litigation, especially with respect to the
management of the discovery process.35 4
California law does not require individual judges to have
any training on new or existing rules regarding capital litiga-
tion, or any new or existing discovery process. 35  The Illinois
Commission recommended new discovery and pre-trial proce-
dures3 which, if adopted in California, would require addi-
tional training.57 However, a judge without substantial death
penalty case experience would also benefit from training, and
such training would raise the standards of justice and fair-
ness in the individual cases.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 96. (Recommendation 34)
355. See CAL. CT. R. APPENDIX§ 25.1-.3.
356. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 115-21 (Recommenda-
tions 46, 49, 50, and 51).
357. By their terms, many of the Commission's recommendations will imple-
ment procedures not currently required or available in California. See id. (Rec-
ommendations 46 (permitting discovery depositions); 52 (requiring a pre-trial
evidentiary hearing to evaluate the reliability of an in-custody informant); 53
(requiring the court to closely scrutinize any prosecution tactic that might in-
duce an involuntary or untrustworthy confession)). Judges will certainly re-
quire additional training to ensure correct and uniform implementation of these
new procedures.
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Recommendation 35
All judges who are tr4ng capital cases should receive pe-
riodic training in the following areas and experts on these
subjects be retained to conduct training and prepare
training manuals on these topics: (1) The risks of false tes-
timony by in-custody informants ("'ailhouse snitches9; (2)
The risks of false testimony by accomplice witnesses; (3)
The dangers of tunnel vision or confirmatory bias; (4) The
risks of wrongful convictions in homicide cases; (5) Police
investigative and interrogation methods; (6) Police inves-
tigating and reporting of exculpatory evidence; (7) Foren-
sic evidence; and (8) The risks of false confessions.
The Illinois Commission studied the thirteen cases in Il-
linois where people had been released from death row, as well
as a number of scholarly writings and government-sponsored
reports.3 59 Based on its two-year review, the Illinois Commis-
sion concluded that "many of these recommended training
subjects cover areas where capital cases can go painfully
wrong.", O6
California law does not require judges to receive training
on the risks of false testimony by "jailhouse snitches," the
risks of false testimony by accomplice witnesses, the dangers
of tunnel vision or confirmatory bias, the risks of wrongful
convictions in homicide cases, police investigative and inter-
rogation methods, police investigating and reporting of excul-
patory evidence, forensic evidence, or the risks of false confes-
sions.36 '
Recommendation 36:
The Illinois Supreme Court and the Administrative Office
of the Courts should consider development of and provide
sufficient funding for state- wide materials to train judges
in capital cases, and additional staff to provide research
support.
362
The Illinois Commission found that despite Illinois' ex-
358. See id. at 96.
359. Id. at 5-6.
360. Id. at 96.
361. CAL. CT. R. APPENDIX § 25.1-.3. Note that the Center for Judicial Edu-
cation and Research Benchguides 98 and 99, supra note 347, do not cover any of
these topics.
362. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 97.
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tensive effort to improve judicial training, judges handling
death penalty cases needed access to additional resources to
do the job well. 63 The Illinois Commission looked to New Jer-
sey and New York to find examples of effective ways to pro-
vide such access.3" Likewise, California could also increase
judges' access to resources, but needs to take the next step.
Recommendation 36 is actually two recommendations in
one. First, it mandates statewide funding for materials to
train judges in capital litigation. Second, it requires the fund-
ing of additional staff to provide research support.
California trial judges do not have a statewide manual
covering the topics recommended by the Illinois Commission,
and have not been provided with additional staffing for capi-
tal cases.365 Regarding statewide materials, the CJER train-
ing materials include only two brief chapters on capital litiga-
tion.366 Those chapters cover, in outline form, the basics of
death penalty cases, but they barely scratch the surface of
current California law.367 Furthermore, to comply with this
part of the recommendation, the materials should contain in-
formation on other issues under the recommendations which
have not been implemented, such as management of the dis-
covery process and police practices which have yet to be re-
formed.
Regarding provision of research support, there is no pro-
vision in California law for additional court staffing. In order
to comply with this recommendation, the courts would have
to budget resources to provide law clerks or research attor-
neys for judges handling capital cases. This would be of par-
ticular importance to smaller courts or to courts which have a
high volume of capital cases.
Recommendation 37"
The Illinois Supreme Court should consider ways in which
information regarding relevant case law and other re-
sources can be widely disseminated to those trying capital
363. Id.
364. Id at 97-98.
365. Although continuing judicial education is provided for in general, there
are no statutory provisions requiring a capital litigation manual or an increased
support staff for capital cases. See supra text accompanying notes 341-48.
366. See CJER California Judges Benchguides 98 and 99, supra note 347.
367. See id.
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cases, through development of a digest of applicable law
by the Supreme Court and wider publication of the outline
of issues developed by the State Appellate Defender or the
State Appellate Prosecutor and/or Attorney General.1
6 s
The Illinois Commission recommendation contemplates
more than just a summary of the advance sheets.369 Although
it also recommended increased proficiency for death penalty
lawyers, the Commission emphasized that the courts play an
important role in raising the quality of capital trials. 7 '
California does not require that this information be pro-
vided to the judges or lawyers handling capital cases. How-
ever, defense attorneys can get information through the Cali-
fornia Appellate Project. 7' Prosecutors have access to similar
material from the California District Attorney's Association.72
This recommendation suggests that these materials be as-
similated into one form, for distribution by the courts.7
Recommendation 38:
The Illinois Supreme Court, or the chiefjudge of the vari-
ous judicial districts throughout the state, should consider
implementation of a process to certify judges who are
qualified to hear capital cases either by virtue of experi-
ence or training. Trial court judges should be certified as
qualified to hear capital cases based upon completion of
specialized training and based upon their experience in
heaing criminal cases. Only such certified judges should
hear capital cases.
3 7 4
Judges need not be certified in order to hear capital cases
in California. Nothing in California law prevents a judge
with no criminal experience, either as a lawyer or a judge,
from hearing a capital case. The Illinois Commission under-
368. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 98.
369. See id.
370. Id. at 93.
371. Attorneys actively defending a death row inmate can get assistance from
the California Appellate Project's San Francisco office. See generally
CALIFORNIA APPELLATE PROJECT - SAN FRANCISCO, ABOUT CAP, at
http://www.cdaa.org/assoc.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2003) [hereinafter
CALIFORNIA APPELLATE PROJECT].
372. See CALIFORNIA DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S ASSOCIATION, CDAA
ASSOCIATION AND STAFF, at http://www.cdaa.org/assoc.html (last visited Aug.
12, 2003).
373. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 98-99.
374. Id. at 99.
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stated the point when it said, "[mlany problems typically as-
sociated with capital trials can be averted by a trial judge
who is particularly familiar with capital cases."375
Trial lawyers for both the defense and prosecution are all
too familiar with the problems associated with litigating a
complex case before a judge who is not steeped in the proce-
dure, forensics, evidence, and other unique aspects of death
penalty litigation. The litigators should litigate and the judge
should have independent expertise upon which to draw in
managing this life or death litigation.376
Recommendation 39.
The [state] supreme court should consider appointment of
a standing committee of trial judges and/or appellate jus-
tices familiar with capital case management to provide re-
sources to trial judges throughout the state who are re-
377sponsible for trying capital Cases.
California law does not provide for such a standing com-
mittee. The Illinois Supreme Court had already established a
standing Committee on Capital Cases. 7 ' The Commission
suggested that the Committee continue its work analyzing
the death penalty system, but also recommended that the
Committee expand its role throughout the state to act as a re-
source panel for judges handling capital cases.79  A California
standing committee would make resources available to judges
presiding over capital cases, helping to ensure that trial
judges have the latest information available and improving
the uniformity of managing capital sentencing procedures. 8 '
Judges would also benefit from the knowledge of others who
375. Id. at 100.
376. For instance, we expect that Major League Baseball umpires be more
than general sports enthusiasts. We expect that they not only be experts on the
rules of baseball but have experience in calling professional games under pres-
sure. We expect that the umpire will be more qualified when there is more on
the line-the division championship or the World Series, for example. Al-
though the author ordinarily eschews sports metaphors, it is rather compelling
to compare the demand of the public for the best referees in sporting events
with the relative lack of concern for requiring judges with the most relevant ex-
perience when it comes to refereeing a trial in which the loser may be put to
death.
377. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 100.
378. Id.
379. Id at 100-01
380. Id. at 101.
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have experienced similar problems in their cases.3 8 '
6. Trial Lawyers: Recommendations 40 Through 45
The Illinois Commission made six specific recommenda-
tions pertaining to trial lawyers who handle capital cases.382
Recommendations 40 through 45 establish levels of training
and experience for members of the capital bar and assure that
all persons handling capital cases meet them.383 Recommeda-
tion 41 also creates a Capital Litigation Trial Bar.3
Recommendation 40:
The Commission supports new Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 416(d) regarding qualifications for counsel in capital
385
cases.
California law does not establish minimum qualifications
for retained defense counsel or for the prosecuting attorney.386
In California, there are minimum requirements for appointed
defense counsel at trial387 and appointed defense counsel on
direct appeal and habeas corpus,88 but these requirements do
not apply to retained counsel or to the prosecutor.
The American Bar Association has recently revised the
guidelines for defense counsel in capital cases.88 The guide-
lines now apply to all lawyers handling capital cases rather
than just to appointed counsel."' The Illinois Commission
specifically supports the Illinois Supreme Court Rule that
also applies these standards to retained counsel.391 If the goal
is to avoid the conviction of the innocent and ensure fairness
and justice, retained counsel should also meet minimum stan-
381. Id.
382. Id. at 105-14.
383. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 105.
384. Id. at 106-07.
385. Id. at 106.
386. See CAL. R. CT. 4.117 (2003) (establishing qualifications for appointed
trial counsel in capital cases but not for privately retained counsel or prosecu-
tors).
387. Id. R. 76.6.
388. Id. R. 4.117.
389. AM. BAR ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE
OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES (2003) [hereinafter ABA
GUIDELINES FOR APPOINTMENT].
390. Id. at 35.
391. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 106 (quoting Illinois Su-
preme Court Rule 416(d)).
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standards.
California also does not comply with this recommenda-
tion, since it does not set any standards for prosecutors."2
The Illinois Commission found that prosecutorial misconduct
led to over twenty-six percent of reversals in Illinois, and con-
stituted an "error that did not warrant reversal" in a signifi-
cant number of other cases.393 Prosecutorial misconduct also
contributes to appellate reversal of California cases. Cer-
tainly, no prosecutor wants to have a case reversed, particu-
larly a capital case. Mandatory training of prosecutors would
help to reduce the incidence of misconduct. This would help
avoid the unfairness associated with that misconduct and
would also avoid retrials and, on occasion, reversals where re-
trial is barred.
Recommendation 41:
The Commission supports new Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 701(b) which imposes the requirement that those ap-
pearing as lead or co-counsel in a capital case be first ad-
mitted to the Capital Litigation Bar under Rule 714.
California has neither a Capital Litigation Trial Bar nor
a requirement that lead or co-counsel belong to such a bar.
The Illinois Commission noted: "Society as a whole has an
important interest in the fair and just administration of capi-
tal punishment."3 96 Therefore, minimum standards should
apply to "counsel for all capital defendants."397 To accomplish
this goal, California should create a Capital Litigation Trial
Bar, and require counsel to apply for certification to be admit-
ted as a member of the Capital Litigation Trial Bar.
Recommendation 42:
The Commission supports new Illinois Supreme Court
392. CAL. CT. R. 4.117, 76.6.
393. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 105.
394. See, e.g., People v. Batts, 30 Cal. 4th 660 (2003) (overturning a defen-
dant's murder conviction because prosecutor misconduct at the first trial barred
the subsequent retrial); People v. Hill, 17 Cal. 4th 800 (1998) (reversing defen-
dant's multiple convictions-including first degree murder-because prosecu-
tor's misconduct created a poisonous atmosphere that prevented a fair trial).
395. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 107.
396. Id. (quoting SUPREME COURT STANDING COMMITTEE SUPPLEMENTAL
REPORT 7 (Oct. 2000)).
397. Id.
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Rule 714 which imposes requirements on the qualifica-
., 1 398tions of attorneys handling capital cases.
The Illinois Commission recognized that standards will
not eliminate poor advocacy on behalf of death penalty defen-
dants. 99 They conceded that some attorneys who have dem-
onstrated poor advocacy would still have met the minimum
qualifications."' Nevertheless, the Commission recognized
that the minimum standards and continuing education would
have a positive impact.
4 0 1
The Illinois Commission recommendation also allows a
lawyer to sit "third chair" and thereby gain experience in
capital litigation.4 2 There is also a procedure for a waiver of
the strict qualifications if a particular lawyer warrants ad-
mission despite a lack of compliance with the minimum quali-
fications.03
Recommendation 43:
The office of the State Appellate Defender should facilitate
the dissemination of information with respect to defense
counsel qualified under the proposed Supreme Court proc-
404
ess.
California law does not require that the State Public De-
fender participate in locating qualified counsel around the
state. The California Appellate Project does work with the
California Supreme Court in locating qualified counsel for
appointment to direct appeals and habeas corpus proceedings
in capital cases.4 " There is no centralized process to qualify
trial counsel, however. The Commission found that the State
Appellate Defender should take this action because the state's
new certification rules created practical concerns about the
availability of qualified local counsel for capital defendants
tried in small counties. 6 While California does not have cer-
tification rules for the trial level, the rational underlying the
398. Id. at 108.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 108.
402. Id. at 109.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 110.
405. See CALIFORNIA APPELLATE PROJECT, supra note 371.
406. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 110.
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recommendation is applicable. California has many small
counties where qualified local counsel may be difficult to find.
Recommendation 44."
The commission supports efforts to have training for
prosecutors and defenders in capital litigation, and to
have funding provided to insure that training programs
continue to be of the highest quality.4 7
The Illinois Commission recommended that the training
be mandatory for both prosecution and defense lawyers. °8 In
addition the Commission recommended that the training be
of the highest quality and adequately funded.4 9  California
does not meet this recommendation because capital case
training is not mandatory. Based on the author's observa-
tions, lawyers can take on death penalty cases in California
without any formal training in capital cases. Without public
funding and mandatory attendance; however, many lawyers
on both sides handle death penalty cases without adequate
training.410
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. While private lawyers can sometimes devote more time than some pub-
lic defenders, given the extraordinary demands of the public defender caseload,
private lawyers do not necessarily have more training or experience than public
defenders. In fact, sometimes the decision to hire a private lawyer in lieu of a
public defender can be disastrous. As Justice Gardner of the California Court of
Appeal said in People v. Huffman, 71 Cal. App. 3d 63, 70 fn.2 (1977):
"It is an odd phenomenon familiar to all trial judges who handle ar-
raignment calendars that some criminal defendants have a deep dis-
trust for the public defender. This erupts from time to time in savage
abuse to these long-suffering but dedicated lawyers. It is almost a tru-
ism that a criminal defendant would rather have the most inept private
counsel than the most skilled and capable public defender. Often the
arraigning judge appoints the public defender only to watch in silent
horror as the defendant's family, having hocked the family jewels, hire
a lawyer for him, sometimes a marginal misfit who is allowed to repre-
sent him only because of some ghastly mistake on the part of the Bar
Examiners...."
A recent example of this phenomenon involved a lawyer, already being sued by
other clients and under investigation by the State Bar, who convinced family
members of a defendant to hire her on a death penalty case. She had only been
practicing for two years and had no capital experience. After the death verdict,
she resigned from the State Bar with investigations pending. See People v.
Ryan Hoyt, Santa Barbara Superior Court Case Number 1014465, wherein the
author was substituted in to attempt to obtain a new trial; the appeal is pend-
ing before the California Supreme Court, number to be assigned.
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California law does not provide such funding. In recent
years, the Habeas Corpus Resource Center, the Office of the
State Public Defender, and the California Appellate Project
provide some training for defense lawyers. Private organiza-
tions, such as The California Public Defenders Association
and the California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, provide
most of the extensive training sessions which are available to
capital case defense lawyers.411 The California District Attor-
ney's Association provides training for prosecutors. Atten-
dees at these training sessions must pay their own way or be
reimbursed by their employers. However, employers may not
have the budget to reimburse their employees. In addition,
employees take these training courses at their own election;
nothing requires that they be trained on capital litigation.
Recommendation 45.
All prosecutors and defense lawyers who are members of
the Capital Trial Bar who are trying capital cases should
receive peiodic training in the following areas and ex-
perts on these subjects should be retained to conduct
training and prepare manuals on these topics: (1) The
risks of false testimony by in-custody informants (Yail-
house snitches'; (2) The risks of false testimony by ac-
complice witnesses; (3) The dangers of tunnel vision or
confirmatory bias; (4) The risks of wrongful convictions in
homicide cases; (5) Police investigative and interrogation
methods; (6) Police investigating and reporting of exculpa-
tory evidence; (7) Forensic evidence; and (8) The risks of
false confessions. 412
The Illinois Commission recommended that police and
judges also receive this training."3 The Commission made the
point that based on its extensive study, these problems recur
411. Each year CACJ, along with the California Public Defenders
Association, co-sponsors the Capital Case Defense Seminar in Monterey, during
the President's Day Weekend in February. The four-day program is an
intensive educational opportunity for those involved in death penalty defense
and it includes lectures, plenary sessions, and specialized workshops. With the
2001 seminar attendance topping 1,200, the CACJ/CPDA Capital Case Defense
Seminar is the largest of its type held in the nation. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA
ATTORNEYS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, SEMINARS, at
http://www.cacj.org/seminars.htm (last visited Aug. 6, 2003).
412. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 111.
413. See id. at 39, 96 (describing the Commission's Recommendation 16, re-
garding police, and Recommendation 35, regarding judges).
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in capital cases and lead to injustice.414 It also emphasized
that both the defense and the prosecution should be aware of
these pitfalls.415 California has no such requirement.
7 Pretrial Proceedings: Recommendations
46 Through 54
The Illinois Commission made nine recommendations
pertaining to pre-trial proceedings in capital cases. 16 The
Commission identfied a number of procedures which will en-
sure that a defendant and his or her counsel are fully in-
formed, have notice in order to defend, and can prepare to go
to trial or fairly enter a non-capital plea if it is available.1 7
Recommendation 46:
The Commission supports new Illinois Supreme Court
rule 416(e) which permits discovery depositions in capital
418
cases on leave of the court for good cause.
The Illinois Commission concluded that discovery deposi-
tions simply permit both sides to hear critical evidence before
a trial.4 9  The Commission echoed the Illinois Supreme
Court's conclusion that pre-trial discovery procedures provide
an extra step toward a fair trial, and that it is better for all
concerned, including witnesses, victims, and survivors, to do
it right the first time rather than having everyone endure a
second trial.
California law does not permit discovery depositions in
capital cases. California has a limited provision for a condi-
tional examination where a witness may become unavail-
able,42' but this is not a discovery deposition. California
414. Id. at 105, 111.
415. Id. at 111.
416. Id. at 115-26.
417. Id. at 115.
418. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 115.
419. Id. at 116-17 (quoting the Illinois Supreme Court Committee).
420. Id.
421. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1335-1345 (West 2003).
422. A conditional examination can only be taken if the witness is in danger
of becoming unavailable as a witness. The Sixth and the Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the United Sates Constitution require that the state make a "good
faith effort to obtain [the witness's] presence at trial." Barber v. Page, 390 U.S.
719 (1968). The Court emphasized the importance of confrontation and cross-
examination before the "contemporaneous trier of fact." Id. California cases
have further emphasized that transcript testimony, of which a conditional ex-
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used to have a liberal preliminary examination procedure
that allowed broad cross-examination of prosecution wit-
nesses and allowed the defense to depose witnesses.4"3 The
law was amended by initiative,4 24 however, to allow the prose-
cution to introduce police officer hearsay testimony in lieu of
live witnesses4 25 and to prevent the defense from deposing
most witnesses.426 This latter provision expressly states that
the preliminary hearing "shall not be used for the purposes of
discovery" and that the section "shall not be construed to
compel or authorize the taking of depositions of witnesses. 427
In addition, many capital cases are indicted before the grand
jury where the defense counsel has no opportunity for partici-
pation at all.428
An opportunity to evaluate the live testimony of critical
witnesses prior to trial is invaluable to both the prosecution
and the defense. Prior to Proposition 115, when California al-
lowed full preliminary hearings, both sides to the case had an
opportunity to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the
witness before trial. This made it easier and more meaning-
ful to discuss pre-trial disposition of a case. It also allowed
the prosecution to better evaluate the charging decision at the
information stage.
Discovery depositions would accomplish much the same
purpose. Both sides would have an opportunity to evaluate
the strengths and weaknesses of testimony after it was sub-
jected to cross-examination. Defense lawyers could be better
prepared, and both the defense and the prosecution could de-
amination is one form, can only be used after due diligence is exercised to bring
the live witness before the court by interstate process, People v. Jones 89
Cal.Rptr. 661 (1970); People v. Blackwood 188 Cal.Rptr. 359 (1983), or even by
international law, People v. St. Germain, 187 Cal.Rptr. 915 (1982) (requiring
the party to use federal law to obtain the attendance of a witness who is a na-
tional or resident of the United States who is presently in a foreign country).
Therefore, the use of conditional examinations is greatly limited.
Conditional examinations are limited to questions and answers which would be
admissible at trial. Discovery depositions, on the other hand, allow direct and
cross-examination of a witness in a fashion calculated to lead to the discovery of
relevant evidence.
423. CAL. PENAL CODE § 866 (West 1983), amended by Cal. Proposition 115
(1990).
424. Cal. Proposition 115 (1990).
425. CAL. PENAL CODE § 872(b) (West 2003).
426. Id. § 866.
427. Id. § 866(b)-(c).
428. Id. §§ 888-92.
2003]
SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW
tect false accusations and perjured testimony before trial.
Recommendation 47:
The Commission supports the provisions of the new Illi-
nois Supreme Court rule 416(1) mandating case manage-
ment conferences in capital cases.
The Illinois Supreme Court should consider adoption of a
rule requiring a final case management conference in
capital cases to insure that there has been compliance
with the newly mandated rules, that discovery is complete
and that the case is fully prepared for trial.4 2 9
The Illinois Commission observed:
The trial judge has ultimate responsibility for ensuring
that the trial moves at an appropriate pace and that deci-
sions are fairly made. The trial judge is the person respon-
sible for managing the conduct of both the prosecution and
defense before the jury, and supervising the overall con-
duct of the trial to ensure that a fair and just result is ob-
tained. A great many problems can be avoided by active
410and interested judicial management.
California law does not mandate case management con-
ferences which ensure compliance with discovery rules. In
fact, California law has been amended over recent years to
reduce judicial supervision of discovery procedures. 3 ' A false
economy exists in allowing the courts to withdraw from su-
pervising discovery issues rather than affirmatively insuring
compliance. Failure to resolve discovery disputes early on re-
sults in even greater expenditure of judicial resources on ap-
peal.432
Recommendation 48.
The Commission supports Illinois Supreme Court Rule
416(g), which requires that a certificate be filed by the
state indicating that a conference has been held with all
those persons who participated in the investigation or trial
preparation of the case, and that all the information re-
429. Id. at 117.
430. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 117.
431. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1054-1054.9 (West 2003).
432. See Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?" An Eco-
nomic Analysis of the Justifications for Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 429,450 (2001).
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quired to be disclosed has been disclosed.433
The Illinois Commission reviewed cases where informa-
tion was not disclosed to the defense,434 and found that "[t]he
omission of key information, regardless of whether inten-
tional or accidental, can pose a serious threat to the truth-
seeking process."4 5 The Illinois Commission had before it one
of the truly tragic examples of a "tunnel vision" prosecution,
where prosecutors did not turn over exculpatory evidence be-
cause of their desire to win.4" They prevailed at trial and Ro-
lando Cruz received a death sentence.4 "7 They tried the case
three times and Mr. Cruz spent years on death row. 38 In the
end, the prosecutors were wrong. Mr. Cruz was innocent. 9
Even more tragically, while the police, prosecutors, and
courts were tied up convicting and re-convicting Mr. Cruz, the
real killer was out raping and killing others, including an
eight-year-old girl." °
California law does not require the state to hold a confer-
ence with those who participated in the investigation and
trial preparation of the case. Nor does it require certification
that all information required to be disclosed has been dis-
closed. To avoid injustice such as that suffered by Mr. Cruz,
California should adopt these safeguards as recommended by
the Illinois Commission.
Recommendation 49.
The Illinois Supreme Court should adopt a rule delining
"exculpatory evidence"in order to provide guidance to
counsel in making appropriate disclosures. The commis-
sion recommends the following definition:
Exculpatory information includes, but may not be limited
to, all information that is mateial and favorable to the de-
433. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 118.
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. The Illinois Commission referred to Mr. Cruz's case. Id. at 126. For a
fuller account of the painful story, see THOMAS FRISBIE & RANDY GARRETT,
VICTIMS OF JUSTICE (1998).
437. See IllinoisDeathPenalty.com, For Rolando Cruz and Alejandro Her-
nandez, The Third Time Was a Charm, at
http://www.illinoisdeathpenalty.com/cruz.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2003).
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id.
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fendant because it tends to: (1) Cast doubt on defendant's
guilt as to any essential element in any count in the in-
dictment or information; (2) Cast doubt on the admissibil-
ity of evidence that the state anticipates offering in its
case-in-chief that might be subject to a motion to suppress
or exclude; (3) Cast doubt on the credibility or accuracy of
any evidence that the state anticipates offering in its
case-in-chief, or (4) Diminish the degree of the defendant's
culpability or mitigates the defendant's potential sen-
tence." 
1
The Illinois Commission found value in requiring the po-
lice and prosecutors to be as candid as possible with the de-
fense and the courts.42 Regardless of the prosecution's desire
to convict, prosecutors have an ethical obligation to seek jus-
tice, and a responsibility to ensure that justice is done. " '
California law does not define exculpatory evidence. Al-
though both federal and state case law on exculpatory evi-
dence exists, California does not have a statute or rule im-
plementing the broad definition contained in the
recommendation requiring disclosure."4 Recently, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court expanded the definition of exculpatory
evidence to include evidence that is harmful to the prosecu-
tion's case." 5 This recommendation goes beyond that defini-
tion.
Recommendation 50.
Illinois law should require that any discussion with a wit-
ness or a representative of a witness concerning benefits,
potential benefits or detriments conferred on a witness by
any prosecutor, police otfcial, corrections official or any-
one else, should be reduced to writing, and should be dis-
441. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 119.
442. Id. at 119-120.
443. See CAL. BAR. R. 5-110 (2002).
444. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that suppres-
sion, by the prosecution, of evidence favorable to an accused, upon request, vio-
lates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punish-
ment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution); see also In
re Sassounian, 887 P.2d 527 (Cal. 1995) (holding the prosecution's duty of dis-
closure applies only to evidence that is both favorable to the defendant and ma-
terial on either guilt or punishment).
445. "Evidence is favorable and must be disclosed if it will either help the de-
fendant or hurt the prosecution." People v. Coddington, 2 P.3d 1081, 1132
(2000).
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closed to the defense in advance of trial."6
The Illinois Commission found that in a number of the
thirteen cases in which the state released death row inmates,
accomplices or informers had testified. 7  The Commission
noted that non-death cases had also been reversed because
defense counsel had not been fully informed about plea
agreements with testifying accomplices or informers.48 These
findings from the Commission's two-year study made it clear
that full and candid disclosure was required.
Nevertheless, California law does not require that deals
made with witnesses be reduced to writing. In fact, it is
common practice for the prosecution to claim that no deal ex-
ists, only to find that the unwritten agreement with the wit-
ness benefits the witness later, after the defendant has been
convicted."9 In People v. Kasim,45 ° the district attorney stated
in his closing argument that there was no plea agreement be-
tween his office and the main witnesses. 451 He further stated
that this should enhance the credibility of such witnesses.452
The court of appeals later discovered that while there was no
written agreement, the witnesses received benefits resulting
from their testimony. California should adopt the Commis-
sion's recommendation requiring plea agreements to be in
writing to ensure that situations like Kasim are avoided in
the future.
Recommendation 51:
Whenever the state introduces the testimony of an
in-custody informant who has agreed to testify for the
prosecution in a capital case to a statement allegedly
made by the defendant, at either the guilt or sentencing
phase, the state should promptly inform the defense as to
446. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 120.
447. Id.
448. Id.
449. See People v. Kasim, 56 Cal. App. 4th 1360 (Ct. App. 1997), for a par-
ticularly egregious example of this practice. In that case, the prosecutor argued
to the jury that the nonexistence of a deal should enhance the witness's credibil-
ity. Id. at 1370.
450. 56 Cal. App. 4th 1360 (1997).
451. Id. at 1371.
452. Id.
453. Id. at 1376 (explaining that the witnesses had criminal records ex-
punged to avoid deportation, remained free of confinement, and had probation
infractions overlooked or probation terms revised).
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the identification and background of the wi'tness.454
The Illinois Commission considered prompt disclosure
"particularly important."455 Although it did not expand on the
remark, practical experience teaches that the circumstances
of in-custody informants are particularly hard to investigate
as time passes. Typically, it is necessary to interview other
inmates, and sometimes correctional officers, to understand
the context of the informant's purported testimony. These
people are hard to locate, and they have difficulty remember-
ing critical facts as time passes.
Disclosure of information about an in-custody informant
may be governed by California statute,456 and may also be gov-
erned by federal law.5 7 Neither the timing nor the extent of
disclosure as recommended is required under current Califor-
nia law. As the Illinois Commission recommends, prompt
disclosure should be required, so that the defense may pre-
pare an appropriate cross-examination of any in-custody in-
formants.5 Without such a cross-examination, the jury will
be unable to make an accurate assessment of the informant's
credibility. '
Recommendation 52.
(a) Prior to trial, the trial judge shall hold an evidentiary
hearing to determine the reliability and admissibility of
the in-custody informant's testimony at either the guilt or
sentencing phase;
(b) At the pre-trial evidentiary hearing, the trial judge
shall use the following standards:
The prosecution bears the burden of proving by a propon-
derance of evidence that the witness' testimony is reliable.
The trial judge may consider the following factors, as well
as any other factors bearing on the witness' credibility:
(1) the specific statements to which the witness will tes-
tify; (2) the time and place, and other circumstances of the
alleged statements; (3) any deal or inducement made by
454. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 121.
455. Id.
456. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.1 (West 2003).
457. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
458. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 121.
459. See id. at 122-23.
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the informant and the police or prosecutor in exchange for
the witness' testimony; (4) the criminal history of the wit-
ness; (5) whether the witness has ever recanted his/her
testimony; (6) other cases in which the witness testified to
alleged confessions by others; (7) any other evidence that
may attest to or diminish the credibility of the witness, in-
cluding the presence or absence of any relationship be-
tween the accused and the witness.
(c) The state may file an interlocutory appeal from a rul-
ing suppressing the testimony of an in-custody informant,
pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604.460
The Illinois Commission took note of considerable litera-
ture on the inherent problems with testimony from in-custody
informants.461 From the study it determined, "Testimony from
in-custody witnesses has often been shown to have been false,
and several of the thirteen cases of men released from death
row involved, at least in part, testimony from an in custody
informant." '462
California law provides for an in limine hearing on the
foundational facts pertaining to the admissibility of evi-
dence.4 63  However, current California law does not require
that the court hold a hearing on admissibility or consider the
criteria set forth in this recommendation. California should
adopt these criteria to protect against the possibility of unre-
liable testimony.
Recommendation 53:
In capital cases, courts should closely scrutinize any tactic
that misleads the suspect as to the strength of the evi-
dence against him/her, or the likelihood of his/her guilt, in
order to determine whether this tactic would be likely to
induce an involuntary or untrustworthy confession.464
California law does not require the court to scrutinize the
police tactics within the meaning of this recommendation. Il-
linois has a procedure for a pre-trial hearing on the volun-
tariness of a confession if a defendant moves to suppress it. 465
460. Id. at 122.
461. Id.
462. Id.
463. CAL. EVID. CODE § 402 (West 2003).
464. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 123.
465. Id.
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That practice is similar to the procedures for a hearing on a
motion in limine under California practice. 46  The Illinois
Commission intended for this rule to go beyond Illinois' exist-
ing procedures, requiring the trial judge in capital cases "to
carefully examine police or prosecutor methods during the in-
terrogation process which misstate or overstate the evidence
of the suspect's guilt, or the likelihood that he or she will be
found guilty, in order to induce him or her to confess."467 The
Commission stated that the judges should address whether
the prosecution established, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that the confession was voluntary and sufficiently
trustworthy to be accepted as evidence against the defen-
dant.468
Recommendation 54:
The commission makes no recommendation about whether
or not plea negotiations should be restricted with respect
to the death penalty.469
The Commission was concerned that prosecutors may use
the threat of the death penalty during plea negotiations. 7 °
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed at least two cases where
capital punishment was imposed after the district attorney
promised not to seek such punishment.471 In both People v.
Walke and People v. Brownell, 73 the court reversed be-
cause the defendant waived his right to a jury trial based on
the district attorney's promises during negotiations not to
seek the death penalty.474 The court found that allowing the
district attorney to change his mind was a violation of due
process7 5 as well as cruel and unusual punishment.
Although the Commission could not come to a specific
recommendation on restrictions on coercive plea bargaining,
it did so in the context of having adopted other recommenda-
466. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 402 (West 2003).
467. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 123.
468. Id.
469. Id. at 124.
470. Id.
471. Id.
472. 419 N.E.2d 1167(111. 1981).
473. 449 N.E.2d 1318 (Ill. 1983).
474. See, e.g., id. at 1322.
475. See, e.g., id. at 1323.
476. See Walker, 419 N.E.2d at 1177 (Ryan, J., concurring).
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tions that would "significantly narrow the class of cases in
which the death penalty is being sought."47 7 Illinois' decision
not to make specific recommendations was premised specifi-
cally on the prior recommendations that (a) the eligibility fac-
tors be limited to five and (b) the selection of cases for death
be subject to mandatory state-wide review. In the words of
the Illinois Commission, "the issue of potentially coercive plea
negotiations would likely be significantly reduced if all parts
of the new scheme are adopted." '478
Since California does not follow the recommendations
which comprise "all parts of the new scheme," its death pen-
alty system is susceptible to the abuse of coercive plea bar-
gaining addressed in this section of the Commission Report.
8. The Guilt-Innocence Phase: Recommendations
55 Through 59
The Illinois Commission made five recommendations re-
garding the guilt-innocence phase of the capital trial.479 One
of the recommendations is constitutionally required under ex-
isting precedent from the Supreme Court.48 That recommen-
dation pertains to the requirement that expert testimony on
eyewitness identification be permitted on a case-by-case ba-
sis. Of the four remaining recommendations, California com-
plies with only one.481 That one is also arguably compelled by
the Constitution, prohibiting introduction of polygraph re-
sults in the guilt-innocence phase of the trial. 82 California
case law is in accord.
The other three recommendations require that the courts
provide specific cautionary jury instructions on eyewitness
identification, jail-house informants, and non-recorded state-
ments. California has pattern jury instructions in the Cali-
fornia Approved Jury Instructions, Criminal (CALJIC); how-
ever, they do not cover the specific material recommended by
the Commission.
477. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 124.
478. Id.
479. Id. at 127-36.
480. See infra note 517.
481. See infra notes 516-18 (discussing Recommendation 59).
482. Id.
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Recommendation 55.-
Expert testimony with respect to the problem associated
with eyewitness testimony may be helpful in appropriate
cases. Determinations as to whether such evidence may
be admitted should be resolved by the trial judge on a caseby . •483
by case baSiS,
The Illinois Commission recognized a growing body of lit-
erature concerning problems with eyewitness identification
testimony.484 Expert testimony on the pitfalls of such identifi-
cation could be helpful to the trier of fact in certain cases.
The recommendation of the Commission is extremely modest:
it should be up to the judge to determine if such expert testi-
481
mony would be helpful in a given case.
As a matter of federal constitutional law, it seems that
this recommendation is required in all states. 6 The Illinois
Commission cites a state case in which a per se ban on such
expert testimony was imposed and upheld by the courts of
that stateY.4 7 However, that case flies in the face of the United
States Supreme Court's rulings. 8
No California statutes or guidelines explicitly direct the
483. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 127.
484. Id. at 127 & 135 n.1; see also Wells et al., supra note 173; U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, supra note 177.
485. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 129.
486. While there is no United States Supreme Court case directly on point,
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), stands for the proposition that a defen-
dant is entitled to experts to assist in his or her defense. This, read in conjunc-
tion with Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986), suggests that the courts can-
not make a blanket ruling excluding expert evidence of the circumstances of key
prosecution evidence: "[T]he Constitution leaves to the judges who must make
these decisions 'wide latitude' to exclude evidence that is 'repetitive... only
marginally relevant' or poses an undue risk of 'harassment, prejudice, [or] con-
fusion of the issues."' Id. at 689-90 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.
673, 679 (1986)). Moreover, "we have never questioned the power of States to
exclude evidence through the application of evidentiary rules that themselves
serve the interests of fairness and reliability - even if the defendant would
prefer to see that evidence admitted." Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,
302 (1973). Nonetheless, without "[signaling] any diminution in the respect
traditionally accorded to the States in the establishment and implementation of
their own criminal trial rules and procedures," we have little trouble concluding
on the facts of this case that the blanket exclusion of the proffered testimony
about the circumstances of petitioner's confession deprived him of a fair trial.
Id. at 302-03.
487. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 135, n.2 (citing State v.
Coley, 32 S.W.3d 831, 838 (Tenn. 2000)).
488. Id.
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trial judge to determine whether expert testimony is admissi-
ble. However, California case law has specifically held that it
is error to exclude expert testimony regarding eyewitness
identification if three criteria are met: first, the prosecutor
must rely on eyewitness testimony as a key element of his or
her case; second, the eyewitness testimony must not be sub-
stantially corroborated; and third, the expert must offer tes-
timony on specific psychological factors shown by the record,
the explanation of which would be of assistance to the jury.8 9
California adopts Recommendation 55, but the recommenda-
tion appears to be compelled by the Federal Constitution, as
well as California case law.490
Recommendation 56:
Jury instructions with respect to eyewitness testimony
should enumerate factors for the jury to consider, includ-
ing the difficulty of making a cross-racial identification.
The current version of [the instruction] is a step in the
right direction, but should be improved.
The [model jury instructions] should also be amended to
add a Final sentence which states as follows: Eyewitness
testimony should be carefully examined in light of other
491evidence in the case.
The Illinois Commission found that Illinois had come a
long way in recognizing the problems with eyewitness identi-
fication.492  Nevertheless, the Commission determined that
specific problems discovered in the research and in actual
misidentification cases should be put before the jury by way
of judicial comment.4 93  The Commission also found that the
489. People v. McDonald, 69 P.2d 709, 726 (Cal. 1984).
490. See supra note 487 (discussing constitutional requirements). The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court has held that expert testimony regarding eyewitness
identification can only be inadmissible where other evidence "substantially cor-
roborates the eyewitness identification and gives it independent reliability."
People v. Jones, 70 P.3d 359, 374 (Cal. 2003). This analysis, favoring the intro-
duction of expert testimony, necessitates a case-by-case analysis of the avail-
ability and sufficiency of other, corroborating evidence. See id. The trial court
does the analysis, and the decision to admit or exclude expert testimony re-
mains primarily a matter within the trial court's discretion. Id.
491. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 129.
492. Id. at 130-31.
493. Id. at 130. Eyewitness identification raises the possibility of human er-
ror and mistake. Id. at 130-31. The chance of human error and mistake is often
due to the "probable likeness or similarity of objects and persons" or because of
2003]
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court should specifically admonish the jury to carefully exam-
ine the testimony in light of all of the other evidence in the
case. It made these recommendations "[i]n light of new in-
formation regarding the potential for mistaken eyewitness
testimony and the drastic consequences if such mistakes are
))494made in a capital case ....
California does not require such jury instructions. Cali-
fornia jury instructions do contain some criteria for evaluat-
ing eyewitness identifications. 495  These criteria need not be
given sua sponte, however, and are limited to cases with "no
substantial corroborative evidence."496 California jury instruc-
cross-racial identification. Id. at 131. Furthermore, cross racial identification
contributes to the chance of misidentification; if the identifying witness is a dif-
ferent race than the perpetrator, this may have an impact on the accuracy of the
witness's original perception and subsequent identification, because people may
have greater difficulty in identifying members of a different race. Id. at 130-31.
494. Id. at 129-31.
495. CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 2.92 (2001 & Supp. 2003)
[hereinafter CALJIC] The instructions state:
In determining the weight to be given to eyewitness identification tes-
timony, you should consider the believability of the eyewitness as well
as other factors which bear upon the accuracy of the witness's identifi-
cation of the defendant, including, but not limited to, any of the follow-
ing:
[The opportunity of the witness to observe the alleged criminal act and
the perpetrator of the act;]
[The stress, if any, to which the witness was subjected at the time of
the observation;]
[The witness's ability, following the observation, to provide a descrip-
tion of the perpetrator of the act;]
[The extent to which the defendant either fits or does not fit the de-
scription of the perpetrator previously given by the witness;]
[The cross-racial [or ethnic] nature of the identification;]
[The witness's capacity to make an identification;]
[Evidence relating to the witness's ability to identify other alleged per-
petrators of the criminal act;]
[Whether the witness was able to identify the alleged perpetrator in a
photographic or physical lineup;]
[The period of time between the alleged criminal act and the witness's
identification;]
[Whether the witness had prior contacts with the alleged perpetrator;]
[The extent to which the witness is either certain or uncertain of the
identification;]
[Whether the witness's identification is in fact the product of [his] [her]
own recollection;]
[ ;] and
Any other evidence relating to the witness's ability to make an
identification.
Id.
496. People v. Wright, 755 P.2d 1049, 1059 (Cal. 1988).
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tions do not contain a cautionary admonition, '97 but they
should, per the Commission's recommendation.
Recommendation 57"
The [state committee on pattern criminal jury instruc-
tions] should consider a jury instruction providing special
caution with respect to the reliability of the testimony of
in-custody informants.498
Based on the Commission's two-year study, the need for
such a specific instruction was clear: "In light of the frequency
with which such testimony has appeared in cases of those
who were ultimately released from death row, the Commis-
sion believes that a special emphasis on this credibility issue
is warranted., 499  The Illinois Commission looked to the ex-
perience of other states for guidance on how to word the in-
struction properly. ° Specifically, the Commission looked to
Maryland's, Oklahoma's, and California's jury instructions re-
lating to in-custody informant testimony. 01 Of the three, the
Commission found Maryland's and Oklahoma's instructions
to be the best examples of how Illinois should construct its in-
struction."2 Maryland's instruction advised the jury to give
careful consideration not only to accomplices or in-custody in-
formants, but also to any witness promised leniency, whereas
the Oklahoma instruction specifically targeted informants. °
Under current California law, evaluation of in-custody in-
formants is covered only by the standard credibility instruc-
tion.0 4 In 2000, the standard instruction was amended to al-
low jurors to consider one additional piece of evidence in
determining believability: "Whether the witness is testifying
497. CALJIC 2.91 does not admonish the jury to carefully examine the evi-
dence. In other words, there is nothing cautionary about the instruction; it
simply restates the burden of proof that the prosecutor has to prove each ele-
ment beyond a reasonable doubt. Even this instruction need not be given sua
sponte since the jury is instructed that the people must prove each element of
the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Richardson, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 120, 127 (Ct. App. 1978).
498. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 131.
499. Id. at 132.
500. Id.
501. Id.
502. Id.
503. Id.
504. CALJIC, supra note 495, at R. 2.20.
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under a grant of immunity.""5 However, the California courts
have held that the general instruction on bias, interest, or
other motive is adequate, and the court does not necessarily
have to instruct that the testimony of a paid informer should
be viewed with caution.0 6
Recommendation 58:
[Special jury instructions relating to an alleged statement
of a defendant] should be supplemented... , to be given
only when the defendant's statement is not recorded.-...
You should pay particular attention to whether or not the
statement is recorded, and if it is, what method was used
to record it. Generally, an electronic recording that con-
tains the defendant's actual voice or a statement written
by the defendant is more reliable than a non-recorded
507
summary.
The Illinois Commission found that its recommendation
struck a proper "balance between the interests of effective law
enforcement and the rights of the defendant." °8 This recom-
mendation should help encourage police to record interroga-
tions and is consistent with the extensive literature on false
confessions or unreliable reports of confessions which were re-
ferred to in other parts of the report. 0 9
Like Illinois, California has a general instruction relating
to alleged confessions or admissions of the defendant. "0 Un-
der Illinois law, if the court determines that the defendant
made a voluntary statement, then this statement will be ad-
505. Id. As with other recent amendments or additions, this amendment
falls short of the Commission's recommendation, and the vast majority of the
approximately 620 condemned people in California did not derive any benefit
from it. In determining whether California's current death row population was
tried justly and fairly and how many innocents are on death row, we have to
look at California's unamended credibility instruction.
506. People v. Castro, 160 Cal. Rptr. 156, 158-59 (Ct. App. 1979).
507. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 133.
508. Id. at 133.
509. See, e.g., id. at 24-29, 115-26; see also Clifford Zimmerman, Back from
the Courthouse: Corrective Measures to Address the Role of Informants in
Wrongful Convictions, in WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED
JUSTICE, (Rutgers University Press: New Brunswick, 2001); See White, supra
note 163; Drizin & Colgan, Let the Cameras Roll: Mandatory Videotaping of In-
terrogations Is the Solution to Illinois'Problem of False Confessions, 32 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 339 (2001); DNA Voids Murder Confession, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 5, 2002;
Cops Urged to Tape Their Interrogations, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 6, 2002.
510. CALJIC, supra note 495, at R. 2.71.
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missible in court and is substantive evidence of his or her
guilt.5 1  It is left up to the jury to determine whether the de-
fendant actually made the statement and what weight the
statement should be given. 12 However, the Commission in-
tended its recommendation to allow the court to advise the
jury that recorded statements may have greater reliability,
turning the jury's attention to the steps the police took to ob-
tain the statement.513 This will help the jury identify and re-
ject questionable and untrustworthy statements.514 To strike
a proper balance between the interests of law enforcement
and the rights of defendants, California should adopt a jury
instruction similar to Recommendation 58.
Recommendation 59:
Illinois courts should continue to reject the results ofpoly-
graph examination during the innocence/guilt phase of
capital trials.
515
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments seemingly re-
quire rejection of polygraph results during the innocence/guilt
phase of the trial.516 A majority of the Supreme Court has
held "there is simply no consensus that polygraph evidence is
reliable.
5 17
California case law prohibits the introduction of poly-
graph results in all proceedings.518 Therefore, irrespective of
whether the Constitution compels this result, California is in
accord with Recommendation 59.
9. The Sen ten cing Phase: Recommendations
60 Through 64
The Illinois Commission made five recommendations re-
garding the sentencing phase of trial.5 19 These recommenda-
511. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 133.
512. Id.
513. Id.
514. Id. at 134.
515. Id.
516. Id. (citing People v. Melock, 599 N.E.2d 941 (1992)).
517. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 303 (1998).
518. The California Supreme Court continues to find that polygraph results
are unreliable under the "Kelly-Fryd' rule articulated in People v. Kelly 549
P.2d 1240, 1244 (Cal. 1976) (adopting the rule from Frye v. United States, 293
F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923)). See also People v. Ayala, 1 P.3d 3 (Cal. 2000).
519. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 138-50.
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tions require discovery prior to the penalty phase of the trial
and seek to expand mitigating factors to include the defen-
dant's extreme abuse as a child and reduced mental capac-
ity.520 The recommendations would establish the defendant's
right to allocution, prohibit polygraph results, and require
that jurors be fully informed of the life without possibility of
parole alternative (LWOPP).521
Recommendation 60.
The Commission supports the new amendments to [Illi-
nois] Supreme Court Rule 411, which make the rules of
discovery applicable to the sentencing phase of capital
522
cases.
California meets this requirement with qualifications.
The California Penal Code requires both the prosecution and
the defense to provide discovery no less than thirty days be-
fore trial, unless one party shows good cause why it should
not provide discovery.523 The courts have held that this stat-
ute applies to the penalty phase of a capital case as well as
the guilt-innocence phase.524 In California, the prosecution
also has a statutory obligation to produce evidence which it
intends to introduce in aggravation "within a reasonable pe-
riod of time as determined by the court, prior to trial., 525 The
Federal Constitution also requires disclosure of exculpatory
evidence to the defense.526
Illinois discovery rules require earlier discovery and dif-
fer in some other specifics. The California rules could be
amended to be more liberal, or at least provide for the earlier
disclosure of evidence relating to the penalty phase.
Recommendation 61:
The mitigating factors considered by the jury in the death
penalty sentencing scheme should be expanded to include
the defendant's history of extreme emotional or physical
abuse and that the defendant suffers from reduced mental
520. Id. at 141-42.
521. Id. at 142-48.
522. Id. at 138.
523. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.7 (West 2003).
524. People v. Superior Court (Mitchell), 859 P.2d 102, 106-08 (Cal. 1993).
525. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 2003).
526. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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capacity. [Expand the list of statutory factors to include:]
(6) Defendant's background includes a history of extreme
emotional or physical abuse; and (7) Defendant suffers
cait527from reduced mental capacity.
In California, the defense may present mental health is-
sues to the jury;528 however, the statutory mitigating factors
only pertain to the defendant's mental state at the time of the
offense.5 29 No provision specifically includes the "defendant's
history of extreme emotional or physical abuse" as referred to
in this recommendation. California law has a catch-all provi-
sion for mitigating evidence,8 ° but this provision is required
under the Federal Constitution. 3' Though it may be possible
to present evidence and argue the defendant's history, the
jury is not specifically instructed that such history is a miti-
gating factor.
The Illinois Commission also specifically recommended
expanding the list of statutory mitigating factors to include
that the defendant "suffers from reduced mental capacity.""2
California juries are also not specifically instructed that this
evidence could be considered a mitigating factor; therefore,
California does not follow this recommendation.
Recommendation 62:
The defendant should have the right to make a statement
on his own behalf at [sic] during the aggrava-
tion/mitigation phase, without being subject to
cross-examination.533
The California Supreme Court held that the defendant
has no right to allocution..4 although a contrary belief had
persisted for some time.535 There may be a federal constitu-
527. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 141.
528. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(d), (h) (West 2003).
529. Id.
530. Id. § 190.3(k).
531. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
532. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 141.
533. Id. at 142.
534. People v. Keenan, 758 P.2d 1081, 1102 (Cal. 1988).
535. The right was thought to exist in California, in part because Bernard
Witkin referred to it in his influential treatise on California criminal law. B.E.
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 607(3) (1963). Witkin, a re-
nowned California legal scholar and long-time attorney for the California Su-
preme Court, simply stated in his treatise that the defendant had a right of al-
locution without citation to any authority. However, after Mr. Witkin's
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tional right to allocution,536 but California continues to reject
this proposition."'
The Illinois Commission surveyed the law of several
other states on this subject and concluded that such a right
was workable and recognized elsewhere."' The Commission
reasoned that the prosecution may comment on the defen-
dant's lack of remorse; thus, the defendant should be allowed
to make comments in his or her favor without cross-
examination.53 California also permits the prosecutor to
comment on the defendant's lack of remorse. 4 ' If the defen-
dant is not called to testify, often for good reason, he or she
has no way to express remorse before the jury. Regardless of
whether the Constitution recognizes a right to allocution, al-
locution plays an important role in avoiding wrongful convic-
tions.
Recommendation 63:
The jury should be instructed as to the alternative sen-
tences that may be imposed in the event that the death
penalty is not imposed.
54 1
Supreme Court precedent requires the court to instruct
the jury at the penalty phase that the alternative to voting for
death will be life without the possibility of parole.
4 2
Recommendation 64:
[The state courts] should continue to reject the results of
polygraph examinations during the sentencing phase of
capital trials.
543
retirement, the California Supreme Court held to the contrary. Keenan, 758
P.2d at 1102.
536. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424 (1974).
537. People v. Lucero, 3 P.3d 242, 262 (Cal. 2001).
538. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 142-44.
539. Id. at 144.
540. See, e.g., People v. Gonzales, 800 P.2d 1159, 1186-87 (Cal. 1990). The
court stated that remorse is a mitigating factor and that the absence of a miti-
gating factor cannot be considered aggravating unless it is specifically listed as
an aggravating factor in California Penal Code section 190.3. However, the
court circumvented this by finding that absence of remorse could be considered
an aggravating factor under section 190.3(a). For a discussion of the abuse of
this over broad factor, see supra text accompanying notes 36-41.
541. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 144.
542. Kelley v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246, 248 (2002).
543. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 148.
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California case law still prohibits the introduction of
polygraph results in all proceedings.5"' Therefore, California
follows this recommendation.
10. Imposition of Sentence: Recommendations
65 Through 69
The Illinois Commission made five recommendations re-
lating to the imposition of the sentence of death."5 These rec-
ommendations impose procedural requirements on the man-
ner in which the trial court imposes a death sentence.
Recommendation 65
The statute which establishes the method by which the
jury should arrive at its sentence should be amended to
include language... to make it clear that the jury should
weigh factors in the case and reach its own independent
conclusion about whether the death penalty should be im-
posed. The statute should be amended to read as follows:
"If the jury determines unanimously, after weighing the
factors in aggravation and mitigation, that death is the
appropriate sentence .... 446
This recommendation is met in California. California re-
quires unanimity on the part of the jury, but it does not re-
quire unanimity as to particular factors in aggravation.547
California juries are instructed: "To return a judgment of
death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating
circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the
mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of
life without parole.5 48 The term "unanimously" is not used
but is implied by the use of "each of you.
,
"
5 4 9
Recommendation 66
After the jury renders its judgment with respect to the
imposition of the death penalty, the trial judge should be
required to indicate on the record whether he or she con-
544. See supra note 518.
545. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 151-63.
546. Id. at 151.
547. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 2003); CALJIC, supra note 495, at
R. 8.88.
548. CALJIC, supra note 495, at R. 8.88.
549. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 152.
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curs in the result. In cases where the trial judge does not
concur in the imposition of the death penalty, the defen-
dant shall be sentenced to natural life as a mandatory al-
ternative (assuming the adoption of a new death penalty
scheme limited to five eligibility factors)."'
The Illinois Commission specifically uses the term "con-
cur" and states that the judge should impose natural life if he
or she does not concur.' In this regard, the Commission
stated that, "[t]his proposal is designed to address the situa-
tion in which the trial judge has some lingering concern about
the defendant's guilt, or when the judge believes the verdict of
death may have been influenced by passion or prejudice. 52
This gives the judge much broader authority to avoid an in-
justice than under California law. In California, the judge is
limited to "[making] a determination as to whether the jury's
findings and verdicts that the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances are contrary to the
law or the evidence presented.""5 3
A California trial judge reviews procedure but only re-
weighs the evidence to determine if a death verdict is con-
trary to the law or the evidence.554 Under the California
death penalty system, the judge neither substitutes his or her
judgment, nor decides whether he or she concurs in the re-
sult. The California standard is more liberal than that ap-
plied at a motion for new trial but is not the same as asking
whether the judge concurs in the verdict of death. 5 Califor-
550. Id.
551. Id.
552. Id. at 153.
553. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(e) (West 2003).
554. Seeid. § 190.4(e); People v. Rodrigues, 885 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1994).
555. California Penal Code section 190.4(e) requires the judge to independ-
ently weigh the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. People
v. Weaver, 29 P.3d 103, 171-72 (Cal. 2001). The judge is not asked if she or he
concurs in the judgment, which would give the judge an effective veto. A motion
for a new trial under California Penal Code section 1181 is less liberal. Under
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979), the court asks only whether a ra-
tional trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
See also People v. Hatch, 991 P.2d 165, 173 (Cal. 2000) (affirming the Jackson
standard for California). Arguably, either the trial court or an appellate court
would be competent to apply the Jackson standard. Section 190.4(e) requires
re-weighing of the evidence, thereby giving the judge more leeway to reject a
death sentence than strictly applying the new trial standard, but less leeway
than in states where the judge can veto simply because she or he does not con-
cur.
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nia should adopt this recommendation, because it would pro-
tect the defendant in those situations where the jury ren-
dered its verdict based on sympathy and passion for the vic-
tim, or where the trial judge otherwise does not concur.
Recommendation 67:
In any case approved for capital punishment under the
new death penalty scheme with five eligibility factors, if
the finder of fact determines that death is not the appro-
priate sentence then the mandatory alternative sentence
would be natural life.556
After a finding of special circumstances in California, the
two sentencing options are "death" or "life without possibility
of parole." However, the default alternative of "natural life"
in Illinois would be limited to the five eligibility factors,
whereas California has over twenty-five "special circum-
stances."'557 Reduction of the eligibility factors guarantees to a
greater extent that only heinous crimes will trigger a possible
death sentence.5 11 California's list of twenty-five eligibility
factors is too expansive and allows for a minimum sentence of
life without the possibility of parole for crimes that may not
warrant it.559
Recommendation 68.
[The state] should adopt a statute which prohibits the im-
position of the death penalty for those defendants found to
be mentally retarded. The best model to follow in terms of
specific language is that found in the Tennessee statute.6 °
This is constitutionally required following the Supreme
Court's decision in Atkins v. Virgina.61 In his last days in of-
fice, Governor Gray Davis signed SB3, legislation allowing a
capital defendant to apply for a mental retardation hearing
before trial. 6'
556. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 155.
557. See id.; CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2-.3 (West 2003).
558. See ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 155.
559. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 2003).
560. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 156.
561. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
562. Davis Signs Bill to Ease Collection of Future Online Tax, SAN DIEGO
UNION TRIB., Oct. 11, 2003,
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/uniontrib/sat/news/newslnllbills.html
(last visited Oct. 16, 2003). This law, adding California Penal Code section
1852003]
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Recommendation 69.
[The state] should adopt a statute which provides:
A. The uncorroborated testimony of an in-custody infor-
mant witness concerning the confession or admission of
the defendant may not be the sole basis for the imposition
of a death penalty.
B. Convictions for murder based upon the testimony of a
single eyewitness or accomplice, without any other cor-
roboration, should not be death eligible under any circum-
stances.
56 3
The Illinois Commission was aware of the serious prob-
lems with testimony from in-custody informants, single eye-
witnesses, and accomplices.5" Scholarly studies and the
Commission's own review of the cases of people released from
Illinois death rows demonstrate the dangers of conviction of
the innocent and the attendant failure to apprehend the real
killers."' In this recommendation the Commission suggested
that a court should not impose the irreversible sentence of
death when such a significant possibility of a wrongful convic-
tion exists."'
California has not implemented the recommended police
practices or the other procedural safeguards5 67 that the
Commission presupposed when it made this recommendation.
California does not require corroboration of in-custody infor-
mants regarding defendant admissions in capital cases, nor is
there an exclusion from death eligibility for cases based on a
single eyewitness without corroboration. California does,
however, have a general evidentiary prohibition against con-
viction of a person of any criminal offense based on the uncor-
roborated statement of an accomplice."6 California would
benefit from adopting a statute that both prohibits uncorrobo-
rated testimony of an in-custody informant and exempts con-
victions based on single eyewitness testimony from death eli-
gibility. Such a statute would protect the accused from those
1376, implements the Supreme Court's decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304 (2002). See S.B. 3, 2003 Leg. (Cal. 2003).
563. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 158.
564. Id. at 158-60.
565. Id. at 19-43, 127-34.
566. Id. at 158-60.
567. Id.
568. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1111 (West 2003).
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in-custody informants who may conjure up false testimony to
further their own interests or who may have misidentified the
accused.
11. Proceedings Following Conviction and Sentence:
Recommendations 70 Through 75
The Illinois Commission made six recommendations re-
lating to proceedings that follow sentencing and conviction.6 9
They require proportionality review, ongoing discovery, time
periods for post-conviction relief, mandatory evidentiary hear-
ings, extended procedures for actual innocence claims, and a
clear statute on clemency procedures.
California actually prohibits proportionality review by
the California Supreme Court 7 Prosecutors may be com-
pelled to provide ongoing discovery after conviction on de-
mand, but there are no uniform rules or requirements. Post-
conviction petitions, habeas corpus in California, must be
filed while the direct appeal is still pending. Furthermore,
there are no mandatory evidentiary hearings on habeas and
there are no special rules for actual innocence claims.57'
California has no statutory scheme for clemency procedures.
Recommendation 70.
In capital cases the [State] Supreme Court should consider
on direct appeal (1) whether the sentence was imposed
due to some arbitrary factor, (2) whether an independent
weighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
indicates death was the proper sentence, and (3) whether
569. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 165-76.
570. See, e.g., People v. Marshall, 790 P.2d 676, 691-92 (Cal 1990); see also
People v. Jones, 64 P.3d 762, 786-87 (Cal. 2003) (holding that the California
death penalty scheme is not unconstitutional for failing to provide inter-case
proportionality review).
571. CAL. CT. R. 4.551(f) provides that the court
must order an evidentiary hearing... if, after considering the verified
position, the return, any denial, any affidavits or declarations under
penalty of perjury, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken,
the court finds there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner may
be entitled to relief and the petitioner's entitlement to relief depends on
the resolution of an issue of fact.
Id. This mandate is largely illusory, however, as the court decides whether
there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner may be entitled to relief.
There is no alternate provision or procedure for cases in which actual innocence
is alleged. See id. R. 4.550-4.551.
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the sentence of death was excessive or disproportionate to
the penalty imposed in similar cases.572
The Illinois Commission recommendation for the state
supreme court to reweigh the aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances and to do a proportionality review is intended to
supplement the trial court's concurrence procedures."'
In California, the trial judge performs a limited review,
restricted to determining "whether the jury's findings and
verdicts at aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating
circumstances are contrary to the law or evidence pre-
sented."57 4 Neither the California Supreme Court5 75 nor the
trial court does a proportionality review.7
Although proportionality review is not constitutionally
required,57' nineteen other death penalty states require some
form of such a review.578 The Illinois Commission found value
in ensuring that the death penalty "is being applied in a ra-
tional and even-handed manner throughout the state" and to
monitor "geographic" and "race effects."575 To perform a
proper proportionality review, the state would have to de-
velop a state-wide database on homicides similar to that de-
veloped in New Jersey.58
572. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 166.
573. Id. at 166-68.
574. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(e) (West 2003).
575. See People v. Lang, 782 P.2d 627, 661-62 (Cal. 1989).
576. The trial judge has no authority to do an inter-case proportionality re-
view. See People v. Marshall, 790 P.2d 676, 692 (Cal. 1990). However, the
judge can do an "intra-case" review to determine if the punishment is propor-
tionate to the individual defendant's culpability. Id. at 937-38; see also People
v. Dillion, 668 P.2d 697, 720-21 (Cal. 1983).
577. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 51-54 (1984).
578. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 166 (referring to Ala-
bama, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Caro-
lina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Washing-
ton).
579. Id. at 167.
580. Id. at 168. The New Jersey database collects information at the trial
level. Id. This database includes information on the defendant and victim, ra-
cial and socio-economic characteristics of all those involved, representation by
counsel, the aggravating factors the prosecution proposed and those actually
found, mitigation evidence, the factual circumstances of the crime, and the im-
pressions of the trial judge. Id. The Administrative Office of the Courts com-
pletes the collection of the data. Id.
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Recommendation 71:
Rule 3.8 of the Illinois Supreme Court Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct [ABA Model Rule 3.9], Special Responsi-
bilities of a Prosecutor, should be amended in paragraph
(c) by the addition of the [unlitalicized language: (c) A pub-
lic prosecutor or other governmental lawyer in criminal
litigation shall make timely disclosure to counsel for the
defendant, or to the defendant if the defendant is not
represented by a lawyer, of the existence of evidence,
known to the prosecutor or other government lawyer, that
tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the
degree of the offense. Following conviction, a public
prosecutor or other government lawyer has the continuing
obligation to make timely disclosure to the counsel for the
defendant or to the defendant if the defendant is not
represented by a lawyer, of the existence of evidence,
known to the prosecutor or other government lawyer, that
tends to negate the guilt of the defendant or mitigate the
defendant's capital sentence. For the purposes of this
post-conviction disclosure responsibility "timely
disclosure" contemplates that the prosecutor or other gov-
ernment lawyer should have the opportunity to
investigate matters related to new evidence.5""
The California Supreme Court does not promulgate any
special rules of professional conduct concerning the prosecu-
tor's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence. A California stat-
ute, effective January 1, 2003, permits post-conviction discov-
ery upon request and a showing of good cause.582 No rule
creates an ethical, ongoing duty upon the prosecution to turn
over exculpatory information to the defendant or defense
counsel post-conviction as contemplated by this Illinois Com-
mission recommendation. Like Illinois, California should
clarify that the prosecution's duty to disclose exculpatory evi-
dence extends beyond the date of conviction.
Recommendation 72:
The Post-Conviction Hearing Act should be amended to
provide that a petition for a post-conviction proceeding in
a capital case should be filed within 6 months after the is-
suance of the mandate by the Supreme Court following af-
581. Id.
582. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.9(a)-(b) (West 2003).
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firmance of the direct appeal from the trial.
The Illinois Commission was concerned about allowing
post-conviction petitions to be filed too far in the future."
The statutory scheme in Illinois required a defendant to file
for relief before his or her direct appeal was completed.585
However, the Commission recognized that "requiring a capi-
tal defendant to file a post-conviction petition before his [or
her] original appeal is complete represents an unwise policy
choice.""5 6
The Illinois Commission recommended that post-
conviction petitions (a petition for writ of habeas corpus in
California) be filed after the conclusion of the direct appeal. 87
The California Supreme Court specifically requires that the
defendant file the petition within 180 days after the reply
brief is due on direct appeal.8 This requirement was recently
increased from 90 days; however, the petition must still be
filed before the direct appeal concludes. The Commission also
pointed out that implementing this recommendation would
require that the state supreme court promptly dispose of all
capital cases, and that Illinois had a history of doing this.
Recommendation 73.
The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act should be
amended to provide that in capital cases, the trial court
should convene the ev4dentiary hearing on the petition
within one year of the date the petition is filed.5 89
When the Commission made its recommendations, Illi-
nois law provided for the filing of the post-conviction petition
in the trial court. ° Under this recommendation, the trial
court would then have to set its evidentiary hearing within
one year of the filing of the petition.59
California does not specify a time period within which to
convene an evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction petition
583. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 169.
584. See id. at 169-70.
585. Id. at 170.
586. Id.
587. Id.
588. SUPREME CT. POLICIES REGARDING CASES ARISING FROM JUDGMENT OF
DEATH, supra note 268, Policy 3:1-1.1.
589. Id.
590. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 171.
591. Id. at 170.
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for writ of habeas corpus. More significantly, California
does not require an evidentiary hearing at all. Unlike Illi-
nois, California procedure does not have the additional safe-
guard of an evidentiary hearing in a trial court. In California
death penalty cases, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is
filed directly with the Supreme Court. 93 However, for sys-
tems that do employ evidentiary hearings, such a recommen-
dation helps resolve the concern that post-conviction proceed-
ings in capital cases delay the ultimate disposition of the
case. 94 This recommendation would help ensure that post-
conviction proceedings occur in a timely fashion.9
Recommendation 74:
The Post-Conviction Hearing Act should be amended to
provide that in capital cases, a proceeding may be initi-
ated in cases in which there is newly discovered evidence
which offers a substantial basis to believe that the defen-
dant is actually innocent, and such proceedings should be
available at any time following the defendant's conviction
regardless of other provisions of the Act limiting the time
within such proceedings can be initiated. In order to pre-
vent frivolous petitions, the Act should provide that in
proceedings asserting a claim of actual innocence, the
court may make an initial determination with or without a
hearing that the claim is frivolous.5 96
Here, the Illinois Commission specifically made special
provisions for post-conviction petitions where actual inno-
cence is asserted.597 The Commission recognized that consti-
tutional due process may require some sort of relief; however,
they stated, "The commission has unanimously recommended
that specific provision should be clearly made in the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act to permit the assertion of claims of
actual innocence at any time following conviction in capital
592. The ordinary rules governing petitions for writ of habeas corpus provide
that the court must immediately after the filing of a return proceed to hearing.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1483 (West 2003); see CAL. R. CT. 4.551(f). However, the
direct filings in the California Supreme Court do not follow these rules.
593. SUPREME CT. POLICIES REGARDING CASES ARISING FROM JUDGMENT OF
DEATH, supra note 268, Policy 3.
594. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 171.
595. Id.
596. Id.
597. Id. at 172.
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cases."
598
California law does not implement this recommendation.
A petition for writ of coram nobis or vobis may be filed under
common law but is disfavored by the courts.599 Bars to succes-
sive litigation effectively defeat the recommendation's pur-
pose.
Recommendation 75.
[State] law should provide that after all appeals have been
exhausted and the Attorney General applies for a final
execution date for the defendant, a clemency petition may
not be filed later than 30 days after the date that the
[court] enters an order setting an execution date.600
The Illinois Commission recognized that last minute peti-
tions can place the administrative board in Illinois and the
governor under tremendous time pressure.6"' The Commis-
sion concluded that the recommended procedures would per-
mit a more orderly review process in which the governor may
receive meaningful input from the board."2
The California Constitution has been interpreted to provide
the governor with the power to grant clemency in death pen-
alty cases. +3 California statutes set forth procedures primar-
ily for non-death cases." The procedure is almost entirely
discretionary and provides no time restraints.
The idea of meaningful input and review by the governor
is questionable in California since no governor in forty years
has commuted a death sentenceY.60  However, if there is to be
a system of executive review, it should be organized and
timely.
12. Funding: Recommendations 76 Through 82
The Illinois Commission made seven recommendations
pertaining to funding by the state,6 6 one of which applies only
598. Id.
599. See Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 429 (1996). Cr In re Clark,
855 P.2d 729, 748, 768 (Cal. 1993).
600. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 173.
601. Id. at 174.
602. Id.
603. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 5.
604. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 4800-4906 (West 2003).
605. See supra note 313.
606. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 177-86.
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to Illinois. °7 These recommendations attempt to ensure that
lawyers handling capital cases have adequate funding and
are properly compensated for their time.68 They also seek to
assure that funds for law enforcement equipment, particu-
larly recording devices, are available and properly adminis-
tered throughout the state.6"9
Recommendation 76:
Leaders in both the executive and legislative branches
should significantly improve the resources available to the
criminal justice system in order to permit the meaningful
610implementation of reforms in capital cases.
Though its legislative and executive branches have de-
voted some attention to death penalty litigation,61' California
is not implementing the reforms contemplated by the Illinois
Commission.
California's executive branch, legislative committees, and
supreme court should formally coordinate efforts to effectuate
the recommended reforms. The cost of death penalty trials
affects the whole criminal justice system; money that could
have been spent on proving guilt or innocence is instead spent
on the execution of criminals, some who are later found to be
innocent. Capital cases are very costly; one report estimates
that between 1982 and 1997 the extra cost of capital trials
was $1.6 billion.612 California averages more than twenty new
death sentences per year, and it has carried out ten execu-
tions since it reinstated capital punishment in 1977.613 Ac-
cording to a report in the Sacramento Bee, the death penalty
costs California ninety million dollars in excess of the ordi-
nary costs of the justice system annually, indicating that the
607. Id. at 178 (stating that "The Capital Crimes Litigation Act... should be
reauthorized by the General Assembly."). California does not have any present
legislation comparable to the act. Therefore, California does not follow this rec-
ommendation. To avoid dispute, this article deems this recommendation inap-
plicable and the author removes it from consideration.
608. Id. at 177-82.
609. Id. at 183.
610. Id. at 177.
611. See Legislative Session Complicated by Politics, of All Things, CHI.
DAILY LAW BULLETIN, Jan. 7, 2002, at 23.
612. NBER Working Paper No. w8382, Issued in July 2001, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=108&scid=7.
613. N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2003, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=108&scid=7.
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state has spent more than one billion dollars on the death
penalty in the course of achieving these ten executions.614
Recommendation 77:
The Capital Crimes Litigation Act, ... which is the state
statute containing the Capital Litigation Trust Fund and
other provisions, should be reauthorized by the General
Assembly.
615
Since January 1, 2000, Illinois has had in place a Capital
Crimes Litigation Act that provides for the Capital Litigation
Trust Fund, which in turn provides funding for both prosecu-
tion and defense.616 While the fund is a source of additional
attorney compensation, it also covers many expenses that re-
sult from a properly tried capital case.6"7 It includes funds for
investigation, experts, forensic, witnesses, and other costs as-
sociated with capital cases.61 Existing California law covers
some of the provisions of the Illinois Act.619 California has
funding provisions for capital cases, including a statute pro-
viding for defense expenses in indigent cases."' Though the
statute does authorize funds for investigators and experts for
indigent defendants, the process is much more constricting
when compared to the Illinois process. 62' In California, an at-
torney can ask the court for funds for the specific payment of
investigators, experts, and others for defense preparation, but
the decision lies in the hands of the trial judge. 622 Further,
funds in California are distributed in the form of reimburse-
ments, whereas funds in Illinois are done as appropriations.623
The Illinois Commission recommends that this Act con-
tinue in existence and be renewed. California should do the
same with what provisions it currently has in place and im-
614. SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 18, 1988, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=108&scid=7.
615. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 178.
616. Id. at 178-79.
617. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 124/15 (2003).
618. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 124/15 (2003).
619. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 124/15 (2003); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 987.2,
987.9 (West 2003).
620. CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.9.
621. Compare 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 124/15 (2003) with CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 987.9 (West 2003).
622. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.9.
623. Compare 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 12415 (2003) with CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 987.9 (West 2003).
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plement the additional provisions of the Act.
Recommendation 78:
The Commission supports the concept articulated in the
statute governing the Capital Litigation Trust Fund, that
adequate compensation be provided to trial counsel in
capital cases for both time and expense, and encourages
regular consideration of the hourly rates authorized under
the statute to reflect the actual market rates ofprivate at-
torneys.
624
Hourly rates for appointed counsel at the trial and appel-
late levels are far below the rates earned by competent pri-
vate criminal defense counsel. Furthermore, where trial
counsel is appointed at an hourly rate, the courts routinely
reduce the number of hours for which they will provide com-
pensation resulting in substantial underpayment of counsel.
In many cases in California, indigent defense services are
provided by contract lawyers who often take on the entire fis-
cal year's cases for a flat fee."'
Expenses may be covered by application for funds 26 but
no central statewide system ensures that individual courts
are providing adequate funding in any given case, or that dif-
ferent locations within the state receive equivalent funding.
Because public defenders, private lawyers, contract defense
lawyers, and other appointed lawyers handle death penalty
cases throughout the state, this proposal would have to be
implemented by a statewide statute as the Illinois Commis-
sion recommended. 7
Recommendation 79.
The provisions of the Capital Litigation Trust Fund should
be construed as broadly as possible to insure that public
defenders, particularly those in rural parts of the state,
can effectively use its provisions to secure additional coun-
sel and reimbursement of all reasonable trial related ex-
624. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 179.
625. The California Supreme Court has questioned whether contracts for in-
digent defense services create conflicts of interest. See People v. Barboza, 627
P.2d 188 (Cal. 1981). However, low-bid, flat-fee indigent defense contracts still
exist. See Meredith Anne Nelson, Comment, Quality Control for Indigent De-
fense Contracts, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1147 (1988).
626. CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.9 (West 2003).
627. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 179-80.
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penses in capital cases.
The Illinois Commission observed that, particularly in
rural counties, funding may not be adequate to allow counsel
to adequately prepare for trial.129 The application for state
funds in California is subject to the discretion of the local
judges. 3' A state-wide system for allocating funds would be
an improvement because it would allow the public defender to
utilize resources that would enable proper preparation,
thereby effectuating fairness amongst all capital cases.63'
California law does not require a review for disparity be-
tween areas within the state. California does provide a
means by which public defenders throughout the state may
apply for money for assistance from experts, investigators,
and others, including second counsel.632 No provision accom-
modates other trial related expenses, however, which might
place a significant burden on small or rural public defender
offices.
Recommendation 80:
The work of the State Appellate Defender's office in pro-
viding statewide trial support in capital cases should con-
tinue, and funds should be appropriated for this pur-
633pose.
The California State Public Defender's Office and the
State California Appellate Project (CAP) are both under-
staffed and underfunded. Despite that fact, they both do an
outstanding job of assisting other capital counsel. Their ef-
forts largely focus on appointed appellate and habeas counsel,
however. Appointed counsel at the trial level and retained
counsel can avail themselves of the expertise of individuals at
the State Public Defender and CAP, but they have no formal
statewide support system. Education and training of trial
level counsel are left to privately funded organizations, such
as the California Public Defenders Association and California
Attorneys for Criminal Justice.
628. Id. at 181.
629. Id.
630. Id.
631. Id. at 181.
632. CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.9 (West 2003).
633. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 181.
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Recommendation 81:
The Commission supports the recommendations in the
Report of the Task Force on Professional Practice in the Il-
linois Justice System to reduce the burden of student
loans on those entering criminal justice careers and im-
prove salary levels and pension contributions for those in
the system in order to insure retention of qualified coun-
sel.6
34
Current California law provides for some assistance to
public defenders and prosecutors on student loans.635 Private
lawyers appointed to represent indigent capital defenders
bear the burden of a large part of the capital litigation in
California, yet receive no assistance.6 Certainly, the salaries
of public defenders at all levels could be increased signifi-
cantly to attract the most qualified lawyers for death penalty
cases.
Recommendation 82.
Adequate funding should be provided by the [state] to all
[state] police agencies to pay for the electronic recording
equipment, personnel and facilities needed to conduct
electronic recordings in homicide cases.637
Police agencies receive state money in various forms, but
the earmarked funds are inadequate for the purposes of im-
plementing the recommendations of the Illinois Commission
regarding recording of interviews, interrogations, and identi-
fication procedures.
13. General Recommendations: Recommendations
83 Through 85
The Illinois Commission made three general recommen-
dations which pertain to improving the capital system and
634. Id. at 182.
635. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 69740-69748 (West 2003). Effective Jan. 1,
2002, these statutes provide for $2,000 per year up to a total of $11,000 contri-
bution to student loans. Id. At the time of this writing, however, the program
has not been funded. Interview with Jim Egar, Public Defender for Santa Bar-
bara County, Cal., in Santa Barbara, Cal. (Sept. 11, 2003).
636. Dave Orrick, Fund Created to Pay for Quality Death Penalty Defense
Attorneys Runs Dry, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Aug. 9, 2002.
637. ILLINOIS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 183.
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avoiding errors."' The Commission recommends applying the
recommendations to non-capital cases, collecting and dis-
seminating comparative information throughout the judicial
system, and encouraging the reporting of attorney misconduct
to the state bar.
Recommendation 83:
The Commission strongly urges consideration of ways to
broaden the application of many of the recommendations
made by the Commission to improve the criminal justice
system as a whole.
639
California law does not follow most of the recommenda-
tions, and therefore, no attempt to broaden the application of
such recommendations to non-capital cases has been made.
All three branches of government within the state of Califor-
nia will have to work independently and coordinate with each
other to effectuate these necessary changes. Once that is un-
derway, California could begin to consider how to improve the
criminal justice system as a whole. Many of the recommen-
dations, such as those regarding police practices, forensics,
and funding could transfer directly to non-capital litigation.
Recommendation 84:
Information should be collected at the trial level with re-
spect to prosecutions of first degree murder cases, by trial
judges, which would detail information that could prove
valuable in assessing whether the death penalty is, in fact,
being fairly applied. Data should be collected on a form
which provides details about the trial, the background of
the defendant, and the basis for the sentence imposed. The
forms should be collected by the [state's administrative of-
fice of the courts] and the form from an indiidual case
should not be a public record. Data collected from the
forms should be public, and should be maintained in a
public access database by the Criminal Justice Informa-
tion Authority.4
Some data is collected but no systematic collection of data
on the details of capital cases and the background of the de-
fendant is or has been obtained sufficient to conduct a mean-
638. Id. at 186-206.
639. Id. at 187.
640. Id. at 188-89.
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ingful analysis as recommended by the Illinois Commission.
Recommendation 85.
Judges should be reminded of their obligation under
Canon 3 to report violations of the Rules of Professional
Conduct by prosecutors and defense lawyers.61
The California Code of Judicial Ethics suggests that a
judge has an ethical duty to "take appropriate corrective ac-
tion" if the judge has personal knowledge that a lawyer has
committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 2
The judge has no duty to report the violations to the state bar
or to take any other specific action unless a defense lawyer
has been found to have provided ineffective assistance of
counsel. No similar provision pertains to prosecutors.
V. NEED FOR A MORATORIUM AND FURTHER STUDY
The Illinois Commission has made eighty-five specific
recommendations to try to avoid the travesty, documented in
its state, of condemning the innocent to death while the real
killers are free to kill again. Connecticut, Nevada, Arizona,
and other states have recognized the wisdom of many of these
same recommendations.
It is clear that the death penalty system in California is
broken. California's system has condemned 622 people to its
death row. Most have never had their cases reviewed by the
courts, and many do not even have lawyers to initiate a re-
view. 3 California has recently enacted standards for lawyers
appointed to handle capital trials, but they do not help this
large population who did not have the benefit of these new
rules. Yet, even these new rules do not meet Illinois stan-
dards, leaving California's current compliance with the Illi-
nois Recommendations at a mere 6.17%.
We know that there are innocent people condemned to
641. Id. at 191.
642. CAL. CT. R., APPENDIX: CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS, Cannon D(2).
643. Approximately 140 of the 622 prisoners on California's death row do not
have an attorney representing them. Interview with Michael Millman, supra
note 18. Another 110 have an appellate lawyer, but no attorney to prepare and
file a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Id. As of March 31, 2002, only 189 of
the 610 prisoners had their sentences affirmed by the California Supreme Court
or reversed on appeal. CONDEMNED INMATE SUMMARY, supra note 3, at 103.
644. See infra Part IV.
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die in California. To assume otherwise would fly in the face
of what we know from other jurisdictions and would ignore
the real infirmities already identified in California's death
penalty system. Taking a conservative figure from Illinois'
experience and the history of exonerations nationwide, we
must assume that at least ten percent of the condemned peo-
ple in California are innocent."5 That means that over sixty
innocent people are awaiting death, over sixty killings have
been unsolved, and over sixty real killers have not been iden-
tified.
This article simply brings the problem to the forefront. It
does not identify or answer all of the questions which need to
be asked. It certainly does not solve the problems. The prob-
lems need to be addressed systematically and hundreds of
cases need to be scrutinized individually. Systemic changes
need to be made consistent with the Illinois Commission Re-
port. Even then, the penal system, which is susceptible to the
frailties of human nature, cannot ensure that California will
not execute the innocent or that it will not convict based on
race, geography, poverty, mental illness, or mere randomness.
At the very least, California must impose a moratorium
on executions while these problems are studied. The call for a
moratorium of executions throughout the death penalty
states has been surveyed by Jeffrey Kirchmeier in an article
published in the University of Colorado Law Review.4 6 A
moratorium on executions may engender emotion and politi-
cal debate. With a system as broken as California's, however,
what is needed is a rational and dispassionate look at what is
really happening in this state, around the country, and, for
that matter, the world.
645. See id.
646. Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Another Place Beyond Here: The Death Penalty
Moratorium Movement in the United States, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (2002).
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Appendix
The Illinois Recommendations: Comparison to California
Illinois Commission California Comments on
Report Compliance California LawRecommendation
Recommendation 1: Af- Ntrqie neter a suspect has been Not required under
current California law,identified, the police and current case law
should continue to pursue NOT MET excuses failure to pur-
all reasonable lines of in-quiry wheher hesesue leads, interview
quiry, whether these witnesses and collect
point towards or away evidence.
from the suspect.
Recommendation 2: (a)
The police must list on
schedules all existing
items of relevant evi-
dence, including exculpa-
tory evidence, and their
location. (b) Re-
cord-keeping obligations
must be assigned to spe-
cific police officers or em- NOT MET No requirement under
ployees, who must certify current California law.
their compliance in writ-
ing to the prosecutor. (c)
The police must give cop-
ies of the schedules to the
prosecution. (d) The police
must give the prosecutor
access to all investigatory
materials in their posses-
sion.
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Illinois Commission California Comments on
Report Compliance California Law
Recommendation
Recommendation 3: In a
death eligible case, repre-
sentation by the public
defender during a custo-
dial interrogation should
be authorized by the
[state] legislature when a
suspect requests the ad-
vice of counsel, and where
there is a reasonable be-
lief that the suspect is in-
digent. To the extent that
there is some doubt about
the indigency of the sus-
pect, police should resolve
the doubt in favor of al-
lowing the suspect to have
access to the public de-
fender.
NOT MET
No requirement under
current California law.
The public defender is
only appointed for
adults at the arraign-
ment. Therefore, invo-
cation of right to coun-
sel by an arrestee
results in returning
arrestee to custody un-
til arraignment. Ar-
restees often "voluntar-
ily" waive their right to
counsel while awaiting
arraignment. Also, it
is arguably permissible
for officers to deliber-
ately violate Miranda
in order to obtain con-
fessions which can be
used for further inves-
tigation and impeach-
ment if the defendant
testifies.
Recommendation 4:
Custodial interrogations No requirement under
of a suspect in a homicide current California law.
case occurring at a police Video taping is com-
facility should be video- mon but not required.
taped. Videotaping should NOT MET Also, it is common to
not include merely the video tape only after
statement made by the preliminary discus-
suspect after interroga- sions with the defen-
tion, but the entire inter- dant have taken place.
rogation process.
Recommendation 5: Any
statements by a homicide
suspect which are not re- No requirement under
corded should be repeated NOT MET current California law.
to the suspect on tape,
and his or her comments
recorded.
202
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Illinois Commission California Comments on
Report Compliance California Law
Recommendation
Recommendation 6:
There are circumstances
in which videotaping may
not be practical, and some
uniform method of re-
cording such interroga-
tions, such as tape re-
cording, should be NOT MET No requirement under
established. Police inves- current California law.
tigators should carry tape
recorders for use when
interviewing suspects in
homicide cases outside
the station, and all such
interviews should be
audiotaped.
Recommendation 7: The
[state eavesdropping act] California Penal Code
should be amended to Section 633 allows a
permit police taping of blanket exception to
statements without the the California "eaves-
suspects' knowledge or dropping statutes" for
consent in order to enable law enforcement per-
the videotaping and audio sonnel or anyone act-
taping of statements as NOT MET ing at their direction.
recommended by the Therefore, there is no
Commission. The amend- restriction that the
ment should apply only to suspect be aware that
homicide cases, where the he is talking with a po-
suspect is aware that the lice officer or that, in
person asking the fact, the person be a
question is a police officer, police officer.
Recommendation 8: The
police should electroni-
cally record interviews
conducted of significant No requirement under
witnesses in homicide NOT MET current California law.
cases where it is reasona-
bly foreseeable that their
testimony may be chal-
lenged at trial.
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Report Cali n ce C o rna Ln
Recommendation Compliance California Law
Recommendation 9: Po-
lice should be required to
make a reasonable at-
tempt to determine the
suspect's mental capacity
before interrogation, and No requirement under
if a suspect is determined NOT MET current California law.
to be mentally retarded,
the police should be lim-
ited to asking nonleading
questions and prohibited
from implying they be-
lieve the suspect is guilty.
Recommendation 10: No requirement under
When practicable, police current California law.
departments should in- curre Cacticenia law.
sure that the person who Police practice is con-
conducts the lineup or NOT MET trary in that the inves-photsprad houl no betigating officers usu-
photospread should not be ally conduct the
aware of which member of identification proce-
the lineup or photo spread dures.
is the suspect.
Recommendation 11:
(a) Eyewitnesses should
be told explicitly that the
suspected perpetrator
might not be in the the No requirement under
lineup or photospread, current California law.
and therefore they should A requirement similar
not feel they must make NOT MET to (a) is often followed
an identification. bt is otequired
(b) Eyewitnesses should but is not required, and
also be told that they there is no require-
should not assume that ment similar to (b).
the person administering
the lineup or photospread
knows which person is the
suspect in the case.
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Illinois Commission California Comments on
Report Compliance California LawRecommendation
Recommendation 12: If
the administrator of the No requirement under
lineup or photospread current California law.
does not know who the (This writer believes
suspect is, a sequential that this recommenda-
procedure should be used, tion should be insti-
so that the eyewitness tuted only if the proce-
views only one lineup NOT MET dure is "double-blind"
member or photo at a since there would be a
time and makes a deci- greater risk of sug-
sion (that is the perpetra- gestibility if the admin-
tor or that is not the per- istrator knew the sus-
petrator) regarding each pect's identity and
person before viewing an- showed subjects to the
other lineup member or witness one at a time.)
photo.
Recommendation 13: No requirement under
Suspects should not stand current California law.
out in the lineup or photo Current case law may
spread as being different require suppression at
from the distractors, trial of an unduly sug-
based on the eyewit- gestive line-up or pho-
nesses' previous descrip- tospread. However,
tion of the perpetrator, or the specifics of this
based on other factors NOT MET recommendation are
that would draw attention not met. Also, research
to the suspect. shows that a false
identification at an im-
proper line-up or photo
spread can signifi-
cantly contaminate the
identifying witnesses'
testimony.
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Report Compliance California LawRecommendation
Recommendation 14: A
clear written statement
should be made of any
statements made by the
eyewitness at the time of No requirement under
the identification proce- current California law.
dure as to his or her con- NOT MET (See comment for Rec-
fidence that the identified ommendation 13 re-
person is or is not the ac- garding contamination
tual culprit. This state- of witness testimony.)
ment should be recorded
prior to any feedback by
law enforcement person-
nel.
Recommendation 15:
When practicable, the po-
lice should videotape NOT MET No requirement under
lineup procedures, includ- current California law.
ing the witness' confi-
dence statement.
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Illinois Commission California Comments on
Report Compliance California Law
Recommendation
Recommendation 16: All
police who work on homi-
cide cases should receive
periodic training in the
following areas, and ex-
perts on these subjects
should be retained to con-
duct training and prepare
manuals on these topics:
1. The risks of false tes-
timony by in-custody in-
formants ("jailhouse
snitches").
2. The risks of false tes-
timony by accomplice wit-
nesses.
3. The dangers of tunnel
vision or confirmatory
bias.
4. The risks of wrongful
convictions in homicide
cases.
5. Police investigative and
interrogation methods.
6. Police investigating
and reporting of exculpa-
tory evidence.
7. Forensic evidence.
8. The risks of false con-
fessions.
NOT MET No requirement under
current California law.
Recommendation 17: Po-
lice academies, police
agencies, and the [de-
partment of corrections] No requirement under
should include within current California law.
their training curricula NOT MET There may be some
information on consular training on this issue
rights and the notification but it is not mandatory
obligations to be followed nor is it universal.
during the arrest and de-
tention of foreign nation-
als.
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Report Compliance California LawRecommendation
Recommendation 18: The California Penal Code
[state attorney general] Section 834(c) now re-
should remind all law en- quires advisement of
forcement agencies of rires ademe
their notification obliga- rights under thetion undr te VinnaVCCR. It is unknown
tions under the Vienna how much discussion of
Convention on Consular this issue has occurred
Relations and undertake NOT MET or the extent to which
regular reviews of the it has reached the offi-
measures taken by state
and local police to ensure working on actual
full compliance. This cases. o n re-
could include publication quirement of regular
of a guide based on the reviews to ensure full
U.S. State Department compliance.
Manual.
Recommendation 19: The
statue relating to the
[state law enforcement
training standards board]
should be amended to add
police perjury (regardless NOT MET No requirement underof wethr thre s acurrent California law.
of whether there is a
criminal conviction) as a
basis upon which the
Board may revoke certifi-
cation of a peace officer.
Recommendation 20: An No requirement under
independent state foren- current California law.
sic laboratory should be The State of California
created, operated by civil- does have a State De-
ian personnel, with its partment of Justice Fo-
own budget, separate rensic Laboratory
from any policy agency or within its Division of
supervision. NOT MET Law Enforcement.
However, it is not in-
dependent and is used
selectively by law en-
forcement. It is not
available for use by the
defense, even on court
order.
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Report Compliance California LawRecommendation
Recommendation 21:
Adequate funding should
be provided by the [state]
to hire and train both en-
try level and supervisory
level forensic scientists to No requirement under
support expansion of DNA current California law.
testing and evaluation Some funding and out-
Support should also be NOT MET sourcing is available
provided for additional but not to the degree
up-to-date facilities for required by the rec-
DNA testing. The State ommendation.
should be prepared to
outsource by sending evi-
dence to private compa-
nies for analysis when
appropriate.
Recommendation 22: The
Commission supports the
[state supreme court rule] NOT MET No requirement under
establishing minimum current California law.
standards for DNA evi-
dence.
Recommendation 23: The
Federal government and No requirement under
[state] should provide current federal or state
adequate funding to en- NOT MET law. The proposed In-
able the development of a nocence Protection Act
comprehensive DNA da- has not been enacted.
tabase.
Recommendation 24:
[State] statutes should be
amended to provide that
in a capital case a defen-
dant may apply to the NOT MET No requirement under
court for an order to ob- current California law.
tain a search of the DNA
database to identify oth-
ers who may be guilty of
the crime.
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Report Compliance California LawRecommendation
Recommendation 25: In
capital cases forensic test-
ing, including DNA test- No requirement under
ing pursuant to [state current California law.
law], should be permitted California Penal Code
where it has a scientific Sections 1405 and
potential to produce new, NOT MET 1054.9(e), effective
noncummulative evidence January 1, 2003, ad-
relevant to the defen- Jany s, of the
dant's assertion of actual dress only some of the
innocence, even though mendation.
the results may not com-
pletely exonerate the de-
fendant.
Recommendation 26: The California Penal Code
provisions governing the Section 987.9 provides
Capital Litigation Trust for the funds for capital
Fund should be construed defense at the trial
broadly so as to provide a level in cases where
source of funding for fo- the defendant can
rensic testing pursuant to show indigence.
[state law] when the de- Individual trial court
fendant faces the possibil- MET WITH judges have wide dis-
ity of a capital sentence. QUALIFICATIONS cretion to grant or deny
... particular requests.
Furthermore, funds
available on direct ap-
peal and habeas corpus
proceedings are limited
and are insufficient for
expensive procedures
or complex cases.
Recommendation 27: The California currently
current list of 20 eligibil- has a list of 25 sepa-
ity factors should be re- rate eligibility factors
duced to a smaller num- under California Penal
ber. NOT MET Code Section 190.2 and
the additional sections
referred to in 190.3,
many of which have
subparts.
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Report Compliance California LawRecommendation
Recommendation 28:
There should be only five
eligibility factors: [murder
of multiple persons, mur-
der of a police officer or See comment for
firefighter, murder of an NOT MET Recommendation 27.
officer or inmate in a cor-
rectional institution,
murder to obstruct jus-
tice, and murder involv-
ing torture.]
Recommendation 29: The
[state attorney general]
and the [state's prosecu-
tor association] should There is great dispar-
adopt recommendations ity in the filing deci-
as to the procedures sions from county to
[prosecutors] should fol- NOT MET county in California,
low in deciding whether which gives rise to se-
or not to seek the death rious geographical de-
penalty, but these rec- nial of equal protec-
ommendations should not tion.
have the force of law, or
be imposed by court rule
or legislation.
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Recommendation 30: The
death sentencing statute
should be revised to in-
clude a mandatory review
of death eligibility under-
taken by a state-wide re-
view committee. In the
absence of legislative ac-
tion to make this a man-
datory scheme, the Gov-
ernor should make a
commitment to setting up
a voluntary review proc-
ess, supported by the pre-
sumption that the Gover-
nor will commute the
death sentences of defen-
dants when the prosecu-
tor has not participated in
the voluntary review
process, unless the prose-
cutor can offer a compel-
ling explanation, based on
exception circumstances,
for the failure to submit
the case for review....
Recommendation 31: The
Commission supports [Il-
linois] Supreme Court
Rule 416(c), requiring
that the state announce
its intention to seek the
death penalty, and the
factors to be relied upon,
as soon as practicable but
in no event later than 120
days after arraignment.
NOT MET
NOT MET
No requirement under
current California law.
No requirement under
current California law.
The death penalty it-
self can be elected at
almost any time by the
prosecutor and even
after initially declining
to pursue it. California
Penal Code Section
190.3 requires the
prosecution to disclose
aggravating evidence
within a "reasonable
time" prior to trial, but
there is no require-
ment its intention to
seek the death penalty
at a particular time or
to announce the factors
to be relied upon.
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Recommendation 32: The
[state supreme court]
should give consideration
to encouraging the [state
administrative office of No requirement under
the courts] to undertake a current California law
concerted effort to educate NOT MET although there is non-
trial judges throughoutjudicial
the state in the parame- education.
ters of the Capital Crimes
Litigation Act and the
funding sources available
for defense of capital
cases.
Recommendation 33: The
Commission supports [ex-
panded judicial training NOT MET No requirement under
be required prior to as- current California law.
signment of a capital case
to a judge.]
Recommendation 34: In
light of the changes in the
Illinois Supreme Court
rules governing the dis-
covery procedures capital
cases, the Supreme Court
should give consideration
to ways the Court can in- No requirement under
sure that particularized NOT MET current California law.
training is provided to
trial judges with respect
to implementation of the
new rules governing capi-
tal litigation, especially
with respect to the man-
agement of the discovery
process.
Recommendation 35: All
judges who are trying
capital cases should re-
ceive periodic training in
the following areas, and
experts on these subjects NOT MET No requirement under
should be retained to con- current California law.
duct training and prepare
manuals on these topics:
[same as topics required
for police in Recommen-
dation 16.]
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Recommendation 36: The
Illinois Supreme Court,
and the [administrative No requirement under
office of the courts] should current California law.
consider development of California has some
and provide sufficient NOT MET resources but training
funding for state-wide is not mandatory and
materials to train judges does not meet the rec-
in capital cases, and addi- ommendations.
tional staff to provide re-
search support.
Recommendation 37: The
Illinois Supreme Court
should consider ways in
which information regard-
ing relevant law and
other resources can be
widely disseminated to
those trying capital cases, No requirement under
through development of a NOT MET current California law.
digest of applicable law by
the Supreme Court and
wider publican of the out-
line of issues developed by
the State Appellate De-
fender or the State Appel-
late Prosecutor and/or At-
torney General.
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Recommendation 38: The
Illinois Supreme Court, or
the chief judges of the
various judicial districts
throughout the state,
should consider imple-
mentation of a process to
certify judges who are
qualified to hear capital
cases either by virtue of No requirement under
experience or training. NOT MET current California law.
Trial court judges should
be certified as qualified to
hear capital cases based
upon completion of spe-
cialized training and
based upon their experi-
ence in hearing criminal
cases. Only such certified
judges should hear capital
cases.
Recommendation 39: The
[state supreme court]
should consider appoint-
ment of a standing com-
mittee of trial judges
and/or appellate justices NOT MET No requirement under
familiar with capital current California law.
cases management to
provide resources to trial
judges throughout the
state who are responsible
for trying capital cases.
Recommendation 40: The No requirement under
Commission supports new current California law
Illinois Supreme Court regarding minimum
Rule 416(d) regarding qualifications for re-
qualifications for counsel tained counsel. There
in capital cases. NOT MET are minimum require-
ments for appointed
counsel at trial and on
direct appeal and ha-
beas corpus, but these
do not apply to re-
tained counsel.
216 SANTA CLARA LA WREVIEW [Vol: 44
Illinois Commission California Comments on
Report Compliance California Law
Recommendation
Recommendation 41: The
Commission supports new
Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 701(b) which im-
poses the requirement No requirement under
that those appearing as NOT MET current California law.
lead or co-counsel in a
capital case be first ad-
mitted to the Capital
Litigation Bar under Rule
714.
Recommendation 42: The
Commission supports new
Illinois Supreme Court See comment for
rule 714 which imposes NOT MET Secomment for
requirements on the Recommendation 40.
qualifications of attorneys
handling capital cases.
Recommendation 43: The
office of the State Appel-
late Defender should fa-
cilitate the dissemination No requirement under
of information with re- NOT MET current California law.
spect to defense counsel
qualified under the pro-
posed Supreme Court
process.
Recommendation 44: The No requirement under
commission supports ef- current California law,
forts to have training for particularly with re-
prosecutors and defenders spect to public funding.
in capital litigation, and Limited programs in
to have funding provided recent years have been
to insure that training funded and provided by
programs continue to be the Habeas Corpus Re-
of the highest quality, source Center. Private
NOT MET organizations, such as
the California Public
Defender's Association
and the California At-
torneys for Criminal
Justice, hold more ex-
tensive training ses-
sions which are avail-
able to capital case
defense lawyers.
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Recommendation 45: All
prosecutors and defense
lawyers who are members
of the Capital Trial Bar
who are trying capital
cases should receive peri-
odic training in the fol-
lowing areas, and experts NOT MET No requirement under
on these subjects should current California law.
be retained to conduct
training and prepare
manuals on these topics:
[same as topics required
for police and judges in
Recommendations 16 and
35.]
Recommendation 46: The
Commission supports new
Illinois Supreme Court No requirement under
rule 416(e) which permits NOT MET current California law.
discovery deposition in
capital cases on leave of
the court for good cause.
Recommendation 47: The
Commission supports the
provisions of the new Illi-
nois Supreme Court rule
416(f) mandating case
management conferences
in capital cases. The Illi-
nois Supreme Court
should consider adoption NOT MET No requirement under
of a rule requiring a final current California law.
case management confer-
ences in capital cases to
insure that there has
been compliance with the
newly mandated rules,
that discovery is complete
and that the case is fully
prepared for trial.
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Recommendation 48: The
Commission supports Illi-
nois Supreme Court Rule
416(g) which requires
that a certificate be filed
by the state indicating
that a conference has
been held with all those
persons who participated
in the investigation or
trial preparation of the
case, and that all the in-
formation required to be
disclosed has been dis-
closed.
NOT MET No requirement under
current California law.
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Recommendation 49: The
Illinois Supreme Court
should adopt a rule defin-
ing "exculpatory evidence"
in order to provide guid-
ance to counsel in making
appropriate disclosures.
The Commission recom-
mends the following defi-
nition: "Exculpatory in-
formation includes, but
may not be limited to, all
information that is mate-
rial and favorable to the
defendant because it
tends to: (1) Cast doubt on
defendant's guilt as to any
essential element in any
count in the indictment or
information; (2) Cast
doubt on the admissibility
of evidence that the state
anticipates offering in its
case-in-chief that might
be subject to a motion to
suppress or exclude; (3)
Cast doubt on the credi-
bility or accuracy of any
evidence that the state
anticipates offering in its
case-in-chief; or (4) Di-
minish the degree of the
defendant's culpability or
mitigate the defendant's
potential sentence.
NOT MET
No requirement under
current California law.
There is federal and
state case law on ex-
culpatory evidence but
no statute or rule
implementing the
broad definition con-
tained in the
recommendation re-
quiring disclosure.
2003]
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Recommendation 50: Il-
linois law should require
that any discussions with
a witness or the represen-
tative of a witness con-
cerning benefits, potential
benefits or detriments No requirement under
conferred on a witness by NOT MET current California law.
any prosecutor, police of-
ficial, corrections official,
or anyone else, should be
reduced to writing, and
should be disclosed to the
defense in advance of
trial.
Recommendation 51:
Whenever the state intro-
duces the testimony of an Disclosure is governed
in-custody informant who by federal law, e.g.,
has agreed to testify for Brady v. Maryland,
the prosecution in a capi- 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and
tal case to a statement by California Penal
allegedly made by the de- NOT MET Code Section 1054.1.
fendant, at either the Neither the timing nor
guilt or sentencing phase, the extent of disclosure
the state should promptly as recommended is re-
inform the defense as to quired under current
the identification and California law.
background of the wit-
ness.
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
Illinois Commission California Comments on
Report Compliance California LawRecommendation
Recommendation 52: (a)
Prior to trial, the trial
judge shall hold an evi-
dentiary hearing to de-
termine the reliability
and admissibility of the
in-custody informant's
testimony at either the
guilt or sentencing phase.
(b) at the pre-evidentiary
hearing, the trial judge
shall use the following
standards: ... (1) The
specific statements to
which the witness will
testify. (2) The time and
place, and other circum-
stances of the alleged
statements. (3) Any deal
or inducement made by
the informant and the po-
lice or prosecutor in ex-
change for the witness'
testimony. (4) The crimi-
nal history of the witness.
(5) Whether the witness
has ever recanted his/her
testimony. (6) Other cases
in which the witness testi-
fied to alleged confessions
by others. (7) Any other
evidence that may attest
to or diminish the credi-
bility of the witness, in-
cluding the presence or
absence of any relation-
ship between the accused
and the witness....
NOT MET
California Evidence
Code Section 402 pro-
vides for an in limine
hearing on the admis-
sibility of evidence.
However, current Cali-
fornia law does not re-
quire the court to con-
sider the criteria set
forth.
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Recommendation 53: In
capital cases, courts
should closely scrutinize
any tactic that misleads
the suspect as to the
strength of the evidence
against him/her, or the NOT MET No requirement under
likelihood of his/her guilt, current California law.
in order to determine
whether this tactic would
be likely to introduce an
involuntary or untrust-
worthy confession.
Recommendation 54: The
Commission makes no
recommendation about
whether or not plea nego-
tiations should be re-
stricted with respect to
the death penalty.
NOT MET
While the Commission
could not come to a
specific recommenda-
tion on restrictions on
coercive plea bargain-
ing, it did so in the con-
text of its other rec-
ommendations being
adopted. First, there
are no restrictions on
coercive plea bargain-
ing in California of the
sort contemplated in
the Report. Second, the
failure to make specific
recommendations was
premised specifically
on the prior recom-
mendations that (a) the
eligibility factors be
limited to five (there
are at least 25 under
California law) and (b)
there be a review proc-
ess on the selection of
cases for death. There-
fore, California fails to
meet these criteria and
is susceptible to the
abuse of coercive plea
bargaining addressed
in this section of the
Report.
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Recommendation
Recommendation 55:
Expert testimony with
respect to the problem as- No requirement under
sociated with eyewitness current California
testimony may be helpful statutory law. The re-
in appropriate cases. De- CONSTITUTIONALLY quirement appears to
terminations as to REQUIRED be mandated by the
whether such evidence Sixth and Fourteenth
may be admitted should Amendments and Cali-
be resolved by the trial fornia case law.
judge on a case by case
basis.
Recommendation 56: No requirement under
Jury instructions with current California law.
respect to eyewitness tes- California Jury In-
timony should enumerate structions - Criminal
factors for the jury to con- (CALJIC) 2.92 does
sider, including the diffi- contain some criteria
culty of making a for evaluating eyewit-
cross-racial identification. ness identifications. It
The [model jury instruc- is not required to be
tions] should also be given sua sponte, it is
amended to add a final limited to cases where
sentence which states as there is "no substantial
follows: Eyewitness tes- corroborative evi-
timony should be care- dence," and it does not
fully examined in light of contain the cautionary
other evidence in the case. admonition.
Recommendation 57: The
[state committee on pat-
tern criminal jury in-
structions] should con- No requirement under
sider a jury instruction NOT MET current California law.
providing special caution
with respect to the reli-
ability of the testimony of
in-custody informants.
Recommendation 58: [A
special jury should be NOT MET No requirement under
given when a confession is current California law.
not recorded.]
Recommendation 59: I- Seemingly required by
linois courts should con- the Sixth and Four-
tinue to reject the results teenth Amendments.
of polygraph examination MET However, there is some
during the innocence/guilt dispute in other states
phase of capital trials. and California case law
does meet this re-
quirement.
224 SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW [Vol: 44
Illinois Commission California Comments on
Report Compliance California LawRecommendation
Recommendation 60: The California Penal Code
Commission supports the Section 190.3 requires
new amendments to [Illi- discovery to be pro-
nois] Supreme Court Rule MET WITH vided to the defense,
[611] which makes the QUALIFICATIONS however, the timing
rules of discovery applica- and detail of the Illi-
ble to the sentencing nois Rule is more fa-
phase of capital cases. vorable to the defense.
Recommendation 61: The California Penal Code
mitigating factors consid- Section 190.3 (d) and
ered by the jury in the (h) present mental
death penalty sentencing health issues to the
scheme should be ex- jury, however, there is
panded to include the de- no provision to specifi-
fendant's history of ex- cally include the "de-
treme emotional or fendant's history of ex-
physical abuse, and that treme emotional or
the defendant suffers physical abuse." Sec-
from reduced mental ca- NOT MET tion 190.3 (k) is a catch
pacity. all provision required
under the federal Con-
stitution to cover other
mitigating evidence.
To the extent that this
recommendation goes
beyond that which is
required by the federal
Constitution, it is not
met.
Recommendation 62: The
defendant should have
the right to make a There is no right to al-
statement on his own be- NOT MET locution under current
half during the aggrava- California law.
tion/mitigation phase,
without being subject to
cross-examination.
Recommendation 63: The
jury should be instructed This recommendation
as to the alternative sen- CONSTITUTIONALLY follows the federal re-
tences that may be im- REQUIRED quirement under Kel-
posed in the event that ley v. South Carolina
the death penalty is not 534 U.S. 246 (2002).
imposed.
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Recommendation
Recommendation 64:
[The state] courts should California case law still
continue to reject the re- prohibits the introduc-
sults of polygraph exami- MET tion of polygraph re-
nations during the sen- ts at poly g .
tencing phase of capital suits at sentencing.
trials.
Recommendation 65: The
statute which establishes
the method by which the
jury should arrive at its CALJIC 8.88 states,
sentence should be "To return a judgment
amended to include lan- of death, each of you
guage... to make it clear must be persuaded
that the jury should that the aggravating
weigh factors in the case circumstances are so
and reach its own inde- substantial in compari-
pendent conclusion about MET son with the mitigating
whether the death pen- circumstances that it
alty should be imposed. warrants death instead
The statute should be of life without parole."
amended to read as fol- The term "unani-
lows: If the jury unani- mously" is not used but
mously, after weighing unanimity is required
the factors in aggravation by this instruction.
and mitigation, that
death is the appropriate
sentence....
Recommendation 66: Af- California Penal Code
ter the jury renders its Section 190.4(e) re-
judgment with respect to quires the trial judge
the imposition of the to reweigh the evidence
death penalty, the trial presented to the pen-
judge should be required alty phase jury. How-
to indicate on the record althe juge How-
whether he or she concurs ever, the judge decides
in the result. In cases contrary to the law or
where the trial judge does NOT MET the evidence. This
not concur in the imposi- standard is more lib-
tion of the death penalty, eral than that applied
the defendant shall be era tin for ne
sentenced to natural life trial but is not the
as a mandatory alterna- sal as ing
tive (assuming adoption of whether or not the
a new death penalty judge concurs in the
scheme limited to five verdict of death.
eligibility factors). verdict of death.
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Recommendation 67: In After a finding of spe-
any case approved for cial circumstances in
capital punishment under California, the two sen-
the new death penalty tencing options are
scheme with five eligibil- death or life without
ity factors, if the finder of possibility of parole.
fact determines that However, the recom-
death is not the appropri- NOT MET mendation of "natural
ate sentence, the manda- life" in Illinois would
tory alternative sentence be limited to the five
would be natural life. eligibility factors
whereas there are over
25 under Penal Code
Section 190.2 and the
sections referred to in
190.3.
Recommendation 68:
[The state] should adopt a
statute which prohibits
the imposition of the The recommendation is
death penalty for those CONSTITUTIONALLY consistutionally man-
defendants found to be REQUIRED dated by Atkins v. Vir-
mentally retarded. The ginia 536 U.S. 304
best model to follow in (2002).
terms of specific language
is that found in the Ten-
nessee statute.
Recommendation 69:
[The state] should adopt a
statute which provides: A.
The uncorroborated tes-
timony of an in-custody
informant witness
concerning the confession
or admission of the defen-
dant may not be the sole No requirement under
basis for the imposition of NOT MET current California law.
the death penalty. B.
Convictions for murder
based upon the testimony
of a single eyewitness or
accomplice without any
other corroboration,
should not be death eligi-
ble under any circum-
stances.
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Recommendation 70: In
capital cases the [state] No requirement under
Supreme Court should current California law
consider on direct appeal to do a proportionality
(1) whether the sentence review. There is an
was imposed due to some independent weighing
arbitrary factor, (2) of sorts by the trial
whether an independent judge under Penal
weighing of the aggravat- NOT MET Code Section 190.4(e).
ing and mitigating cir- However, the
cumstances indicates recommendation that
death was the proper sen- the Supreme Court re-
tence, and (3) whether the weigh in addition to
sentence of death was ex- the trial court's concur-
cessive or disproportion- rence is not followed in
ate to the penalty im- California.
posed in similar cases.
Recommendation 71: There are no special
Rule 3.8 of the Illinois rules of professional
Supreme Court Rules of conduct promulgated
Professional Conduct by the California Su-
[ABA Model Rule 3.9], preme Court for prose-
Special Responsibilities of cutors. State and fed-
a Prosecutor, should be eral case law suggests
amended in paragraph (c) that prosecutors are
by the addition of [lan- held to higher stan-
guage concerning the on- dards. California Pe-
going duty to turn over nal Code Sections
exculpatory information]. NOT MET 1054.9(a) and (b) were
added, effective Janu-
ary 1, 2003, permitting
post-conviction discov-
ery upon request and a
showing of good cause.
However, there is no
rule creating an on-
going ethical duty upon
the prosecution to turn
over excuplatory in-
formation.
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Recommendation 72: The The Illinois Commis-
Post-Conviction Hearing sion recommends that
Act should be amended to the time for filing a
provide that a petition for post-conviction petition
a post-conviction proceed- (a Petition for Writ of
ing in a capital case Habeas Corpus in Cali-
should be filed within 6 fornia) be after the di-
months after the issuance rect appeal is con-
of the mandate by the Su- cluded. California
preme Court following NOT MET Supreme Court Policy
affirmance of the direct 3:1-1.1 requires that
appeal from the trial, the Petition be filed
180 days after the Re-
ply Brief is due on di-
rect appeal. The prac-
tical effect, however, is
still to require the fil-
ing of the Petition be-
fore the direct appeal is
concluded.
Recommendation 73: The
Illinois Post-Conviction There is no time period
Hearing Act should be under current Califor-
amended to provide that nia law and, more im-
the trial court should con- NOT MET portantly, no require-
vene the evidentiary hear- ment of an evidentiary
ing on the petition within hearing at all.
one year of the date the
petition is filed.
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 229
Illinois Commission California Comments on
Report C
Recommendation Compliance California Law
Recommendation 74: The
Post-Conviction Hearing
Act should be amended to
provide that in capital
cases, a proceeding may
be initiated in cases in
which there is newly dis-
covered evidence which
offers a substantial basis
to believe that the defen-
dant is actually innocent,
and such proceedings
should be available at any
time following the defen-
dant's conviction regard-
less of other provisions of
the Act limiting the time
within such proceedings
can be initiated. In order
to prevent frivolous peti-
tions, the Act should pro-
vide that in proceedings
asserting a claim of actual
innocence, the court may
make an initial determi-
nation with or without a
hearing that the claim is
frivolous.
NOT MET
There is no require-
ment under current
California law. A Peti-
tion for Writ of Coram
Nobis (or Vobis) may
be filed under common
law but is disfavored
by the courts. Bars to
successive litigation
effectively defeat the
recommendation's pur-
pose.
Recommendation 75: The California Consti-
[State] law should provide tution, Article 8, Sec-
that after all appeals tion V, has been inter-
have been exhausted and preted to provide the
the Attorney General ap- Governor with the
plies for a final execution power to grant clem-
date for the defendant, a NOT MET ency in death penalty
clemency petition may not cases. California Penal
be filed later than 30 days Code Sections 4800 et
after the date [after the seq. set forth proce-
setting of] an execution dures primarily for
date. non-death cases. The
procedure is almost
entirely discretionary.
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Recommendation 76: Some attention is being
Leaders in both the ex- giv ento isbeingecutive and legislative given to capital case
bracuties shod legitie litigation by the legis-branches should signifi- lative and executive
cantly improve the re- NOT MET branches but actual
sources available to the reforms are not being
criminal justice system in implemented as con-
order to permit the mean- impl ted as con-iguimlmnainof templated by the Illi-
ingful implementation ofnois Commission.
reforms in capital cases. noisCommission.
Recommendation 77: Because California
The Capital Crimes Liti- does not have such an
gation Act,... which is Act and, it could be ar-
the state statute contain- gued that recommen-
ing the Capital Litigation dation is not met. On
Trust Fund and other NOT APPLICABLE the other hand, this is
provisions, should be re- arguably peculiar to
authorized by the General Illinois and, therefore,
Assembly. the recommendation
should be deemed in-
applicable.
Recommendation 78: The Hourly rates for ap-
Commission supports the pointed counsel at the
concept articulated in the trial and appellate lev-
statute governing the els are far below the
Capital Litigation Trust rates earned by compe-
Fund, that adequate com- tent private criminal
pensation be provided to defense counsel. Fur-
trial counsel in capital thermore, the courts,
cases for both time and NOT MET and in particular the
expense, and encourages California Supreme
regular consideration of Court, routinely reduce
the hourly rates author- the number of hours
ized under the statute to for which they will
reflect the actual market provide compensation
rates of private attorneys, resulting in substantial
underpayment of coun-
sel.
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Recommendation 79:
The provisions of the
Capital Litigation Trust
Fund should be construed
as broadly as possible to
insure that public defend-
ers, particularly those in
rural parts of the state,
can effectively use its
provisions to secure addi-
tional counsel and reim-
bursement of all reason-
able trial related expenses
in capital cases.
Recommendation 80: The
work of the State Appel-
late Defender's office in
providing statewide trial
support in Capital Cases
should continue, and
funds should be appropri-
ate for this purpose.
NOT MET
NOT MET
There is no require-
ment in current Cali-
fornia law that there
be no disparity be-
tween areas within the
state. California Penal
Code Section 987.9 pro-
vides a basis for an
application by public
defenders throughout
the state for experts,
investigators and oth-
ers, including second
counsel. However,
there is no provision to
accommodate other
trial related expenses
which might place a
significant burden on
small or rural public
defender offices. In
addition, the applica-
tion for these funds is
subject to the discre-
tion of the local judges
to a certain extent.
The California State
Public Defender's Of-
fice and CAP are both
understaffed and
underfunded. Despite
that fact, both do an
outstanding job of as-
sisting other capital
counsel. However,
their efforts are largely
focused on appointed
appellate and habeas
counsel, leaving sup-
port and education to
largely privately
funded organizations
such as CPDA and
CACJ.
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Recommendation 81: The
Commission supports the
recommendation in the Under current Califor-
Report of the Task Force nia law, public defend-
on Professional Practice ers and prosecutors
in the Illinois Justice Sys- receive some assistance
tem to reduce the burden on student loans. Pri-NOT MET vt ayrwoba
of student loans on those vate lawyers, who bear
entering criminal justice the burden of a large
careers and improve sal- part of the capital liti-
ary levels and pension gation in California,
contributions for those in receive no assistance.
the system in order to in-
sure qualified counsel.
Recommendation 82:
Adequate funding should Police agencies receive
be provided by the [state] state money in various
to all [state] police agen- forms but none is ear-
cies to pay for the elec- NOT MET marked specifically for
tronic recording equip- these purposes (to the
ment, personnel and thee of the
facilities needed to con- knowledge of this
duct electronic recordings wrter).
in homicide cases.
Recommendation 83: The California law does not
Commission strongly meet the recommenda-
urges consideration of tions regarding capital
ways to broaden the ap- cases and, therefore,
plication of many of the NOT MET there is no attempt to
recommendations made broaden the applica-
by the Commission to im- tion of such recom-
prove the criminal justice mendations to non-
system as a whole. capital cases.
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Recommendation 84: In-
formation should be col-
lected at the trial level
with respect to prosecu-
tions of first degree mur-
der cases, by trial judges,
which would detail
information that could
prove valuable in assess-
ing whether the death
penalty is, in fact, being
fairly applied. Data
should be collected on a
form which provides de-
tails about the trial, the
background of the defen-
dant, and the basis for the
sentence imposed. The
forms should be collected
by the [state's ad-
ministrative office of the
courts], and the form from
an individual case should
not be a public record.
Data collected from the
forms should be public,
and should be maintained
in a public access
database by the Criminal
Justice Information Au-
thoritv.
NOT MET
Some data is collected
but (to the knowledge
of this writer) no sys-
tematic collection of
data on the details of
capital cases is or has
been conducted.
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Report Compliance California Law
Recommendation
Recommendation 85: Cannon D(2) of the
Judges should be re- California Code of Ju-
minded of their obligation dicial Ethics suggests
under Canon 3 to report that a judge has an
violations of the Rules of ethical duty to "take
Professional Conduct by appropriate corrective
prosecutors and defense action" if the judge has
lawyers. personal knowledge
that a lawyer has
committed a violation
of the Rules of Profes-
NOT MET sional Conduct. There
is no duty to report the
violations to the State
Bar or to take any
other specific action
unless a defense law-
yer has been found to
have provided ineffec-
tive assistance of coun-
sel. There is no similar
provision pertaining to
prosecutors.
TOTALS NOT MET: 76
MET: 3
MET WITH
QUALIFICATIONS: 2
CONSTITUTIONALLY
REQUIRED: 3
NOT APPLICABLE: 1
COMPLIANCE: 5 OF
81=6.17%
